Medieval Jewish Philosophical Writings

2008 ◽  

In his philosophical writings, Coleridge increasingly developed his thinking about imagination, a symbolizing precursor to contemplation, to a theory of contemplation itself, which for him occurs in its purest form as a manifestation of ‘Reason’. Coleridge is a particularly challenging figure because he was a thinker in process, and something of an omnimath, a Renaissance man of the Romantic era. The dynamic quality of his thinking, the ‘dark fluxion’ pursued but ultimately ‘unfixable by thought’, and his extensive range of interests make essential an approach that is philosophical yet also multi-disciplinary. This is the first collection of essays to be written mainly by philosophers and intellectual historians on a wide range of Coleridge’s philosophical writings. With a foreword by Baroness Mary Warnock, and original essays on Coleridge and Contemplation by prominent philosophers such as Sir Roger Scruton, David E. Cooper, Michael McGhee, and Andy Hamilton, this volume provides a stimulating collection of insights and explorations into what Britain’s foremost philosopher-poet had to say about the contemplation that he considered to be the highest of the human mental powers. The essays by philosophers are supported by new developments in philosophically minded criticism from Coleridge scholars in English departments, including Jim Mays, Kathleen Wheeler, and James Engell. They approach Coleridge as an energetic yet contemplative thinker concerned with the intuition of ideas and the processes of cultivation in self and society. Other essays, from intellectual historians and theologians, clarify the historical background, and ‘religious musings’, of Coleridge’s thought regarding contemplation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 88 ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker

AbstractThis paper aims to reconstruct Francis Hutcheson's thinking about liberty. Since he does not offer a detailed treatment of philosophical questions concerning liberty in his mature philosophical writings I turn to a textbook on metaphysics. We can assume that he prepared the textbook during the 1720s in Dublin. This textbook deserves more attention. First, it sheds light on Hutcheson's role as a teacher in Ireland and Scotland. Second, Hutcheson's contributions to metaphysical disputes are more original than sometimes assumed. To appreciate his independent thinking, I argue, it is helpful to take the intellectual debates in Ireland into consideration, including William King's defence of free will and discussions of Shaftesbury's views in Robert Molesworth's intellectual circle. Rather than taking a stance on the philosophical disputes about liberty, I argue that Hutcheson aims to shift the focus of the debates towards practical questions concerning control of desire, cultivation of habits, and character development.


Hypatia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-328
Author(s):  
Asaf Angermann

Gillian Rose (1947–1995) was an influential though idiosyncratic British philosopher whose work helped introduce the Frankfurt School's critical theory and renew interest in Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Jewish thought in Anglo‐American philosophy. After years of relative oblivion, her life and thought have recently received new attention in philosophy, sociology, and theology. However, her work's critical Hegelian contribution to feminist philosophy still remains unexplored. This article seeks to reassess the place and the meaning of feminism and gender identity in Rose's work by addressing both her philosophical writings and her personal memoir, written in the months preceding her untimely death. It argues that although Rose's overall work was not developed in a feminist context, her philosophy, and in particular her ethical‐political notion of diremption, is valuable for developing a critical feminist philosophy that overcomes the binaries of law and morality, inclusion and exclusion, power and powerlessness—and focuses on the meaning of love as negotiating, rather than mediating, these oppositions.


1955 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 656
Author(s):  
Willis Doney ◽  
Elizabeth Anscombe ◽  
Peter Thomas Geach ◽  
Alexandre Koyre

Lampas ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-79
Author(s):  
Jörn Soerink

Summary This article offers an introduction to Cicero’s philosophical writings in general and his Tusculan Disputations in particular. Two passages from this treatise are part of the set texts for the Dutch final school exam Latin in 2018 (1.96-104 and 5.57-62). After introducing Cicero philosophus, it offers a synopsis of the Tusculan Disputations and a selective discussion of the aforementioned passages, with some suggestions for the classroom.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-296
Author(s):  
Mark Smilowitz

Abstract Two philosophical positions adopted by Soloveitchik in his doctoral dissertation continued to inform his Jewish philosophical writings throughout his career. The first position, epistemological pluralism, stands behind Soloveitchik’s approach to the religious view of causality and repentance in his writings during the 1940s–1960s. It also grounds his consistent use of the dialectical method. The second position, the eternal mystery of the unknown, comes from the Marburg neo-Kantian Paul Natorp; this idea is a consistent thread throughout Soloveitchik’s writings and a foundation of his existentialist writings through the late 1970s. The conclusion suggests how these two positions might be related to one another.


2012 ◽  
pp. 117-135
Author(s):  
Md Abdul Muhit

The distinction between necessary and contingent truths has so much important role in the explication of Leibniz’s philosophy of logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of science that the distinction spreads throughout most of his philosophical writings. My aim in this paper is to try to provide a clear and detailed account of some of the aspects of Leibniz’s distinction between necessary and contingent truths. This paper is divided into four parts. In the first part, an analysis of Leibniz’s general notion of “truth” (“the Principle of the Predicate-in-Notion”) is given. This will be followed by his distinction between necessary truths and contingent truths, which he also terms as “truths of reason” and “truths of fact” respectively. Thirdly, the implication of this distinction in Leibniz’s theory of human freedom will be addressed. I will end my discussion with an answer to the following questions: The distinction goes traditionally under Leibniz' name; but is it his own invention, or has he merely picked it up from one of his predecessors? And secondly, how far this distinction has an impact (if any) on the philosophies of his contemporaries, especially on Wolff, Hume and Kant? DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/afj.v4i0.12936 The Arts Faculty Journal Vol.4 July 2010-June 2011 pp.117-135


Vox Patrum ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 761-783
Author(s):  
Ewa Osek

There are some references to the famous Delphic inscription „Know thyself” (gnothi sauton) in the Hexaemeron (IX 6; VI 1) and the Homilia in illud: Attende tibi ipsi by St. Basil of Caesarea. In the Homilia in illud: Attende tibi ipsi St. Basil accepts the Philo’s and Clement of Alexandria’s opinion that the Septuagint proseche seauto („Attend to yourself”) and the Hellenie gnothi sauton („Know thyself”) are the same. According to St. Basil, influenced by the Alcibiades I, „yourself” means „a soul” as an opposite to a body and its environment. St. Basil interprets the Delphic maxim in the following meanings: (1) „Turn to yourself”, (2) „Know God from yourself”, (3) „Take care of your soul”, (4) „Control yourself”, and (5) „Remember you are a human”. His interpretation is influenced by the many philosophical writings, especially the Platonie dialogues (the Charmides, the Alcibiades I), the Stromata of Clement of Alexandria, and the Origen’s In Canticum canticorum.


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