Executive Order 13928 on Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Beth Van Schaack
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Legal Person ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Aggressive Action ◽  
Blocking Property ◽  
Trump Administration

On June 11, 2020, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 13928 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court under the authority vested in him by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and other federal statutes. Although the Trump Administration had earlier threatened aggressive action against the International Criminal Court (ICC), the issuance of the E.O. followed a ruling by the ICC Appeals Chamber authorizing the Prosecutor to commence an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, which might implicate U.S. persons. The E.O. declared the ICC's “illegitimate assertion of jurisdiction” over U.S. personnel and the personnel of “certain of its allies” to be “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” within the meaning of IEEPA. It is a sweeping measure, blocking all property within the United States owned by designated natural or legal person (section 1); barring any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to, or for the benefit of, designated persons (section 3), including even the donation of food, clothing, or medicine (section 2). The E.O. also authorized the imposition of certain immigration restrictions, including suspension of entry into the United States of ICC officials and their immediate family members (Section 4).

scholarly journals United States Imposes Economic Sanctions and Visa Restrictions on International Criminal Court Officials

2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-140
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Justice ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Trump Administration

On September 2, 2020, the Trump administration announced that the United States had added the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and the head of the Office of the Prosecutor's Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division, Phakiso Mochochoko, to the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. The action followed Executive Order 13,928, signed in June, which authorized economic sanctions and visa restrictions on ICC employees who are investigating whether U.S. forces committed war crimes in Afghanistan. Governments and human rights groups decried the sanctions as an attack on international justice.

scholarly journals The Trump Administration Revokes the ICC Prosecutor's U.S. Visa Shortly Before the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Declines to Authorize an Investigation into War Crimes in Afghanistan

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (3) ◽  
pp. 625-630
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Preliminary Investigation ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trial Chamber ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Trump Administration

On April 4, 2019, the United States revoked the visa of Fatou Bensouda, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This action occurred less than a month after Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that, except to the extent otherwise required by the UN Headquarters Agreement, the United States would impose visa restrictions on “those individuals directly responsible for any ICC investigation of U.S. personnel.” In her preliminary investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, Bensouda had specifically listed war crimes by U.S. military and intelligence agencies as one of several categories of crimes that her office found reason to believe had occurred. Approximately one week after Bensouda's visa revocation, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) denied her request to move forward with an investigation of the situation in Afghanistan.

scholarly journals Trump Administration Expresses Strong Disapproval of the International Criminal Court

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-173
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Intelligence Agencies ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Trump Administration

On September 10, 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered an address fiercely criticizing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Bolton challenged the legitimacy of the ICC and expressed particular concern over its inquiry into potential war crimes committed by members of the U.S. military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan. He identified retaliatory measures the United States would undertake if the ICC “comes after us, Israel or other U.S. allies.”

The United States, the International Criminal Court, and Afghanistan: The Rupturing of Mutual Accommodation

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107
Author(s):  
Kevin S. Robb ◽  
Shan Patel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Strategic Approach ◽  
Chief Prosecutor ◽  
The U.S

Abstract In September 2018, then U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech that ushered in a new, more aggressive era of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (icc). Washington’s disapprobation over the icc’s interest in the alleged crimes of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan has been seen as the cause for this change. While this is certainly partly true, little attention has been paid to Fatou Bensouda’s prosecutorial behaviour as an explanatory factor. Using the framework from David Bosco’s Rough Justice, this article demonstrates that a distinct shift in prosecutorial behaviour occurred when Fatou Bensouda took over as Chief Prosecutor. In contrast to Luis Moreno Ocampo’s strategic approach, avoidant of U.S. interests, Bensouda’s apolitical approach directly challenged the U.S. This shift in prosecutorial behaviour ruptured the ‘mutual accommodation’ that previously characterised the icc-U.S. relationship and, in turn, produced the shift in U.S. policy that now marginalises the Court.

The United States and the International Criminal Court: Avoiding Jurisdiction Through Bilateral Agreements in Reliance on Article 98

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Bogdan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
Bilateral Agreements ◽  
General Obligation ◽  
History Of ◽  
Treaty Interpretation

AbstractState-parties to the International Criminal Court Statute have a general obligation to cooperate with the Court. The duty to cooperate represents the functional cornerstone of the Court's existence. A narrow exception to this duty is contained in Article 98 of the Statute, which provides for limited circumstances in which the Court must refrain from seeking a surrender of an individual to the Court. Following rules of treaty interpretation, as well as an examination of the legislative history of the ICC Statute, the article explores the scope of Article 98, the provision the United States relied on in concluding a series of bilateral agreements that are primarily aimed at preventing the surrender of any U.S. nationals to the ICC. The article considers the issue of what impact, if any, the agreements have in the context of extradition, and the U.S.' legal ability to fulfill the commitments made in the "Article 98" agreements.

Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUDITH KELLEY
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
International Commitments ◽  
The Creation

What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances two classic arguments that typically are difficult to substantiate; namely, state preferences are indeed partly normative, and international commitments do not just screen states; they also constrain.

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