Campaign Finance Deregulation and the Hyperpolarization of Presidential Nominations in the Super PAC Era

2020 ◽  
pp. 260-278
Author(s):  
Michael S. Kang
2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (04) ◽  
pp. 709-715 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne P. Steger

ABSTRACTThe 2016 Republican presidential nomination challenges arguments about political party insiders’ influence on the outcome. This article argues, first, that party insider influence is conditional on the participation, coalescence, and timing of party stakeholders behind a front-runner during the invisible primary, and second, that party insider influence has probably declined since the 2000 presidential election. Data on endorsements by elite elected officials in open presidential nominations from 1984 to 2016 show that party insiders’ participation and convergence of support behind the front-runner is less extensive than what was found by Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller (2008), though the data sets differ. Party insiders participate and unify more readily when the party coalition is stable and there is a candidate in the race who has demonstrable national support. Party elites remain on the sidelines when the party coalition is divided or when there is uncertainty about the appeal of candidates (Ryan 2011; Whitby 2014). The potency of insider endorsements likely has declined with the rise of social media, the changing campaign finance landscape, and the reemergence of populism in each party.


2020 ◽  
pp. 39-62
Author(s):  
Maciej Turek

The aim of the paper is to analyze the relationship between campaign money and winning the 2016 and 2020 presidential nominations in the United States. While in the last two decades of the twentieth century candidates who raised most money almost always became major party nominees, the record is mixed for presidential cycles 2004-2012. By comparing various dimensions of campaign finance, including activities of candidates' campaign committees and outside groups, the Author demonstrates that while successful fundraising, resulting in dozens of millions of dollars at the disposal of candidates, seems necessary to run a competitive campaign, raising the most money is no longer pre-requisite for becoming major party presidential nominee.


The Forum ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Dwyre ◽  
Evelyn Braz

AbstractSuper PACs can raise and spend money in unlimited amounts, but what do they do with their money? What goals do super PACs pursue in allocating their money? We analyze how super PACS spent their money in the 2012 federal elections. What principles guided super PAC spending strategies? Do they follow strategies similar to traditional PACs? We argue that their spending patterns have changed the dynamics of federal campaign finance by directing more funds to individual candidate races than in the past, particularly through candidate-specific super PACs. We find that most super PACs spend their money differently than conventional PACs in that they are less interested in access to sitting lawmakers and more focused on an electoral strategy to affect the partisan composition of government. Thus many super PACs behave more like political parties than traditional PACs.


2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce W. Hardy ◽  
Jeffrey A. Gottfried ◽  
Kenneth M. Winneg ◽  
Kathleen Hall Jamieson
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Necmi Avkiran ◽  
Direnn Kanol ◽  
Barry R. Oliver
Keyword(s):  

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