Instream Rights and Groundwater Extraction

Riverflow ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 134-156
1979 ◽  
Vol 10 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 171-190
Author(s):  
Pertti Lahermo ◽  
Jouko Parviainen

In this study the changes in the quality of groundwater are described on the basis of material collected at some groundwater extraction plants situated mainly in urban areas. The causes of the marked increase in the content of dissolved solids are evaluated from the 1960s onwards.


1979 ◽  
Vol 84 (B2) ◽  
pp. 603 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Holzer ◽  
Stanley N. Davis ◽  
Ben E. Lofgren

2006 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroyasu OHTSU ◽  
Noppadol PHIENWEJ ◽  
Nutthapon SUPAWIWAT ◽  
Kenji TAKAHASHI ◽  
Hiroaki IZUMI

Author(s):  
Alain Jean-Marie ◽  
Mabel Tidball ◽  
Víctor Bucarey López

We consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon dynamic game of groundwater extraction. A Water Agency charges an extraction cost to water users and controls the marginal extraction cost so that it depends not only on the level of groundwater but also on total water extraction (through a parameter [Formula: see text] that represents the degree of strategic interactions between water users) and on rainfall (through parameter [Formula: see text]). The water users are selfish and myopic, and the goal of the agency is to give them incentives so as to improve their total discounted welfare. We look at this problem in several situations. In the first situation, the parameters [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are considered to be fixed over time. The first result shows that when the Water Agency is patient (the discount factor tends to 1), the optimal marginal extraction cost asks for strategic interactions between agents. The contrary holds for a discount factor near 0. In a second situation, we look at the dynamic Stackelberg game where the Agency decides at each time what cost parameter they must announce. We study theoretically and numerically the solution to this problem. Simulations illustrate the possibility that threshold policies are good candidates for optimal policies.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrin Karner ◽  
Hermine Mitter ◽  
Erwin Schmid

<p>In the semi-arid Seewinkel region in Austria, competing demands exist for land and water such as from agriculture, nature protection, tourism and settlements. In addition, water quality problems are prevalent due to nitrate leaching in groundwater in the region. Climate change likely will amplify existing resource demands and environmental impacts, imposing considerable challenges for adapting and regulating agriculture in the Seewinkel. Hence, compromises between competing policy objectives are needed. <br>The aim of this presentation is to assess efficient land and water management strategies considering several economic and agro-ecological policy objectives in the Seewinkel region in context of climate scenarios. A multi-objective optimization experiment was performed with an integrated modelling framework to compute agro-economic-ecological Pareto frontiers. The frontiers combine levels of (i) net benefits from agricultural production, (ii) groundwater extraction for agricultural irrigation, (iii) nitrate leaching from agricultural production, and (iv) topsoil organic carbon stocks. 30 stochastic realizations of three climate scenarios are considered for a future period of 31 years: WET, SIMILAR and DRY, which mainly differ regarding annual precipitation volumes. <br>Model results show that a 1% (20%) reduction of agricultural net benefits can lower groundwater extraction by 11-83% (61-100%) and nitrate leaching by 18-19% (49-53%) as well as increase topsoil organic carbon sequestration by 1% (5%) depending on the climate scenario. However, substantial changes in land use and management would be required. For instance, less groundwater extraction by 11-83% requires a 6-21% reduction of irrigated cropland, a 21-33% reduction of highly fertilized cropland, a 10-24% increase of grassland, and a 23-52% increase of abandoned land depending on the climate scenario. Less nitrate leaching by 18-19% (or higher topsoil organic carbon stocks by 1%) require that highly fertilized cropland decreases by 9-13% (4-7%), abandoned land increases by 5-9% (19-49%) and grassland either declines by 3% (14%) or increases by up to 5% (32%) depending on the climate scenario. In general, the share of grassland increases in the wetter climate scenario.<br>Overall, the analysis reveals that especially groundwater extraction and nitrate leaching can be reduced substantially for fairly small reduction in agricultural net benefits in all climate scenarios. 50% of maximum modelled improvements of agro-ecological objectives can be already achieved at 1-15% reductions of agricultural net benefit depending on climate scenarios. Thus, respective land use policies would allow considerable improvements of the agro-ecological performance at relatively low costs. However, improving the agro-ecological performance beyond a particular level can quickly lead to high reductions of agricultural net benefits, as depicted by the non-linear form of the Pareto frontiers. This is mainly related to large declines of cropland and increases in grassland or abandoned land. Furthermore, the results indicate that water management policies are less costly than climate change mitigation policies, at least in the Seewinkel region.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 105-129
Author(s):  
Achiransu Acharyya ◽  
Madhusudan Ghosh ◽  
Rabindra N. Bhattacharya

Based on village-level primary household survey in three districts of West Bengal, the present study tries to understand the groundwater market structure using the standard market theory. Comparing the internal rate of return of private investors on groundwater irrigation with past studies, it is found that although the degree of monopoly has gone down in the state over time, a certain element of monopoly still exists in the groundwater market. The estimates of price-to-marginal cost ratios and the Lerner index amply demonstrate the existence of high degree of monopoly in groundwater market. The study also shows that since banks give loans based on collateral, it is the large farmland owners who benefit from these bank loans for installation of electric submersibles for groundwater irrigation. Factors such as availability of rain and canal water, advance payment for water, distance of the land from the irrigation source, and maintenance and labour cost of water extraction mechanism also affect the price of water. As the groundwater extraction increases, it leads to lowering of the groundwater table leading to increasing cost for the water seller who in effect transfers the increasing cost to price leading to a rise in groundwater prices. This is a cause of concern not only for the small and marginal farmers but also for the sustainability of groundwater. JEL Classifications: Q15, D42, Q21


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