Briefly Noted

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-355

On Friday, December 18, 2020, the International Court of Justice issued its decision in Guyana v. Venezuela, on the question of its jurisdiction in the case. Guyana asked the Court “to confirm the legal validity and binding effect of the Award regarding the Boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela, of 3 October 1899).” According to a press release from the Court, Guyana argued that the 1899 award was the final settlement on all questions relating to the boundary line between British Guyana and Venezuela. According to Guyana, the Court's jurisdiction was based on the 1966 Agreement to Resolve the Controversy between Venezuela and the UK over the Frontier between Venezuela and British Guiana (the Geneva agreement), as well as the U.N. Secretary General's decision in 2018 to choose the ICJ as the means to settle the dispute between the two parties. Venezuela opposed the Court's jurisdiction and so the Court separated the question of jurisdiction from the merits of the case. By a judgment of twelve votes to four, the Court found that it has jurisdiction to hear the aspects of the application filed by Guyana that related to the validity of the 1899 award and the question of the definitive nature of the settlement of the land boundary dispute. It ruled that, pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Agreement, the “‘controversy’ that the parties agreed to settle through the mechanism established under the Geneva Agreement concerns the question of the validity of the 1899 Award, as well as its legal implications for the boundary line between Guyana and Venezuela.” Moreover, the Court found that the parties agreed to give the U.N. Secretary General the authority to choose, by a binding legal decision, the means to settle their dispute and that the parties consented to the Secretary General's choice of judicial settlement. This means, ultimately, that the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.

2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 673-694 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT D. SLOANE

This article analyzes the provisional measures order of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, the first provisional measures order issued by the ICJ after its decision in LaGrand holding that such orders have binding effect. After reviewing the background to Mexico's action, the article focuses on Avena's place in the Court's provisional measures jurisprudence, its international legal significance, its potential effects, if any, on the ICJ's perceived institutional legitimacy and authority, and its legal and political consequences for the United States. In particular, the article examines the domestic legal implications of the Court's order for the United States in the context of developing international norms on capital punishment and the due process standards governing its implementation in states that continue to practise it.


2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-53
Author(s):  
David P. Stewart

On July 7, 2011, the United States Supreme Court declined to stay the execution of Humberto Leal García, a Mexican national who had been convicted some sixteen years ago in Texas of murder.1 Relying on the decision of the International Court of Justice (‘‘ICJ’’) in the Avena case,2 García contended that the United States had violated his right to consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (‘‘Consular Convention’’).3 He sought the stay so that the U.S. Congress could consider enactment of proposed legislation to implement the ICJ decision.4 In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected his argument, stating that ‘‘[t]he Due Process Clause does not prohibit a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment.’’5 García was executed by lethal injection that evening.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (12) ◽  

In its judgement from June 27, 2001, in the LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), the International Court of Justice made a number of watershed rulings: (a) The Court established that Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations creates individual rights for foreign nationals abroad, and not just rights protecting the interests of states that are a party to the Convention; (b) The Court ruled that, beyond the undisputed failure on the part of the U.S. to take the measures required by the Convention, the application of an American provision of criminal procedure in the LaGrand brothers' cases (a provision that prevented the domestic courts from reviewing the implications of the Convention violation admitted by the Americans) itself constituted a violation of Article 36(2) of the Convention; (c) The Court, as a remedy in the case of future violations of the Convention, ordered the United States to provide a procedure for the review and reconsideration of convictions secured in circumstances in which the obligations of the Convention had not been observed; and (d) as a separate matter the Court ruled that its provisional orders, issued pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, have binding effect.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-22
Author(s):  
Victor KATTAN

AbstractThe Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] on the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 has been hailed as a major victory by the government of Mauritius and by representatives of the Chagossians who were forcibly removed from the islands to make way for the establishment of an American military facility on the island of Diego Garcia at the height of the Cold War. The opinion was categorical: the process of decolonization of Mauritius was not lawfully completed when that country acceded to independence in 1968. The UK lost on every single argument it made before the Court and is under an obligation to bring its administration of the Chagos Archipelago to an end “as rapidly as possible”. This comment focuses on what the ICJ said about self-determination, and whether the Advisory Opinion could have consequences for future cases at the Court.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-182

In the wake of President Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reimpose sanctions, Iran instituted proceedings against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In its application, filed on July 16, 2018, Iran alleged that the re-imposition of sanctions constituted a violation of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Treaty of Amity) between Iran and the United States. In order to prevent “irreparable damages” to the Iranian economy, Iran simultaneously filed a request for provisional measures. After the ICJ issued an order unanimously granting limited provisional measures on October 3, 2018, the United States announced its intention to terminate the Treaty of Amity. The United States issued its first phase of sanctions on August 7, 2018, and the remaining sanctions took effect on November 5, 2018.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Chachko

On October 3, 2018, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a unanimous order indicating limited provisional measures against the United States. Iran initiated the case, Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. United States), after the United States announced its decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and revoke related sanctions relief for Iran. While the ICJ found that it had prima facie jurisdiction to hear the case—contrary to the U.S. position—the provisional measures it granted fell significantly short of the relief Iran sought. The Court also hinted that it might accept a significant element of the U.S. jurisdictional objection at the merits stage of the case.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-216
Author(s):  
Francis A. Boyle

The article explores the author’s experience of crafting legal actions meant to bring a case against the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the genocidal conditions that arose from their actions against the people of Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Based on a similar effort, successfully brought to the International Court of Justice on behalf of the people and Republic of Bosnia in 1993, the strong potential for a legal and peaceful remedy to bring an end to Iraqi civilian suffering ‐ as well as the potential to avert a future war ‐ existed and drove the author to implore Iraqi legal action before the ICJ. Iraqi state officials, from the President’s Office to that of Deputy PM Tariq Aziz, through Iraqi diplomats in New York, were canvassed and engaged in an effort for the author to receive their support to act on Iraq’s behalf at the ICJ. Published here is the author’s recollection of this effort to prosecute international crimes against the Iraqi people as well as an overview of the ICJ case that while never brought forward, could have prevented the 2003 invasion and its aftermath.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. Scott ◽  
Craig L. Carr

The refusal of the United States to consider itself bound by the recent decision in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, coupled with the earlier termination of its adherence to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, has sparked a small storm of controversy and concern. Part of this concern involves how the United States, presumably a law-abiding and law-respecting nation, could possibly bring itself to snub the International Court of Justice and, by extension, the ideal of international law. Another part of this concern involves the likely consequences of the United States move on the vitality of the Court as the focal institution of a slowly evolving system of international law. A less obvious concern, but arguably one of paramount importance, calls into question the wisdom of insisting that the ICJ retain its optional compulsory jurisdiction. It is this less obvious concern that we propose to discuss here.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER J. LE MON

Following the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Avena case, US courts have had a mixed record in applying the decision domestically. In this article, I examine the treatment by US courts of claims by criminal defendants alleging Vienna Convention violations, subsequent to the Avena judgment. First, I discuss the two limited decisions so far taken by the US Supreme Court regarding the Vienna Convention, and briefly explain several of the judicially-created rules that have prevented most US courts from reaching the merits of Vienna Convention claims. Next, I analyse the ICJ judgment in the LaGrand case, and provide an overview of the reception of that case by the US courts. After a summary of the Avena decision, I turn to the latest cases in which Vienna Convention claims based on Avena have been raised in US courts, focusing on the two most important decisions, and examining their contradictory rulings. As the US Supreme Court has now decided to hear an appeal in one of these cases, I conclude by arguing that the Supreme Court should take the opportunity to elucidate the role of the International Court of Justice in US law when the United States has consented to binding treaty interpretation by that court.


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 152-154

On 8 December 2003, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution asking the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague to render an ““advisory opinion”” on the legality of Israel's separation wall in the occupied territories after a Security Council draft resolution condemning the wall had been vetoed by the United States on 9 October. The ICJ initiated proceedings on 10 December, receiving written and oral statements over the next two months. Israel's statement focused on challenging the ICJ, while the United States and a number of European states also questioned the appropriateness of the court's rendering an opinion on a political matter. Almost a fourth of the court's sixty-four-page ruling was taken up with addressing these challenges on grounds of law and precedent. The fifteen-member court ruled unanimously that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, but there was one dissenting voice (the American judge, Thomas Buergenthal) as to whether the ICJ should comply with the request to give an advisory opinion. At the end of six months of hearings and deliberations, the court voted on the five questions put to it by the General Assembly pertaining to the legality of the wall. The vote (paragraph 63) was fourteen to one (with Judge Buergenthal dissenting; see Doc. D3) on four of the five questions, as follows: (1) that the ““construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law””; (2) that Israel must dismantle the structure forthwith (as in para. 151 reproduced below); (3) that Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage (as in para. 153 below); and (4) that ““The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated regime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.”” Concerning the question of whether all UN member states had an ““obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the wall's construction”” (see para. 159 below), Judge Kooijmans of Holland joined Judge Buergenthal in his dissent, making the vote 13-to-2. The full text of the opinion is available online at www.icj-cij.org.


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