scholarly journals The Carbon Footprint of the Games – International Climate Change Law and the Olympics

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 362-367
Author(s):  
Rebecca Schmidt

Olympic Games do not happen in a vacuum or a sports bubble. They are embedded in both local and global realities of a social, economic, and environmental nature. Environmental factors, in particular, have impacted the Olympic Movement for several decades. In this context, climate change is a more recent, yet increasingly important, issue on the agenda. This essay examines the Olympic Movement's multi-level climate change policy. Based on the goals established in the Paris Agreement, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) launched the Sports for Climate Action Initiative in 2018. In the context of the Olympics, this Initiative is implemented through the interplay between the IOC and actors at the local, host city level. Consequently, the system is highly dependent on local organizers’ capabilities to meet the Initiative's ambitious targets, as well as on the IOC's willingness and ability to take an active role in steering and supporting host cities in this process.

Subject Climate change policy views in Russia. Significance After years of delay, the Russian government has acceded to the Paris Agreement to limit global warming. This is a positive step, although the decision is more symbolism than substance. Moscow's obligations under the agreement are very limited and powerful domestic interests are obstructing implementation of a more active climate policy. Impacts Due to warming in the Arctic, Russia plans to increase cargo traffic along its Arctic maritime route to 80 million tonnes per year by 2024. As Russia promotes itself as an international climate leader, state-owned Rusnano is promoting high-tech solutions to emissions reductions. Objections to radical policy change will not be couched in the language of climate change denial.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 64-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica Di Gregorio ◽  
Leandra Fatorelli ◽  
Jouni Paavola ◽  
Bruno Locatelli ◽  
Emilia Pramova ◽  
...  

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-758 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Spies-Butcher ◽  
Adam Stebbing

Despite growing evidence of significant impacts from human-induced climate change, policy responses have been slow. Understanding this policy inertia has led to competing explanations, which either point to the need to build a consensual politics separated from economic partisanship, or which encourage solidarities between environmental and social movements and issues. This article analyses a recent successful mobilisation, leading to the passage of the Clean Energy Act in Australia, to explore the relationship between attitudes to environmental and social protection, particularly among the core constituency in favour of stronger climate action. Using social survey data from the Australian Election Study, the article finds evidence of independent associations between prioritising environmental concerns and support for welfare state expansion, and a realignment of materialist and post-materialist values. This we argue is consistent with Polanyian analysis that posits a link between social and environmental causes based on resistance to commodification.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Jordan ◽  
Harro van Asselt ◽  
Frans Berkhout ◽  
Dave Huitema ◽  
Tim Rayner

The European Union (EU) has sought to lead the world in the adoption of ambitious climate change mitigation targets and policies. In an attempt to characterize and broadly explain the resulting pattern of EU climate governance, scholars have employed the term “multi-level reinforcement.” This term does help to account for the paradoxical situation whereby the EU seeks to lead by example but is itself a relatively leaderless system of governance. Drawing on a much fuller empirical account of the evolution of EU climate governance, this article finds that the term captures some but not all aspects of the EU's approach. It identifies four other paradoxical features of the EU's approach and assesses the extent to which they exhibit “multi-level reinforcement.” It concludes by looking forward and examining the extent to which all five features are expected to enable and/or constrain the EU's ability to maintain a leading position in climate governance.


Author(s):  
Alex L. Wang

This chapter outlines China’s developing climate change response. The nation is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and the largest consumer of energy. China’s engagement in the international climate change negotiations can be divided into three phases: a ‘learning’ phase from 1989 to 1995; a shift toward more active participation between 1995 and 2007; and more comprehensive engagement on climate change domestically and internationally around the time of the UN Climate Conference in Bali in 2007. Shortly before the conference, Chinese authorities announced for the first time a comprehensive National Climate Change Program. It presented a range of existing policies created earlier to address other energy and environmental issues.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakob Skovgaard

In the course of the last four years, finance ministries have increasingly become involved in the international climate change negotiations. Their involvement has to a large degree been an outcome of the framing of climate change as a market failure. This framing calls for an active climate change policy and is at odds with the framing of climate change policy that was previously predominant in finance ministries: that it constitutes expenditure to be avoided. The persistence of both framings has led to clashes within and between finance ministries with respect to climate change. The article calls for further research focusing on the role of the two frames and of finance ministries as actors in climate change politics.


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