The Stackelberg Games of Water Extraction with Myopic Agents

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Jean-Marie ◽  
Mabel Tidball ◽  
Víctor Bucarey López
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Water Extraction ◽  
Discount Factor ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Groundwater Extraction ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Water Users ◽  
Threshold Policies

We consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon dynamic game of groundwater extraction. A Water Agency charges an extraction cost to water users and controls the marginal extraction cost so that it depends not only on the level of groundwater but also on total water extraction (through a parameter [Formula: see text] that represents the degree of strategic interactions between water users) and on rainfall (through parameter [Formula: see text]). The water users are selfish and myopic, and the goal of the agency is to give them incentives so as to improve their total discounted welfare. We look at this problem in several situations. In the first situation, the parameters [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are considered to be fixed over time. The first result shows that when the Water Agency is patient (the discount factor tends to 1), the optimal marginal extraction cost asks for strategic interactions between agents. The contrary holds for a discount factor near 0. In a second situation, we look at the dynamic Stackelberg game where the Agency decides at each time what cost parameter they must announce. We study theoretically and numerically the solution to this problem. Simulations illustrate the possibility that threshold policies are good candidates for optimal policies.

Deterioration in the Water Quality of Groundwater in Some Municipal Water Extraction Plants in Finland

1979 ◽  
Vol 10 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 171-190
Author(s):  
Pertti Lahermo ◽  
Jouko Parviainen
Keyword(s):  
Water Quality ◽  
Urban Areas ◽  
Water Extraction ◽  
Groundwater Extraction ◽  
Dissolved Solids ◽  
Municipal Water ◽  
The 1960S

In this study the changes in the quality of groundwater are described on the basis of material collected at some groundwater extraction plants situated mainly in urban areas. The causes of the marked increase in the content of dissolved solids are evaluated from the 1960s onwards.

scholarly journals A Dynamic Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain for a Corporate Social Responsibility

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Ferrara ◽  
Mehrnoosh Khademi ◽  
Mehdi Salimi ◽  
Somayeh Sharifi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Corporate Social

In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a supply chain in a decentralized state which includes a supplier and a manufacturer. For analyzing supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members of the supply chain, we formulate a model that crosses through multiperiods with the help of a dynamic discrete Stackelberg game which is made under two different information structures. We obtain an equilibrium point at which both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken up by supply chains are maximized.

Game Theoretic Study of Cooperative Spectrum Leasing in Cognitive Radio Networks

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fatemeh Afghah ◽  
Abolfazl Razi
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Radio ◽  
Cognitive Radio Networks ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Search Space ◽  
Radio Networks ◽  
Cooperative Relaying ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Secondary Users ◽  
Spectrum Leasing

In this paper, a novel property-right spectrum leasing solution based on Stackelberg game is proposed for Cognitive Radio Networks (CRN), where part of the secondary users present probabilistic dishonest behavior. In this model, the Primary User (PU) as the spectrum owner allows the Secondary User (SU) to access the shared spectrum for a fraction of time in exchange for providing cooperative relaying service by the SU. A reputation based mechanism is proposed that enables the PU to monitor the cooperative behavior of the SUs and restrict its search space at each time slot to the secondary users that do not present dishonest behavior in the proceeding time slots. The proposed reputation-based solution outperforms the classical Stackelberg games from both primary and reliable secondary users' perspectives. This novel method of filtering out unreliable users increases the PU's expected utility over consecutive time slots and also encourages the SUs to follow the game rule.

Integrating Prospect Theory and Stackelberg Games to Model Strategic Dyad Behavior of Information Providers and Travelers

2005 ◽  
Vol 1926 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Han ◽  
Benedict G. C. Dellaert ◽  
W. Fred Van Raaij ◽  
Harry J. P. Timmermans
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Specific Activity ◽  
Face Validity ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Start Time ◽  
Policy Objective ◽  
Optimal Guidance ◽  
Activity Schedule ◽  
The Face

Existing policy models of optimal guidance strategies are typically concerned with single-objective optimization based on reliable forecasts in terms of the consistency between predicted and observed aggregate activity–travel patterns. The interaction and interdependencies between policy objective and individuals have not received much attention. This paper considers how one specific activity schedule choice–-namely, the start time of an activity chosen by individual travelers under guidance information–-aggregates to form an equilibrium distribution, which in turn influences guidance generation and determines the best possible achievement of the policy objective. These choices are formalized as the outcomes of a Stackelberg game in which a traveler's behavior model is integrated with prospect theory. The properties of the model are examined by using numerical computer simulations. The results of the simulations support the face validity of the formulated model.

scholarly journals Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport Security

AI Magazine ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Pita ◽  
Manish Jain ◽  
Fernando Ordóñez ◽  
Christopher Portway ◽  
Milind Tambe ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Los Angeles ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Airport Security ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Mixed Initiative ◽  
Airport Terminals

Security at major locations of economic or political importance is a key concern around the world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times, which allows adversaries to observe and exploit patterns in selective patrolling or monitoring, e.g. they can plan an attack avoiding existing patrols. Hence, randomized patrolling or monitoring is important, but randomization must provide distinct weights to different actions based on their complex costs and benefits. To this end, this paper describes a promising transition of the latest in multi-agent algorithms into a deployed application. In particular, it describes a software assistant agent called ARMOR (Assistant for Randomized Monitoring over Routes) that casts this patrolling/monitoring problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game, allowing the agent to appropriately weigh the different actions in randomization, as well as uncertainty over adversary types. ARMOR combines two key features: (i) It uses the fastest known solver for Bayesian Stackelberg games called DOBSS, where the dominant mixed strategies enable randomization; (ii) Its mixed-initiative based interface allows users to occasionally adjust or override the automated schedule based on their local constraints. ARMOR has been successfully deployed since August 2007 at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) to randomize checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals. This paper examines the information, design choices, challenges, and evaluation that went into designing ARMOR.

scholarly journals Receding HorizonH∞Control for Input-Delayed Systems

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Woong Yoo ◽  
Soohee Han ◽  
Young Sam Lee
Keyword(s):  
External Disturbance ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Problem ◽  
Initial Condition ◽  
Performance Bound ◽  
Delayed Systems ◽  
Prediction Horizon ◽  
Quadratic Cost ◽  
Nonzero Initial Condition

We propose the receding horizonH∞control (RHHC) for input-delayed systems. A new cost function for a finite horizon dynamic game problem is first introduced, which includes two terminal weighting terms parameterized by a positive definite matrix, called a terminal weighing matrix. Secondly, the RHHC is obtained from the solution to the finite dynamic game problem. Thirdly, we propose an LMI condition under which the saddle point value satisfies the nonincreasing monotonicity. Finally, we show the asymptotic stability andH∞boundedness of the closed-loop system controlled by the proposed RHHC. The proposed RHHC has a guaranteedH∞performance bound for nonzero external disturbances and the quadratic cost can be improved by adjusting the prediction horizon length for nonzero initial condition and zero disturbance, which is not the case for existing memoryless state-feedback controllers. It is shown through a numerical example that the proposed RHHC is stabilizing and satisfies the infinite horizonH∞performance bound. Furthermore, the performance in terms of the quadratic cost is shown to be improved by adjusting the prediction horizon length when there exists no external disturbance with nonzero initial condition.

scholarly journals Historical analysis of a karst aquifer: recharge, water extraction, and consumption dynamics on a tourist island (Cozumel, Mexico)

2021 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 16
Author(s):  
Gerardo Hernández-Flores ◽  
Martha Angélica Gutiérrez-Aguirre ◽  
Adrián Cervantes-Martínez ◽  
Ana Elizabeth Marín-Celestino
Keyword(s):  
Catchment Area ◽  
Water Resource Management ◽  
Karst Aquifer ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Water Extraction ◽  
Groundwater Extraction ◽  
Aquifer Recharge ◽  
Monthly Data ◽  
Cozumel Island ◽  
Increasing Trends

On Cozumel Island, access to freshwater depends on the extraction of the resource from the aquifer located north of the island (catchment area). Water resource management on the island must be based on updated knowledge of the indicator dynamics related to the recharge of the aquifer, groundwater extraction and the distribution of the resource. In this study, trends, variations and time series of 30 years of monthly data for precipitation, temperature, evapotranspiration, and estimated aquifer recharge were calculated for the catchment area. Additionally, groundwater extraction, water consumption for the main uses over a 13-year period (monthly data), and the 5-year status of wells were considered. The results show decreasing trends in precipitation and estimated recharge volumes in the catchment area, in addition to increasing trends in mean air temperature, evapotranspiration, water extraction volumes and consumption by the commercial sector for the considered time periods. Additionally, an increase in dejected (77%) and reposed (38%) wells within the catchment area was observed. Evidence from this study suggests a dynamic behaviour of the analysed indicators over time that increases pressure on karstic, Caribbean aquifers for which monthly monitoring and data analysis are encouraged as the basis for adequate management.

scholarly journals Differential Privacy for Stackelberg Games

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferdinando Fioretto ◽  
Lesia Mitridati ◽  
Pascal Van Hentenryck
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Original Problem ◽  
Differential Privacy ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Privacy Preserving ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Sensitive Information ◽  
Near Optimality

This paper introduces a differentially private (DP) mechanism to protect the information exchanged during the coordination of sequential and interdependent markets. This coordination represents a classic Stackelberg game and relies on the exchange of sensitive information between the system agents. The paper is motivated by the observation that the perturbation introduced by traditional DP mechanisms fundamentally changes the underlying optimization problem and even leads to unsatisfiable instances. To remedy such limitation, the paper introduces the Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM), a framework that enforces the notions of feasibility and fidelity (i.e. near-optimality) of the privacy-preserving information to the original problem objective. PPSM complies with the notion of differential privacy and ensures that the outcomes of the privacy-preserving coordination mechanism are close-to-optimality for each agent. Experimental results on several gas and electricity market benchmarks based on a real case study demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. A full version of this paper [Fioretto et al., 2020b] contains complete proofs and additional discussion on the motivating application.

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