Executive Order 13928 on Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Beth Van Schaack

On June 11, 2020, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 13928 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court under the authority vested in him by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and other federal statutes. Although the Trump Administration had earlier threatened aggressive action against the International Criminal Court (ICC), the issuance of the E.O. followed a ruling by the ICC Appeals Chamber authorizing the Prosecutor to commence an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, which might implicate U.S. persons. The E.O. declared the ICC's “illegitimate assertion of jurisdiction” over U.S. personnel and the personnel of “certain of its allies” to be “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” within the meaning of IEEPA. It is a sweeping measure, blocking all property within the United States owned by designated natural or legal person (section 1); barring any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to, or for the benefit of, designated persons (section 3), including even the donation of food, clothing, or medicine (section 2). The E.O. also authorized the imposition of certain immigration restrictions, including suspension of entry into the United States of ICC officials and their immediate family members (Section 4).

2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-140

On September 2, 2020, the Trump administration announced that the United States had added the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and the head of the Office of the Prosecutor's Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division, Phakiso Mochochoko, to the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. The action followed Executive Order 13,928, signed in June, which authorized economic sanctions and visa restrictions on ICC employees who are investigating whether U.S. forces committed war crimes in Afghanistan. Governments and human rights groups decried the sanctions as an attack on international justice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (3) ◽  
pp. 625-630

On April 4, 2019, the United States revoked the visa of Fatou Bensouda, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This action occurred less than a month after Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that, except to the extent otherwise required by the UN Headquarters Agreement, the United States would impose visa restrictions on “those individuals directly responsible for any ICC investigation of U.S. personnel.” In her preliminary investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, Bensouda had specifically listed war crimes by U.S. military and intelligence agencies as one of several categories of crimes that her office found reason to believe had occurred. Approximately one week after Bensouda's visa revocation, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) denied her request to move forward with an investigation of the situation in Afghanistan.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-173

On September 10, 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered an address fiercely criticizing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Bolton challenged the legitimacy of the ICC and expressed particular concern over its inquiry into potential war crimes committed by members of the U.S. military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan. He identified retaliatory measures the United States would undertake if the ICC “comes after us, Israel or other U.S. allies.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107
Author(s):  
Kevin S. Robb ◽  
Shan Patel

Abstract In September 2018, then U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech that ushered in a new, more aggressive era of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (icc). Washington’s disapprobation over the icc’s interest in the alleged crimes of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan has been seen as the cause for this change. While this is certainly partly true, little attention has been paid to Fatou Bensouda’s prosecutorial behaviour as an explanatory factor. Using the framework from David Bosco’s Rough Justice, this article demonstrates that a distinct shift in prosecutorial behaviour occurred when Fatou Bensouda took over as Chief Prosecutor. In contrast to Luis Moreno Ocampo’s strategic approach, avoidant of U.S. interests, Bensouda’s apolitical approach directly challenged the U.S. This shift in prosecutorial behaviour ruptured the ‘mutual accommodation’ that previously characterised the icc-U.S. relationship and, in turn, produced the shift in U.S. policy that now marginalises the Court.


2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Bogdan

AbstractState-parties to the International Criminal Court Statute have a general obligation to cooperate with the Court. The duty to cooperate represents the functional cornerstone of the Court's existence. A narrow exception to this duty is contained in Article 98 of the Statute, which provides for limited circumstances in which the Court must refrain from seeking a surrender of an individual to the Court. Following rules of treaty interpretation, as well as an examination of the legislative history of the ICC Statute, the article explores the scope of Article 98, the provision the United States relied on in concluding a series of bilateral agreements that are primarily aimed at preventing the surrender of any U.S. nationals to the ICC. The article considers the issue of what impact, if any, the agreements have in the context of extradition, and the U.S.' legal ability to fulfill the commitments made in the "Article 98" agreements.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUDITH KELLEY

What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances two classic arguments that typically are difficult to substantiate; namely, state preferences are indeed partly normative, and international commitments do not just screen states; they also constrain.


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