agent model
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2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 496
Author(s):  
João Sequeira ◽  
Jorge Louçã ◽  
António M. Mendes ◽  
Pedro G. Lind

We analyze the empirical series of malaria incidence, using the concepts of autocorrelation, Hurst exponent and Shannon entropy with the aim of uncovering hidden variables in those series. From the simulations of an agent model for malaria spreading, we first derive models of the malaria incidence, the Hurst exponent and the entropy as functions of gametocytemia, measuring the infectious power of a mosquito to a human host. Second, upon estimating the values of three observables—incidence, Hurst exponent and entropy—from the data set of different malaria empirical series we predict a value of the gametocytemia for each observable. Finally, we show that the independent predictions show considerable consistency with only a few exceptions which are discussed in further detail.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bartomeu Mulet ◽  
Florian Ferreira ◽  
Eduardo Quinones ◽  
Damien Gratadour ◽  
Mario Martin

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Se-Hak Chun ◽  
Jeong-Yoo Kim

Abstract In this article, we extend the model of Newman, H., and D. Wright. 1990. “Strict Liability in a Principal-Agent Model.” International Review of Law and Economics 10: 219–231 and strengthens their result that the strict liability can attain social optimum in a principal-agent relation to the situation in which the court appreciates any contractual terms regarding apportionment of damages between an employer and an employee under vicarious liability rule. Our model also generalizes and extends vicarious liability to the negligence-based liability rule.


2021 ◽  
pp. 225-245
Author(s):  
Peter John

This chapter explores the central government departments, executive agencies, and other public bureaucracies in operation in the UK today, such as those in local and territorial governments. These bodies help make and implement public policies and run public services. The chapter reviews more general work on bureaucracy and public administration, and sets out the theory of politician–bureaucrat relationships (going back to the principal–agent model), before addressing the classic question of civil service influence over public policy. It then takes account of the diversity of bureaucratic organizations operating in Britain today. The chapter also looks at the evidence of how politicians manage to satisfy their political objectives through delegating authority to these bodies.


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