Remarks by Lori F. Damrosch

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 69-71
Author(s):  
Lori F. Damrosch

Our moderator's questions begin with “in what sense is international law and in what sense isn't it universal?” and continue with whether international law may be “different in different places” and what the implications of such differences may be. I am here to defend the “universalist” perspective, as the immediate past president of the American Society of International Law and before that, editor-in-chief of the American Journal of International Law. Though both the Society and the Journal have “American” in their titles and our geographic headquarters is in the United States, the Society's mission statement commits us to pursue “a just world under law,” which I interpret as a global vision for a universal system of international law.

1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-559
Author(s):  
William L. Rodgers

At the recent annual dinner of the American Society of International Law I listened with much interest to the eloquent and impassioned address of Judge Florence E. Allen, of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting that the conservation of peace has not hitherto been, and should be made, the principal objective in the development of international law. I think that her views might be summarized not unfairly in the form of a syllogism. Undeniable is its major premise that war is cruel, costly in life and resources, full of horror—a terrible infliction on those who resort to it. The minor premise is that means exist and others may be discovered whereby disputes may always be settled and peace enforced without recourse to war. And so comes the conclusion that all these means should be sought for, discovered and used, after which war will be unnecessary and will disappear from the world, leaving us under the rule of perpetual physical peace, no matter what may be the mental and emotional differences between nations.


1956 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Finch

The founding fifty years ago of a society to promote the establishment of international relations on the basis of law and justice was a step marking the progress that had been made at the beginning of the century in the age-long efforts to find a means of substituting reason for force in the settlement of international controversies. At that time arbitration was generally regarded as the most suitable and acceptable substitute for war. Great Britain and the United States had both heavily contributed to that conviction first by submitting to arbitration under the Jay Treaty of 1794 the numerous misunderstandings that developed in carrying out the provisions of the Peace Treaty of 1783, and then three-quarters of a century later in submitting to arbitration by the Treaty of Washington of 1871 the dangerous Alabama Claims dispute following the American Civil War.


Author(s):  
John P. S. McLaren

From whatever standpoint it may be viewed, the decision of President Johnson to order the Marines into the Dominican Republic on April 28, 1965, was bound to provide a focus for controversy. However, the essentially political nature of that act and its ostensible and concealed motivations have tended to shroud the impact of the Dominican crisis upon the legal mechanisms of the Inter-American System, outlined in the basic documents and developed in the practice of the Organization of American States. This is not to suggest that the problems of Latin America in general and of the Dominion Republic in particular are reducible to a statement of principles of international law. Indeed, it is the present writer’s contention that the Latin American members of the Organization have demonstrated that they are far too servile towards what they deem to be the basic norms of American international law, and that this attitude coupled with the equivocal political manœuvres of the United States has produced a form of institutional schizophrenia which deflects attention from the basic problems of contemporary Latin America and the pressing need for their solution. The main purposes of this comment are to examine the Dominican crisis in the context of fundamental stresses in Latin American society, to evaluate the roles of the United States and the O.A.S. in terms of their reactions to this case, and to make some general comments on how the Inter-American System may be rendered more meaningful in dealing with the political, economic, and social priorities of the region.


Author(s):  
Paolo Amorosa

After winning with unexpected ease the Spanish–American War of 1898, justified at home as a case of humanitarian intervention, the United States started understanding itself as a world power. This led to a renewed attention to international law, in order to reconcile the new leading role of the country with its democratic tradition. Even the formal colonialism in the Philippines and the tutelage of the newly independent Cuba were recast by the founders of the American Society of International Law as an expression of egalitarian values, American and universal at the same time. This ambiguous nationalist/cosmopolitan identity was based on a narrative of progress: the peak of civilization reached by the United States would expand world-wide through example and benevolent assimilation. This chapter argues that it was a narrative of primarily religious origin that justified the war in the eyes of the American people and underpinned future foreign policy.


1958 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan F. Triska ◽  
Robert M. Slusser

Speaking before the American Society of International Law, Aleksandr Troianovski, the first Soviet Ambassador to the United States, summed up his views on the basic sources of order in international relations. He began by rejecting the idea of a “supernational support” for international law, since the source of the rules regulating the relations among nations “lies in the nations, and not in a superforce acting from above the nations.”


Author(s):  
Andrew Valls

The persistence of racial inequality in the United States raises deep and complex questions of racial justice. Some observers argue that public policy must be “color-blind,” while others argue that policies that take race into account should be defended on grounds of diversity or integration. This chapter begins to sketch an alternative to both of these, one that supports strong efforts to address racial inequality but that focuses on the conditions necessary for the liberty and equality of all. It argues that while race is a social construction, it remains deeply embedded in American society. A conception of racial justice is needed, one that is grounded on the premises provided by liberal political theory.


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