The Source Conflict Cost Criterion: A Pragmatic Approach to Floating Conclusions

<p>Our research examines the problem of multiple lines of reasoning reaching the same conclusion, but only through different and unrelated arguments. In the context of non-monotonic logic, these types of conclusions are referred to as floating conclusions. The field of defeasible reasoning is divided between those who claim that floating conclusions ought not to be accepted through a prudent or skeptical point of view, whereas others argue that they are good enough conclusions to be admitted even from a conservative or skeptical standard. We approach the problem of floating conclusions through the formal framework of Inheritance Networks. These networks provide the simplest and most straightforward gateway into the technical aspects surrounding floating conclusions in the context of non-monotonic logic and defeasible reasoning. To address the problem of floating conclusions, we construct a unifying framework of analysis, namely, the Source Conflict Cost Criterion (SCCC), that contains two basic elements: source conflict and cost. Both elements are simplified through a binary model, through which we provide a comprehensive understanding of the floating conclusions as well as the problematic nature of the debate surrounding this type of inferences. The SCCC addresses three key objectives: (a) the assessment of floating conclusions and the debate surrounding its epistemological dimension, (b) the construction of a general and unified framework of analysis for floating conclusions, and (c) the specification of the normative conditions for the admission of floating conclusions as skeptically acceptable information.</p>

The Source Conflict Cost Criterion: A Pragmatic Approach to Floating Conclusions

<p>Our research examines the problem of multiple lines of reasoning reaching the same conclusion, but only through different and unrelated arguments. In the context of non-monotonic logic, these types of conclusions are referred to as floating conclusions. The field of defeasible reasoning is divided between those who claim that floating conclusions ought not to be accepted through a prudent or skeptical point of view, whereas others argue that they are good enough conclusions to be admitted even from a conservative or skeptical standard. We approach the problem of floating conclusions through the formal framework of Inheritance Networks. These networks provide the simplest and most straightforward gateway into the technical aspects surrounding floating conclusions in the context of non-monotonic logic and defeasible reasoning. To address the problem of floating conclusions, we construct a unifying framework of analysis, namely, the Source Conflict Cost Criterion (SCCC), that contains two basic elements: source conflict and cost. Both elements are simplified through a binary model, through which we provide a comprehensive understanding of the floating conclusions as well as the problematic nature of the debate surrounding this type of inferences. The SCCC addresses three key objectives: (a) the assessment of floating conclusions and the debate surrounding its epistemological dimension, (b) the construction of a general and unified framework of analysis for floating conclusions, and (c) the specification of the normative conditions for the admission of floating conclusions as skeptically acceptable information.</p>

The pedagogical work of G.G. Antonescu from a diachronic perspective

The general purpose of this article is to analyze the work of G.G. Antonescu from the perspective of his actuality in the modern and contemporary (postmodern) era, as seen by one of the most important representatives of the history of Romanian pedagogy, Ion Gh. Stanciu. We consider the analysis of the historical dimension of the work of the pedagogue G.G. Antonescu (1882-1955), from a diachronic perspective and highlighting the epistemological dimension of his pedagogy, supported at a conceptual, normative and methodological level, but also by the institutional model designed at the level of his entire work in the spirit of the planned reform.

Anthropocene: Does the New Geological Age push towards a Metamorphosis of the World

The Anthropocene has created a new cartography. Various disciplines and discourses overlap each other. Two fields of knowledge: geology and anthropology are unified in one single concept. The Axial Age separated everyday practices from an unbiased and objective view of the world. Romanticism, in the nineteenth century, challenged the separation between the natural sciences and the sciences of the spirit. Paul J. Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer had two distinct parts; a first establishes "a period of time" the second an "epistemic tool". This paper is intended to illustrate the epistemological dimension of the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene defines the present geological epoch as dominated by humans. Eduard Suess, Antonio Stopani, Teilhard de Chardin, Vladimir Vernadsky etc., a century ago, anticipated the concept of Anthropocene. "No&ouml;sphere" is a term from the "world of thought". The hypothesis of an earth as a living organism, which is inspired by J.W. Goethe's "Naturwissenschaft", allows two disciplines to be inte-grated into one term: geology and anthropology. We have atmospheric phenomena that are in-compressible without presupposing life. The Anthropocene modifies the foundations of our vi-sion of the world. In the Gaia Hypothesis we find the same roots as in the Anthropocene concept: Goethe, Vernadky, etc. The concepts of symbiogenesis, homeostasis, etc., allow us to formulate new questions. This paper analyzes the reconfiguration of relations between the earth and all its inhabitants. It is, for the social sciences, a challenge: a metamorphosis of our vision of the world is taking place.

God, New Natural Law Theory, and Human Rights

Critics of the “New” Natural Law (NNL) theory have raised questions about the role of the divine in that theory. This paper considers that role in regard to its account of human rights: can the NNL account of human rights be sustained without a more or less explicit advertence to “the question of God’s existence or nature or will”? It might seem that Finnis’s “elaborate sketch” includes a full theory of human rights even prior to the introduction of his reflections on the divine in the concluding chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights. But in this essay, I argue that an adequate account of human rights cannot, in fact, be sustained without some role for God’s creative activity in two dimensions, the ontological and the motivational. These dimensions must be distinguished from the epistemological dimension of human rights, that is, the question of whether epistemological access to truths about human rights is possible without reference to God’s existence, nature, or will. The NNL view is that such access is possible. However, I will argue, the epistemological cannot be entirely cabined off from the relevant ontological and motivational issues and the NNL framework can accommodate this fact without difficulty.

Anthropocene: New Geological Era or New Biophysical

The Anthropocene has created a new cartography where various discursive levels are intertwined. It unites two fields of knowledge: geology and anthropology. In the 19th century, Romanticism challenged the separation between natural sciences and spirit sciences. With the Anthropocene a geological era is established, but with an epistemological dimension: environmental catastrophes are not a passive "object", they become an agent of social and political change. Images of the world (Weltbild) turn nature into an animated whole that challenges the dual vision: observer and observed. There is no nature without "observer", nor geology without anthropology. The Anthropocene modifies the foundations of our view of the world where we had excluded life. This is how concepts such as symbiogenesis, homeostasis, etc., which make visible and try to explain phenomena that are otherwise inexplicable. The Naturwissenschaft by J.W. Goethe is a point of support, with all these ideas that develop in the 20th century and anticipate the Anthropocene term of the 21th century. While the concepts of "belief" and "science" continue to be sharpened, rehabilitating "old quarrels" around anthropology, cosmology, theology, etc. The dignity of man is at stake.

Conspiracy Theories as Superstition: Today’s Mirror Image in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus

The contention in this paper is that the theological-political disputes Spinoza was concerned with 350 years ago are similar to the conspiratorial disputes we experience today. The world in Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus, a political intervention in his time, serves as a “mirror image”, that is to say, it deals with the same problem we face today albeit in a different mode. Understanding our contemporary condition under the auspices of a Spinozist perspective, problems in countermeasures to the conspiratorial disputes come to light. Scholarly work and practice focus on the epistemological dimension of conspiracy theories, tying in the extent to which they are problematic to the degree in which they deal in untruth. However, the lesson from Spinoza’s analysis of the theological-political disputes is that such theories do not deal in truth, but, in affect, they do not spring from a lack of education but a lack of certainty. The work of Spinoza opens up a different approach, and if our aim is like that of the TTP, to defend political life against the threat of civil war, such a different approach is in order.

Archaeological heritage in the age of digital colonialism

Digital archaeologists claim that their practices have proven to be an important tool for mediating conflict, ensuring that the digital turn in archaeology entails engaging in current political issues. This can be questioned by analysing a copy of the Syrian Arch of Triumph. The original was destroyed in 2015. A year later, a copy was carved out of Egyptian marble; the replica was constructed thanks to digital documentation, which allowed archaeologists to create a 3D model. The arch was placed in various Western locations; however, it never reached Syria. Hybridity, the cultural and political significance of the arch’s replica and its ‘Grand Tour’ invite us to think about different interpretive layers of this artefact of ideological discourse (ontological, epistemological, ethical). In this paper, the replica of the Syrian arch will be analysed through the frameworks of post-colonial theory and technology studies. Both perspectives provide an insight into promising advantages and alarming drawbacks of such digital practices. This paper argues that the case of a copy of the Syrian Arch of Triumph on the one hand reflects the contemporary colonial technocracy in heritage politics (an ethical dimension), and on the other demonstrates that an ideological aspect of its digital reconstruction emerges from a speculative anticipation of what might constitute the universal value of world heritage in the future (an onto-epistemological dimension).

How to Treat a Testifier

This chapter offers a positive account of the speaker’s expectation of proper treatment (when she testifies that p). It does so in terms of the job that the speaker purports to be performing qua testifier, and the expectations she is entitled to have in virtue of the purport of that act. After noting that assertion is the speech act tailor made to enable a speaker to perform the type of job associated with acts of testifying, the chapter argues that it is the expectations one is entitled to have in making an assertion that generate the relevant conversational pressures. This makes clear how the pragmatic and interpersonal dimensions of this type of act interact with the epistemological dimension of testimonial transactions.

The Speaker’s Expectation of Trust

Given a speaker who tells one that p, there are ways of responding to what one is told whereby one wrongs (or does an injustice to) the speaker. This motivates the idea that a speaker is entitled to expect that her say-so not be responded to in those ways. Chapter 3 argued that this sort of normative expectation is the key to understanding the conversational pressure that bears on an audience who is told that p. Chapter 4 considers recent attempts to understand the source and scope of the speaker’s normative expectation. It argues that all extant attempts fail in this regard. The lesson that it takes from these failures concerns the main challenge of providing what is wanted: our account must illuminate how the interpersonal and pragmatic dimensions of the speech acts of telling and testifying interact with the epistemological dimension of testimony.