scholarly journals Use of Deadly Force by Peacekeepers When Carrying out Law Enforcement Operations

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 111-114
Author(s):  
Siobhán Wills

In this Article, I argue that there is inconsistency and confusion at the heart of UN policy on use of deadly force by peacekeepers and that this lack of clarity has resulted in deaths and injuries to people that pose no threat to UN forces or anybody else and have not engaged in any violent activities or indeed in any type of crime. Such deaths and injuries are likely to recur if the United Nations continues to use the same rules of engagement for law enforcement operations as it does for operations aimed at curtailing violence by parties to an armed conflict. The problem would be greatly mitigated if the United Nations were to formally commit to applying customary international human rights law standards on use of force in all circumstances except those to which international humanitarian law applies.

1993 ◽  
Vol 33 (293) ◽  
pp. 94-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck ◽  
Sylvain Vité

International humanitarian law is increasingly perceived as part of human rights law applicable in armed conflict. This trend can be traced back to the United Nations Human Rights Conference held in Tehran in 1968 which not only encouraged the development of humanitarian law itself, but also marked the beginning of a growing use by the United Nations of humanitarian law during its examination of the human rights situation in certain countries or during its thematic studies. The greater awareness of the relevance of humanitarian law to the protection of people in armed conflict, coupled with the increasing use of human rights law in international affairs, means that both these areas of law now have a much greater international profile and are regularly being used together in the work of both international and non-governmental organizations.


2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne

The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically in recent decades. In particular, it is increasingly the case that hostilities now occur alongside ‘everyday’ situations. This has led to a pressing need to determine when a ‘conduct of hostilities’ model (governed by international humanitarian law – IHL) applies and when a ‘law enforcement’ model (governed by international human rights law – IHRL) applies. This, in turn, raises the question of whether these two legal regimes are incompatible or whether they might be applied in parallel. It is on this question that the current article focuses, examining it at the level of principle. Whilst most accounts of the principles underlying these two areas of law focus on humanitarian considerations, few have compared the role played by necessity in each. This article seeks to address this omission. It demonstrates that considerations of necessity play a prominent role in both IHL and IHRL, albeit with differing consequences. It then applies this necessity-based analysis to suggest a principled basis for rationalising the relationship between IHL and IHRL, demonstrating how this approach would operate in practice. It is shown that, by emphasising the role of necessity in IHL and IHRL, an approach can be adopted that reconciles the two in a manner that is sympathetic to their object and purpose.


2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-827 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

AbstractThis article provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. The article argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes, namely: the law regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum); international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the ius ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law, and that since those latter obligations are owed to individuals, one State cannot consent to their violation by another State. The article considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the law relating to the use of force by States against non-State groups abroad. This part examines the principles of self-defence and consent, in so far as they may be relied upon to justify targeted killings abroad. The article then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes. It examines the threshold for non-international armed conflicts, the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section of the article considers the nature and application of the right to life in armed conflict, as well as the extraterritorial application of that right particularly in territory not controlled by the State conducting the strike.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Crawford

In the years following the adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, debate emerged regarding the extant lacunae in the international rules relating to armed conflict. It was argued that there were gaps in international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law with regards to so-called ‘grey-zone conflicts’ – armed conflicts that did not reach the minimum threshold of either Protocol II or Common Article 3. Therefore, it was proposed that a declaration outlining the minimum humanitarian standards applicable in all situations of violence and conflict be adopted. By 1990, this debate had crystallised around the Turku Declaration on Minimum Humanitarian Standards. However, progress on the declaration quickly stalled once discussion was moved to the United Nations. Since 1995, there have been nine reports by the Secretary-General on the question of fundamental standards of humanity to use the current terminology. Over the years, the scope and content the fundamental standards of humanity has become clearer, yet the adoption of a document on these fundamental standards is no more imminent than when the issue first moved to the United Nations. This article will therefore examine why and how this apparently vital piece of international policy has stalled.


2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (888) ◽  
pp. 1433-1454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katharine Fortin

AbstractThis article shows that between the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Tehran conference in 1968, international human rights law and international humanitarian law and their respective guardian institutions, the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), were not so conceptually far apart as is sometimes suggested. Its purpose is to give further legitimacy to the role of human rights law in armed conflict and show that cooperation between the UN and the ICRC has a long history.


Author(s):  
Eian Katz

Abstract Disinformation in armed conflict may pose several distinctive forms of harm to civilians: exposure to retaliatory violence, distortion of information vital to securing human needs, and severe mental suffering. The gravity of these harms, along with the modern nature of wartime disinformation, is out of keeping with the traditional classification of disinformation in international humanitarian law (IHL) as a permissible ruse of war. A patchwork set of protections drawn from IHL, international human rights law and international criminal law may be used to limit disinformation operations during armed conflict, but numerous gaps and ambiguities undermine the force of this legal framework, calling for further scholarly attention and clarification.


Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

This chapter provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. It argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the jus ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The chapter then considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the application of the right to life in armed conflict, particularly in territory not controlled by the state conducting the strike. The chapter then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes, such as the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section considers the law relating to the use of force by states against non-state groups abroad.


Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

This chapter examines international humanitarian law, the principal body of international law which applies in times of armed conflict, and which seeks to balance the violence inherent in an armed conflict with the dictates of humanity. International humanitarian law protects the civilian population from the ravages of conflict, and establishes limitations on the means and methods of combat. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the nature of international humanitarian law and identifies some of its cardinal principles and key rules. Section 3 explores the similarities and differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, comparing and contrasting their historical origins and conceptual approaches. Given that international humanitarian law applies during armed conflict, Section 4 considers whether there is a need for international human rights law also to apply. Section 5 ascertains the relationship between the two bodies of law and Section 6 considers some of the difficulties with the application of international human rights law in time of armed conflict.


2005 ◽  
Vol 87 (857) ◽  
pp. 39-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvia Borelli

AbstractThousands of individuals have been detained abroad in the context of the “war on terror”, both during the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and in Iraq and as a result of transnational law-enforcement operations. This paper argues that, notwithstanding contrary positions expounded by some States, the protections of international humanitarian law and/or international human rights law remain applicable to these individuals, wherever detained, and examines recent decisions of domestic courts and international bodies which appear to reveal a reassertion of international standards.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are traditionally two distinct branches of law, one dealing with the protection of persons from abusive power, the other with the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. Yet, developments in international and national jurisprudence and practice have led to the recognition that these two bodies of law not only share a common humanist ideal of dignity and integrity but overlap substantially in practice. The most frequent examples are situations of occupation or non-international armed conflicts where human rights law complements the protection provided by humanitarian law.This article provides an overview of the historical developments that led to the increasing overlap between human rights law and humanitarian law. It then seeks to analyse the ways in which the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law can work in practice. It argues that two main concepts inform their interaction: The first is complementarity between their norms in the sense that in most cases, especially for the protection of persons in the power of a party to the conflict, they mutually reinforce each other. The second is the principle of lex specialis in the cases of conflict between the norms.


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