Remarks by Judge Stephen Schwebel

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 141-141
Author(s):  
Judge Stephen Schwebel

It should be recalled that the Committee of Jurists that drew up the draft Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for general compulsory jurisdiction. But when that draft Statute was laid before the Council of the League, the Great Powers of the day were unwilling to accept compulsory jurisdiction, and the optional clause came forth as an inadequate substitute. There were high hopes for its expansion, and it did expand over the years. By the outbreak of World War II, there were more states adhering to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court than there are now. In the 1930s, President Roosevelt made a strong effort to have the United States ratify the Statute of the Court, which was a separate instrument from the League of Nations Covenant. He got a majority in the Senate, but not a two-thirds majority.

1992 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-209
Author(s):  
Theodore Caplow

In the course of World War II, the seven great powers of 1939 – Germany, the Soviet Union. Britain. France, Italy, Japan and the United States – were temporarily reduced to two. each commanding awesome strength, and each posing a realistic threat of world domination. The huge forces of the Soviet Union at the edge of western Europe were positioned to move all the way to the Atlantic, thus achieving the control of the Eurasian heartland that, according to geopolitical doctrine, would confer world domination. There were fifth columns prepared to assist them within most European and Asiatic nations.


Author(s):  
Christopher Layne

The chapter compares the pre-1914 Anglo-German antagonism with the current Sino-American relationship to address two issues. First, does the rise of new great powers lead to war? Second, are rising great powers prone to challenge the existing international order into which they emerge—that is, are rising great powers “revisionists”? China’s rapid ascent has pushed these two questions to the top of the agendas of both international relations scholars and policy makers alike. This chapter shows that the United States and China are on a collision course. Like Britain and Germany before World War I, the United States and China seem fated, at best, to engage in an intense security competition; at worst, war between them is a real possibility. One reason the Sino-American rivalry is intensifying is because a rising China inevitably will seek to revise the current international order that the United States established after World War II.


Author(s):  
Udi Greenberg

This chapter focuses on theories of Hans J. Morgenthau, a German émigré specialist on foreign relations. In the years immediately after World War II, Morgenthau emerged as the highest intellectual authority on international relations in the United States. His theory, which became known as “realism,” explained why the United States had no choice but to oppose the Soviet Union and China and prevent them from expanding their power in Europe and East Asia. However, Morgenthau also opposed U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War. This dual position marked both the high point of the German–American symbiosis and the moment of its crisis.


Author(s):  
J. Casey Doss

This epilogue places the challenges of landpower examined in this volume into a historical perspective since World War II. It argues that the American use of landpower is both ambivalent and Janus-faced. Ambivalent in that the United States has a militarized interventionist foreign policy but looks to withdraw once the complications of conflict become apparent. Janus-faced in that the United States seeks to use landpower in two opposing roles: as a foreign policy deterrent against other great powers and as a global constabulary. That the United States has neither resolved this dilemma nor overcome this ambivalence has curtailed the possibilities inherent to the use of force and must be taken into account when considering the American use of landpower since 9/11.


1950 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-378
Author(s):  
George Fischer

American wartime policy regarding Russia continues to be disputed heatedly. In these controversies the genesis of Soviet-American relations in World War II, although it obviously played a key role in shaping both the victorious anti-Axis alliance and the uneasy peace that followed, has so far been neglected. To throw light on the initial rapprochement, this paper is presented as a survey of the half-year period in 1941 between the German attack on Russia and the Japanese attack on the United States.Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State in 1941, records that “the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly during the period of the German-Soviet agreement, had been practically non-existent.” The Soviet invasion of Finland, sharply resented by American public opinion, served to exacerbate relations further. Only after the German attack of June 22, 1941, did the two great powers draw together.


1970 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-475
Author(s):  
Jane H. Pease

SinceWorld War II, a spate of interpretations of empire and imperialism has issued from the press. In part the interest stems from the progressive decolonization of much of what had previously been part of European empires. In part it arises from a present-minded concern with expansion by the modern superpowers, the United States, the Soviet Union and, more recently, China. Nor does the decline of the former great powers of western Europe lessen interest, for their loss of empire seems, for some, a manifestation of Spenglerian theory and for others, a causal factor in that decline. Certainly Great Britain's plummet from first-rate-power rank to a considerably lesser plane has been most spectacularly accompanied by a recessional from palm and pine. Not surprisingly, given the context of their writing, the new sociological and psychological studies and assessments are markedly critical of and variant from the old. New perspectives presented by an epoch seemingly finished and new techniques drawn from the behavioral sciences have molded historians’ assessment of the old “new imperialism's” apogee between 1870 and 1914.


Author(s):  
Mary S. Barton

This is a book about terrorism, weapons, and diplomacy in the interwar years between the First and Second World Wars. It charts the convergence of the manufacture and trade of arms; diplomacy among the Great Powers and the domestic politics within them; the rise of national liberation and independence movements; and the burgeoning concept and early institutions of international counterterrorism. Key themes include: a transformation in meaning and practice of terrorism; the inability of Great Powers—namely, Great Britain, the United States, France—to harmonize perceptions of interest and the pursuit of common interests; the establishment of the tools and infrastructure of modern intelligence—including the U.S.-U.K. cooperation that would evolve into the Five Eyes intelligence alliance; and the nature of peacetime in the absence of major wars. Particular emphasis is given to British attempts to quell revolutionary nationalist movements in India and elsewhere in its empire, and to the Great Powers’ combined efforts to counter the activities of the Communist International. The facilitating roles of the Paris Peace Conference and League of Nations are explored here, in the context of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1919, the Arms Traffic Conference of 1925, and the 1937 Terrorism Convention.


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