What is wrong with rights might lie in several places. Some accuse the very concept of a right belonging to an individual as a kind of property. Chapter 6 considered this charge and found it wanting. Instead, Chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9 identified problems in misleading connotations of talk about ‘natural rights’, the failure to reckon with the contingency of rights upon economic and political conditions, and the importation of what is paradigmatically a legal idea into ethical deliberation. An additional possibility is that problems lie not only in concepts of rights, but also in the way in which judges treat them. This is the topic of this chapter and the following one. The present chapter examines recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (Al-Skeini [2011], Al-Jedda [2011]), and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (Smith [2013]), which threaten the UK’s military power. It concludes that, in these cases, the jurisprudence of the European court is vitiated by an imprudence born of a limited historical and political imagination, a culture of risk-aversion, and an ideological rights-fundamentalism. Such imprudent jurisprudence serves to weaken the military effectiveness of European States Party and their ability to support politically fragile states, to undermine states’ confidence in international treaties, and to provoke calls for states’ withdrawal from the Convention altogether.