Labour as the efficient cause of the domain of property

1994 ◽  
pp. 67-116
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-83
Author(s):  
Margaret Cameron

The essence of artefacts is typically taken to be their function: they are defined in terms of the goals or aims of the artisans that make them. In this paper, an alternative theory is proposed that emphasizes, via a reconstruction of Aristotle's various comments about the nature of artefacts, the role of the moving, or efficient, cause of artefacts. This account shifts the emphasis to the role played by the investment of expertise into the creation (and subsequent being) of artefacts. It turns out that expertise is prior in being and prior in explanation to the function of artefacts, and thus plays the most fundamental role in the explanation of the ontology of artefacts.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Greig

Proclus introduces the concept of the unparticipated (ἀμέθεκτον) (P1) among two other terms— the participated (P2) and participant (P3)—as the first principle (ἀρχή) of any given series of entities or Forms in his metaphysical structure. For instance, the unparticipated monad (P1), Soul, generates all individual, participated souls (P2), which in turn generate the attribute of life in their respective, participating bodies (P3). Proclus looks at (P2) as an efficient cause of (P3), where (P2) must be the attribute in actuality in relation to the attribute it brings about in (P3). At the outset, this suggests that (P2) is necessary and sufficient for (P3), which then implies a problem for positing (P1): if (P2) is doing the causal legwork for (P3), what role does (P1) play? One of Proclus’ main explanations is that (P1) is responsible for ‘unifying’ the multiple participated entities (P2), so that the commonality of the participated entities (P2) must go back to a separate source (P1). However, one could easily respond that this just amounts to a reversion to a priori Platonist principles for transcendent, separate Forms without providing a real justification for the necessity of (P1) as a cause. In my talk, I wish to elaborate on how Proclus thinks about (P1)’s type of causation in relation to (P2) and (P3), particularly showing why (P2) for Proclus is ultimately insufficient as an efficient cause compared to (P1) as the absolute first cause for a given series.[Early work on a PhD thesis chapter — presentation for the University of Edinburgh, July 16, 2017. Any comments or feedback are welcome!]


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudi Palmieri ◽  
Johanna Miecznikowski

Compared to other domains of media discourse, economic-financial news contain a considerable amount of speech acts regarding future events, in particular predictions. This can be explained by their specific institutional context, financial markets, where investors constantly seek to single out gain opportunities and to correctly assess their risk. One of the crucial factors making economic-financial predictions worthy of being considered in investment decisions is argumentation, in particular the extent to which the predicted proposition follows from a plausible and acceptable reasoning. Starting from a corpus of 50 articles of the Italian economic-financial press, we consider the inferential dimension of prediction-oriented arguments, focusing on the locus, i.e. the ontological relation on which the connection between the argument(s) and the predictive conclusion rests. All predictions found in the corpus were manually annotated with the software UAM Corpus Tool. For each of them we identified the source, which could be either the journalist him/herself or a third party, typically financial analysts or corporate actors. We distinguished mere predictive opinions from predictive standpoints, i.e. predictions for which the journalist advances one or more supportive arguments (either confirmatory of refutatory). For the latter category, we identified the locus referring to an adaptation of the taxonomy outlined by Rigotti (2009). The findings highlight in particular the following three interesting aspects: (1) in predictions, journalists reinforce their stance by plausible justifications, but weaken it at the same time by marking it as uncertain and/or by using reported speech or evidential means to reduce their responsibility for the predictive speech act; (2) the justification of a predictive standpoint, by the journalist or by third parties, is mostly based on loci of causality, in particular on the locus from efficient cause, the locus from final cause and complex forms of causality where the involvement of rational agents is implied but defocused; (3) moreover, journalists refer to the predictive opinions of experts or corporate insiders to activate the locus from authority, either by explicit argumentation or implicitly, by reporting speech from reliable sources. Our study suggests that the role of predictions in financial news is not so much that of giving any straightforward advice to investors, but rather that of providing chunks of sound argumentative reasoning, including both supportive evidence and rebuttals or refutatory moves, that the investor-reader might apply and combine in the highly uncertain context of financial markets. Overall, our findings shed light on how financial journalists fulfil the function of information intermediaries in finance.


2020 ◽  
pp. 218-267
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Platt

Chapter 6 argues that La Forge is a “partial” occasionalist, who appeals to “body–body” occasionalism to defend Descartes’ central epistemic thesis that mind is better known than body. La Forge argues for an occasionalistic version of Descartes’ physics. However, La Forge presents a theory of the mind–body union that implies that the human mind and body causally interact. While he says bodies are the “only occasional causes” of sensations in the mind, he uses “occasional cause” to refer to a type of accidental efficient cause. La Forge’s arguments for occasionalism are limited to body–body interaction: Although he holds that God continually re-creates finite substances, he is not committed to full-blown occasionalism. La Forge does not adopt occasionalism simply because he takes it to be a logical consequence of Cartesian physics. He sees body–body occasionalism as playing a broader theoretical role: He uses it to respond to criticisms of Cartesian epistemology.


Author(s):  
Laura Otis

Political Economy is at once a science and an art. The value of the science has for its efficient cause and measure, its subserviency to the art. According to the principle of utility in every branch of the art of legislation, the object or...


2021 ◽  
pp. 121-148
Author(s):  
Benjamin Hill

Benjamin Hill seeks to initiate deeper contemporary discussion of the ontological challenges that drove early modern philosophers (namely, several early Cartesians, Berkeley, and Hume) to accept the negative thesis of occasionalism, that no physical object can truly be an efficient cause. He argues that we should be looking past Hume and his empiricist’s approach to secondary causation to bring the core metaphysical, issues he believes are still lingering, into sharper focus. Hill walks us backwards from Hume’s empirical critiques of powers in the Enquiry and Treatise to Locke’s presentation of the ‘popular’ view that experience lead us to postulate powers as a response to occasionalism. This, he suggests, reveals that the early modern debate about causal powers tracked not the divide between scholastics and mechanical philosophers but the divide between realists and occasionalists and revolved around a confusion between them regarding what was the underlying question of the debate. For the occasionalists, it was not really about whether or not causal powers did exist, but about explaining how they could exist. This leads Hill to explore the metaphysical worries animating seventeenth-century occasionalists.


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