Earning Social Citizenship in the European Union: Free Movement and Access to Social Assistance Benefits Reconstructed

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 270-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dion KRAMER

AbstractWhile ideas on ‘earned citizenship’ have been around in discussions on the coexistence of freedom of movement and nationally-bounded welfare states in the European Union, both the concept and the process it entails have hardly been explored in connection to EU (case) law. This contribution identifies earned citizenship as a technique of government in the broader political strategy of neoliberal communitarianism, requiring Union citizens to ‘earn’ access to the welfare system through an emphasis on their individual responsibility to fulfil the economic, social and cultural conditions of membership. Analysing economically inactive Union citizens’ access to social assistance benefits, it argues that earned citizenship has been visible since the Court’s early citizenship jurisprudence, but has been reconstructed with the recentDano-line of case law.

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 27-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksander Cieśliński

THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND “SOCIAL TOURISM”The idea of social citizenship in the European Union as a brand new stage of the integration process following well established market citizenship used to be very popular and tempting, especially for Euro-enthusiasts. Taking into account at the same time how important social rights turn out to be for modern state and citizenship it should not be a surprise that such development would be a solid basis for the concept of the more advanced and human-oriented Union. For the decades since the Maastricht Treaty the evolution of the case-law of the Court of Justice has seemed to prove that direction. Unfortunately, due to the worldwide crisis as well as new EU accessions covering rather less developed countries, political climate has changed in recent years and particularly EU migrating citizens’ claims for social benefits are rather considered a threat and part of so called “social tourism” that needs to be explained. As it turned out the CJEU case-law has also been modified and here the most famous example is the Dano case.The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the most important changes brought by this ruling and subsequent ones until the present day and their wider implications. What is particularly interesting is the restoration of practical meaning of the limitations and conditions for legal residence and social assistance stemming from Directive 2004/38 that seemed to be almost omitted in previous case-law in the name of respecting the general citizenship guarantees and non-discrimination principle. There should also be no doubt that  his principle shall not be treated as unlimited for all EU citizens who find themselves in the same situation, as Member States are again entitled to differentiate them more rigorously basing on such criteria as the level of integration with its society and the market. Another important aspect that has been modified refers to a less individual approach to every claimant for social benefits which was criticized due to serious administrative burden for national authorities and the way it became rationalized also seems to be quite interesting.


Author(s):  
Sébastien Brisard ◽  
Guglielmo Cantillo ◽  
Ramona Grimberger ◽  
Victoria Hanley-Emilsson ◽  
Rebeka Hevesi ◽  
...  

Council of the European Union v. European Commission, Case C-409/13, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 14 April 2015European Commission v. Vanbreda Risk & Benefits, Case C‑35/15 P(R), Order of the Vice-President of the Court, 23 April 2015Geoffrey Léger v. Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des femmes, Établissement français du sang...


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


ERA Forum ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-117
Author(s):  
Sofía Mairal Montero De Espinosa ◽  
Laviero Buono ◽  
Balázs Rozsnyai

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Daukšienė ◽  
Arvydas Budnikas

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the purpose of the action for failure to act under article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The statements are derived from the analysis of scientific literature, relevant legislation, practice of the European Union Court of Justice (CJEU) and the European Union General Court (EUGC). Useful information has also been obtained from the opinions of general advocates of the CJEU. The article of TFEU 265, which governs the action for failure to act, is very abstract. For this reason, a whole procedure under the article 265 TFEU was developed by the EU courts. The original purpose of the action for failure to act was to constitute whether European Union (EU) institution properly fulfilled its obligations under the EU legislation. However, in the course of case-law, a mere EU institution’s express refusal to fulfill its duties became sufficient to constitute that the EU institution acted and therefore action for failure to act became devoid of purpose. This article analyzes whether the action for failure to act has lost its purpose and become an ineffective legal remedy in the system of judicial review in the EU. Additionally, the action for failure to act is compared to similar national actions.


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