Basic Results on Normal Form Games

2015 ◽  
pp. 3-57
Author(s):  
Jean-Francois Mertens ◽  
Sylvain Sorin ◽  
Shmuel Zamir
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Normal Form Games

scholarly journals Opponent learning awareness and modelling in multi-objective normal form games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roxana Rădulescu ◽  
Timothy Verstraeten ◽  
Yijie Zhang ◽  
Patrick Mannion ◽  
Diederik M. Roijers ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Multi Objective

scholarly journals Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Bruno Yun ◽  
Srdjan Vesic ◽  
Nir Oren
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Normal Form Games

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

scholarly journals Distance-Based Equilibria in Normal-Form Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 1750-1757
Author(s):  
Erman Acar ◽  
Reshef Meir
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Existence Results ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Strategy Profile ◽  
Action Profile

We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of “possible profiles” that are within a certain distance from the actual action profile. We investigate the various instantiations in which the agent chooses her strategy using well-known rationales e.g., considering the worst case, or trying to minimize the regret, to cope with such uncertainty. Any such modification in the behavioral model naturally induces a corresponding notion of equilibrium; a distance-based equilibrium. We characterize the relationships between the various equilibria, and also their connections to well-known existing solution concepts such as Trembling-hand perfection. Furthermore, we deliver existence results, and show that for some class of games, such solution concepts can actually lead to better outcomes.

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