The Individual’s Place in the Grounding of her Rights

Author(s):  
Rowan Cruft

Chapter 8 develops a taxonomy of the differing degrees and manner in which a right might be grounded on its holder’s good—and, in the author’s terms, exist ‘for its holder’s sake’. This is a taxonomy of the extent to which a right’s status as a right, and a duty’s status as a directed duty whose violation wrongs someone, are pre-institutional or ‘natural’. The chapter explores the important question of whether non-individualistic, communitarian moral views can accommodate this idea of ‘natural’ rights grounded by their holder’s good. It turns out that while many communitarian approaches are compatible with the idea, it is inconsistent with those communitarians who deny the very possibility of distinguishing one party’s good from the wider good. The chapter ends by sketching the appeal of taking human rights as grounded ultimately on ‘natural’ rights that exist for the right-holder’s sake.

Author(s):  
Rowan Cruft

Chapter 12 assesses arguments that certain specific property rights, and some general rights to participate in property systems, can be morally justifiable for the right-holder’s own sake—primarily on the basis of the right-holder’s own good—in a way that makes them ‘natural’ or recognition-independent rights. Versions of such arguments based on the importance of the right-holder’s freedom, her chosen purposes, and her other human rights, are developed from the work of Hegel, Locke, and Nickel, respectively. The chapter shows that the reach of these arguments is limited. Some property rights might indeed be ‘natural’ rights groundable for the right-holder’s sake, but the chapter’s arguments imply that most property held by those who are moderately wealthy cannot be—including any property rights morally justifiable only as the results of a market exchange.


Author(s):  
Daria Lazareva

The scientific article draws attention to the subject of the right to liberty and security of person and its place in the science of legal law. The content of this right in terms of its components is also studied. Particular attention is paid to the structure of the right to liberty and security of person, namely: the division into two independent structural elements: the right to liberty and the right to personal integrity. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights is studied through the prism of guarantees of the right to liberty and security of person contained in Art. 5 of the Convention. Freedom and personal inviolability are personal human rights, which in the theory of legal and philosophical thought are defined as natural rights that belong from birth and, according to the generally accepted classification, belong to the first generation of (civil and political) human rights. The right to liberty and security of person is a fundamental right of every person and citizen, inalienable and personal, and belongs to the list of natural rights and is perceived by civil society through the prism of the theory of natural law, which has existed for several centuries. The article forms a certain position on the approach to the study of the right to liberty and security of person, its structural elements, it is important to follow a systematic approach, to consider this right as a set of interrelated elements on the principles of integrity, structure, plurality and equality. «Freedom» and «personal inviolability», which in close cooperation form a single complex. These categories should be considered the subject of the right to personal inviolability in the narrow sense, but the freedom of the individual from unlawful encroachment on property, honor, dignity, from unauthorized interference in private and family life is the subject of the right in the broadest sense.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ndumiso Ncube

One of the modern dictates of freedom is a human’s right to free speech as enshrined in the United Nations’ (2015) Universal Declaration of Humans Rights (UDHR) of 1948. The very concept of “universal” rights foregrounds the question on what and who is human. Following this universal doctrine, all freedoms, including the freedom to free speech translates ultimately to “beings” that are critically self-conscious, or at least beings who are regarded as human-beings, who are allowed to exist, to live, and to be free. Indeed, to examine what has happened to those who exist in Fanon’s (2008) zones of non-being who are denied their right to free speech even after the “universal” pronouncements of 1948 is equally important. In fact, all along and even today (and because of coloniality) the Third World citizens may still be denied their right to free speech, their right to be free from economic bondage or otherwise – which are, after all, their natural rights to be human. To be “free”, to be “human” or to “live” denotes that one has the ability to speak as the universal declaration accords. The voice (an ability to be heard) or its lack creates beings that are not regarded as human. Indeed, the effects of talking or not talking of the anthropos, or on behalf of them is explored, somewhat as the unreliability and the corruptibility of the authority of language and authorship. This is to say, the meaning and intentions (of the voice) that belongs to those in the zones of non-being are most often misunderstood, mistranslated and sometimes misread and unheard – stripping them of one of their essential human rights to be heard. This way, I seek to investigate the dilemma of the right to free speech in J.M. Coetzee’s novel Foe (1986) as well as challenge the UDHR declaration that all humans are born equal with a right to freedom of speech. I argue that the possession of language in the world where there are two zones, as illustrated in John Maxwell Coetzee’s Foe (1986) does not guarantee one to be heard or liberated.


1999 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-81
Author(s):  
John R. Meyer

Before the General Assembly of the United Nations Pope John Paul II declared that the quest for freedom points to the existence of ‘natural rights’ that reflect the objective and inviolable demands of a universal moral law. While this assertion was well received by those in attendance, an important question remains: how are we to reconcile this universal vision of human rights with the current plethora of disputable legislated rights? Ernest Fortin claims the problem is rooted in the fact that modern ‘rights talk’ emphasizes individual subjective rights over the objective reality of human nature, and Alasdair Maclntyre even questions the moral value of human rights because they are all too easily manipulated by those who view them as self-evident truths. When you add to these observations the appearance of such controversial individual entitlements as ‘reproductive rights’, ‘sex rights’, ‘the right to same-sex marriage’ and the ‘right to die’, it is not surprising to hear people calling for a silencing of ‘rights talk’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 76 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 180-188
Author(s):  
Bianca Nicla Romano

Art. 24 of the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights recognises and protects the right of the individual to rest and leisure. This right has to be fully exercised without negative consequences on the right to work and the remuneration. Tourism can be considered one of the best ways of rest and leisure because it allows to enrich the personality of the individual. Even after the reform of the Title V this area is no longer covered by the Italian Constitution, the Italian legal system protects and guarantees it as a real right, so as to get to recognize its existence and the consequent compensation of the so-called “ruined holiday damage”. This kind of damage has not a patrimonial nature, but a moral one, and the Tourist-Traveler can claim for it when he has not been able to fully enjoy his holiday - the essential fulcrum of tourism - intended as an opportunity for leisure and/or rest, essential rights of the individual.


Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Vereno Brugiatelli

Man's ethical fulfilment often faces objective obstacles in the deprivation of rights. The negation of the recognition of certain fundamental rights, or worse, the radical misrecognition of man, which translates into different forms of violence, often artfully disguised both on an individual and collective level, produces devastating consequences in the private life of a person upsetting all forms of positive self-esteem. The recognition of human qualities, accompanied by the right to express and extend them, is an integral part of the ethical life of each individual and, at the same time, constitutes a fundamental moment in the construction of a responsible civilized community. In this dissertation, I aim to analyse the connection between ethical life and human rights in order to draw attention to the repercussions that the recognition and misrecognition of liberty produce with regard to man's ethical fulfilment. From this perspective, I intend to highlight the importance of the existence of favourable juridical and institutional conditions to ensure ethical fulfilment. At this level, I will underline that the deprivation of capabilities is often the main cause of the profound sense of discontent affecting individuals in their desperate attempt to realise a type of existence which corresponds to their ambitions.


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