Thinking What One is Doing: Knowledge-how, Methods, and Reliability

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
John Turman
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Performance Robustness

Abstract There has been renewed interest over the last twenty years in Ryle's claims and arguments about knowledge-how. Elzinga (2018) and Löwenstein (2017) have both recently defended independent Ryle-inspired accounts of knowledge-how. In what follows, I will propose and defend an amendment to accounts of knowledge-how like those of Elzinga and Löwenstein. I argue that this amendment provides an additional needed distinction between the performance robustness provided by certain performance methods (or styles), and the robustness of an agent's ability to perform according to such methods (or styles). Additionally, the proposed amendment, if adopted, will make the amended views even more Rylean. I argue for this, in part, through original exegetical work on an under-discussed theme in Ryle's philosophy of mind: the relation between semi-hypothetical statements, methodological act-description, and knowledge-how.

The true philosophy of mind.

1869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Columbus Graham
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind

Shaping a Science of Social Work

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Work ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Critical Realism ◽  
Work Practice ◽  
Social Work Practice ◽  
Scientific Discipline ◽  
Helping Professions ◽  
Grand Challenges ◽  
The Future

In contrast to other helping professions, social work does not currently define itself as scientific, or as a scientific discipline. Starting with the work of John Brekke, this volume considers what a science of social work might look like. These ideas have developed from an extended collaboration among the chapter authors and others. Aspects of the framework described here include approaches to ontology and epistemology (scientific and critical realism); science and the the identity of social work; the context of Grand Challenges for social work; the place of values in a science of social work; the importance of theory in social work science; and how ideas from the philosophy of mind can also inform what a social work science should be. The volume then describes the application of social work science to social work practice, managing the tensions between rigor and relevance, and ways to educate future scholars. The concluding chapter suggests some ways in which this framework might affect social work practice and education in the future.

Beyond Concepts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Conceptual Development ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Language Function ◽  
Natural Signs ◽  
Transmission Of Information ◽  
The World ◽  
Natural Information ◽  
Natural Ontology

This book weaves together themes from natural ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and information, areas of inquiry that have not recently been treated together. The sprawling topic is Kant’s how is knowledge possible? but viewed from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The assumption is that we are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is roughly as natural science has tried to describe it. Very unlike Kant, then, we must begin with ontology, with a rough understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world and how it manages to reflect the rest of nature. And in trying to get from ontology to cognition we must traverse another non-Kantian domain: questions about the transmission of information both through natural signs and through purposeful signs including, especially, language. Novelties are the introduction of unitrackers and unicepts whose job is to recognize the same again as manifested through the jargon of experience, a direct reference theory for common nouns and other extensional terms, a naturalist sketch of uniceptual—roughly conceptual— development, a theory of natural information and of language function that shows how properly functioning language carries natural information, a novel description of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, a discussion of perception as translation from natural informational signs, new descriptions of indexicals and demonstratives and of intensional contexts and a new analysis of the reference of incomplete descriptions.

Knowledge First

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter ◽  
Emma C. Gordon ◽  
Benjamin W. Jarvis
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Theoretical Background ◽  
Contemporary Research ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Research Themes ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Individual Contributions ◽  
The Individual

In this introductory chapter, the volume’s editors provide a theoretical background to the volume’s topic and a brief overview of the papers included. The chapter is divided into five parts: Section 1 explains the main contours of the knowledge-first approach, as it was initially advanced by Timothy Williamson in Knowledge and its Limits. In Sections 2–3, some of the key philosophical motivations for the knowledge-first approach are reviewed, and several key contemporary research themes associated with this approach in epistemology, the philosophy of mind and elsewhere are outlined and briefly discussed. The volume’s papers are divided into two broad categories: foundational issues and applications and new directions. Section 4 discusses briefly the scope and aim of the volume as the editors have conceived it, and Section 5 offers an overview of each of the individual contributions in the volume.

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