scholarly journals Justifying Unparticipated Causality in Proclus

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Greig

Proclus introduces the concept of the unparticipated (ἀμέθεκτον) (P1) among two other terms— the participated (P2) and participant (P3)—as the first principle (ἀρχή) of any given series of entities or Forms in his metaphysical structure. For instance, the unparticipated monad (P1), Soul, generates all individual, participated souls (P2), which in turn generate the attribute of life in their respective, participating bodies (P3). Proclus looks at (P2) as an efficient cause of (P3), where (P2) must be the attribute in actuality in relation to the attribute it brings about in (P3). At the outset, this suggests that (P2) is necessary and sufficient for (P3), which then implies a problem for positing (P1): if (P2) is doing the causal legwork for (P3), what role does (P1) play? One of Proclus’ main explanations is that (P1) is responsible for ‘unifying’ the multiple participated entities (P2), so that the commonality of the participated entities (P2) must go back to a separate source (P1). However, one could easily respond that this just amounts to a reversion to a priori Platonist principles for transcendent, separate Forms without providing a real justification for the necessity of (P1) as a cause. In my talk, I wish to elaborate on how Proclus thinks about (P1)’s type of causation in relation to (P2) and (P3), particularly showing why (P2) for Proclus is ultimately insufficient as an efficient cause compared to (P1) as the absolute first cause for a given series.[Early work on a PhD thesis chapter — presentation for the University of Edinburgh, July 16, 2017. Any comments or feedback are welcome!]

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Greig

Damascius posits a split for the Neoplatonic first principle into two aspects, or entities: the Ineffable as the ‘true’ first principle, and the One as the first cause of all things, as in Proclus, but subordinated to the Ineffable. Behind this distinction is an essential shift in the One’s causality, both as a response to and critique of Proclus’ One. I look at De Principiis I, 2–4, and I, 92–94, in relation to Proclus, seeing how Damascius transforms the One as causally synonymous with 'all things' (τά πάντα). In doing so, I show that Damascius both retains Proclus' basic argument that the One does not directly pre-contain plurality, and that the One *indirectly* anticipates plurality by causing 'all things'. By holding these two stances, Damascius appears to lead a *via media* between a Plotinian and a Proclean view of the One.[Colloquium presentation (LMU Munich/MUSAPH, Jan. 17, 2017; Universität Bonn, Jan. 30, 2017; KU Leuven, Mar. 23, 2017) and conference presentation (NAAP, Edinburgh, Apr. 10, 2017) summarizing a basic argument of the final chapter of my PhD thesis. The attached PDF is from the KU Leuven presentation.]


1730 ◽  
Vol 36 (408) ◽  
pp. 59-96 ◽  

Sir, in the year 1725, I wrote to you that I had a method of demonstrating Sir Isaac Newton's rule concerning the impossible roots of equations, deduced from this obvious principle, that the squares of the differences of real quantities must always be positive; and some time after, i sent you the first principle of that method, which were published in the Philosophical Transactions for the month of May, 1726.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 27-51
Author(s):  
Andrzej Maryniarczyk

In this article, the author notes that Thomas Aquinas, in his brief work entitled De Ente et Essentia, proved that at the base of understanding the world, the human being, and God in particular, there is our understanding of being and its essence. When we make a small mistake at the beginning (parvus error in principio) in our understanding of being and its essence, it will turn to be a big one in the end (magnus in fine). And what is “at the end” of our knowledge is the discovery of the First and Ultimate Cause of all things, known as: Ipsum Esse, God, the Absolute, The Most Perfect Substance, on whom everything depends, and who depends not on anything else. These present inquiries about the proper understanding of being and its essence are aimed at formulating proof of the necessity of existence of a Being that is the First Cause, and which, existing as Ipsum Esse, is the source and reason of existence of all beings. Without these inquiries, the proof itself would be incomprehensible, and more importantly it would be a purely a priori one (i.e., ontological). Furthermore, without the existential conception of being, which Thomas first formulated, one could not discover the First Cause which, as Ipsum Esse, is the source of the existence of every being. This issue seems to have escaped the attention of the author of the book Aquinas’s Way to God. The Proof in “De Ente et Essentia.”


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Greig

Aristotle and Plotinus both demonstrate the existence of a first principle as cause of the existence of all things. Aristotle puts forward that this first principle is a divine intellect which thinks on itself, and in being the highest being in complete actuality and without potentiality, it is also absolutely simple. Plotinus, on the other hand, sees reason to assert that the divine intellect can not be absolutely simple but a duality of some sort. Thus for Plotinus the first principle, as a cause of unity for all things, must be beyond the divine intellect and beyond being as an absolutely simple principle. Comparing Plotinus to Aristotle, Plotinus’ position appears odd at the outset given that he also holds to the divine intellect being completely in act and that it thinks on itself. Why thinking should be dual even when it is self-referential and unified in its activity is not apparent, and so Aristotle’s position seems the more coherent one. Yet, through an analysis of both positions, this dissertation proposes that Plotinus better accounts for the problem of self-intellection as requiring some form of distinction in thought while maintaining an identity between the subject and object of thought. If absolute simplicity is an essential attribute to being the first principle, Plotinus’ position is ultimately more consistent in positing a first principle beyond the divine intellect while also holding to a more coherent understanding of thinking with his understanding of divine intellect as a duality instead of an absolute simplicity.[MSc thesis for the University of Edinburgh, completed Aug. 14, 2013.][This is an early work that I am interested to revise and update further, especially in light of recent papers on the issue in Plotinus. I welcome any feedback or comments.]


2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-75
Author(s):  
P. G. Moore

John Robertson Henderson was born in Scotland and educated at the University of Edinburgh, where he qualified as a doctor. His interest in marine natural history was fostered at the Scottish Marine Station for Scientific Research at Granton (near Edinburgh) where his focus on anomuran crustaceans emerged, to the extent that he was eventually invited to compile the anomuran volume of the Challenger expedition reports. He left Scotland for India in autumn 1885 to take up the Chair of Zoology at Madras Christian College, shortly after its establishment. He continued working on crustacean taxonomy, producing substantial contributions to the field; returning to Scotland in retirement in 1919. The apparent absence of communication with Alfred William Alcock, a surgeon-naturalist with overlapping interests in India, is highlighted but not resolved.


2002 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. N. SWINNEY

ABSTRACT: The university career of the polar scientist William Speirs Bruce (1867–is examined in relation to new information, discovered amongst the Bruce papers in the University of Edinburgh, which elucidates the role played by Patrick Geddes in shaping Bruce's future career. Previous accounts of Bruce's university years, based mainly on the biography by Rudmose Brown (1923), are shown to be in error in several details.


Author(s):  
Craig Smith

Adam Ferguson was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and a leading member of the Scottish Enlightenment. A friend of David Hume and Adam Smith, Ferguson was among the leading exponents of the Scottish Enlightenment’s attempts to develop a science of man and was among the first in the English speaking world to make use of the terms civilization, civil society, and political science. This book challenges many of the prevailing assumptions about Ferguson’s thinking. It explores how Ferguson sought to create a methodology for moral science that combined empirically based social theory with normative moralising with a view to supporting the virtuous education of the British elite. The Ferguson that emerges is far from the stereotyped image of a nostalgic republican sceptical about modernity, and instead is one much closer to the mainstream Scottish Enlightenment’s defence of eighteenth century British commercial society.


1996 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Rodger

This article is the revised text of the first W A Wilson Memorial Lecture, given in the Playfair Library, Old College, in the University of Edinburgh, on 17 May 1995. It considers various visions of Scots law as a whole, arguing that it is now a system based as much upon case law and precedent as upon principle, and that its departure from the Civilian tradition in the nineteenth century was part of a general European trend. An additional factor shaping the attitudes of Scots lawyers from the later nineteenth century on was a tendency to see themselves as part of a larger Englishspeaking family of lawyers within the British Empire and the United States of America.


1994 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Anderson ◽  
Robert J. Morris

A case study ofa third year course in the Department of Economic and Social History in the University of Edinburgh isusedto considerandhighlightaspects of good practice in the teaching of computer-assisted historical data analysis.


2012 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 16-21
Author(s):  
Tony Burke

Scholars interested in the Christian Apocrypha (CA) typically appeal to CA collections when in need of primary sources. But many of these collections limit themselves to material believed to have been written within the first to fourth centuries CE. As a result a large amount of non-canonical Christian texts important for the study of ancient and medieval Christianity have been neglected. The More Christian Apocrypha Project will address this neglect by providing a collection of new editions (some for the first time) of these texts for English readers. The project is inspired by the More Old Testament Pseudepigrapha Project headed by Richard Bauckham and Jim Davila from the University of Edinburgh. Like the MOTP, the MCAP is envisioned as a supplement to an earlier collection of texts—in this case J. K. Elliott’s The Apocryphal New Testament (Oxford 1991), the most recent English-language CA collection (but now almost two decades old). The texts to be included are either absent in Elliott or require significant revision. Many of the texts have scarcely been examined in over a century and are in dire need of new examination. One of the goals of the project is to spotlight the abilities and achievements of English (i.e., British and North American) scholars of the CA, so that English readers have access to material that has achieved some exposure in French, German, and Italian collections.


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