scholarly journals Roll-Call Vote Selection: Implications for the Study of Legislative Politics

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 691-706
Author(s):  
CAITLIN AINSLEY ◽  
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBBA ◽  
BRIAN F. CRISP ◽  
BETUL DEMIRKAYA ◽  
MATTHEW J. GABEL ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Voting Procedures ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Representative Samples ◽  
Quantities Of Interest

Roll-call votes provide scholars with the opportunity to measure many quantities of interest. However, the usefulness of the roll-call sample depends on the population it is intended to represent. After laying out why understanding the sample properties of the roll-call record is important, we catalogue voting procedures for 145 legislative chambers, finding that roll calls are typically discretionary. We then consider two arguments for discounting the potential problem: (a) roll calls are ubiquitous, especially where the threshold for invoking them is low or (b) the strategic incentives behind requests are sufficiently benign so as to generate representative samples. We address the first defense with novel empirical evidence regarding roll-call prevalence and the second with an original formal model of the position-taking argument for roll-call vote requests. Both our empirical and theoretical results confirm that inattention to vote method selection should broadly be considered an issue for the study of legislative behavior.

scholarly journals Geography, Uncertainty, and Polarization

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (04) ◽  
pp. 775-794 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nolan McCarty ◽  
Jonathan Rodden ◽  
Boris Shor ◽  
Chris Tausanovitch ◽  
Christopher Warshaw
Keyword(s):  
Rural Areas ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
State Legislators ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Mass Public ◽  
Ideological Polarization ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Democrats And Republicans

Using new data on roll-call voting of US state legislators and public opinion in their districts, we explain how ideological polarization of voters within districts can lead to legislative polarization. In so-called “moderate” districts that switch hands between parties, legislative behavior is shaped by the fact that voters are often quite heterogeneous: the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans within these districts is often greater than the distance between liberal cities and conservative rural areas. We root this intuition in a formal model that associates intradistrict ideological heterogeneity with uncertainty about the ideological location of the median voter. We then demonstrate that among districts with similar median voter ideologies, the difference in legislative behavior between Democratic and Republican state legislators is greater in more ideologically heterogeneous districts. Our findings suggest that accounting for the subtleties of political geography can help explain the coexistence of polarized legislators and a mass public that appears to contain many moderates.

Tracing the selection bias in roll call votes: party group cohesion in the European Parliament

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikoleta Yordanova ◽  
Monika Mühlböck
Keyword(s):  
Selection Bias ◽  
Group Cohesion ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Rule Change ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Strategic Motives ◽  
Party Group

Legislative politics scholars rely heavily on roll call vote (RCV) data. However, it has been claimed that strategic motives behind RCV requests lead to overestimating party group cohesion and, thus, biased findings on legislative behaviour. To explore this claim, we distinguish between two types of bias, a ‘behavioural bias’ and a ‘selection bias’. A recent rule change in the European Parliament, making RCVs mandatory on all final legislative votes, presents the unique opportunity to evaluate the latter. We compare party group cohesion in requested and mandatory RCVs by examining final legislative votes before and after the rule adoption using amendment RCVs (which still need to be requested) as a benchmark. The analysis shows that group cohesion is higher whenever RCVs are not just requested on some but mandatory on all votes. Hence, there is indeed a ‘selection bias’ in RCV data. Yet, somewhat contrary to former claims, relying on requested RCVs leads to underestimation of the cohesion party groups would have had were all votes automatically roll called. We argue that this is mainly because requests occur on more contentious votes.

Off the Record: Unrecorded Legislative Votes, Selection Bias and Roll-Call Vote Analysis

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBBA ◽  
MATTHEW GABEL ◽  
LACEY MURRAH ◽  
RYAN CLOUGH ◽  
ELIZABETH MONTGOMERY ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Random Sample ◽  
Selection Bias ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
General Study ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Legislative Voting ◽  
Sampling Problem ◽  
The Universe

Scholars often use roll-call votes to study legislative behaviour. However, many legislatures only conclude a minority of decisions by roll call. Thus, if these votes are not a random sample of the universe of votes cast, scholars may be drawing misleading inferences. In fact, theories over why roll-call votes are requested would predict selection bias based on exactly the characteristics of legislative voting that scholars have most heavily studied. This article demonstrates the character and severity of this sampling problem empirically by examining European Parliament vote data for a whole year. Given that many legislatures decided only a fraction of their legislation by roll call, these findings have potentially important implications for the general study of legislative behaviour.

Integrating Voting Theory and Roll Call Analysis: A Framework

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua D. Clinton ◽  
Adam Meirowitz
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Point ◽  
Testing Procedure ◽  
Formal Modeling ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
Federal Aid ◽  
Voting Theory ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Legislative Studies ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Hypothesis Testing Procedure

Scholars of legislative studies typically use ideal point estimates from scaling procedures to test theories of legislative politics. We contend that theory and methods may be better integrated by directly incorporating maintained and to be tested hypotheses in the statistical model used to estimate legislator preferences. In this view of theory and estimation, formal modeling (1) provides auxiliary assumptions that serve as constraints in the estimation process, and (2) generates testable predictions. The estimation and hypothesis testing procedure uses roll call data to evaluate the validity of theoretically derived to be tested hypotheses in a world where maintained hypotheses are presumed true. We articulate the approach using the language of statistical inference (both frequentist and Bayesian). The approach is demonstrated in analyses of the well-studied Powell amendment to the federal aid-to-education bill in the 84th House and the Compromise of 1790 in the 1st House.

scholarly journals What Motivates an Oligarchic Elite to Democratize? Evidence from the Roll Call Vote on the Great Reform Act of 1832

2019 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 773-825 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toke S. Aidt ◽  
Raphaël Franck
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Rural Areas ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Members Of Parliament

AbstractThe Great Reform Act of 1832 was a watershed for democracy in Great Britain. We study the vote on 22 March 1831 in the House of Commons to test three competing theories of democratization: public opinion, political expedience, and threat of revolution. Peaceful agitation and mass-support for reform played an important role. Political expedience also motivated some members of Parliament to support the reform, especially if they were elected in constituencies located in counties that would gain seats. Violent unrest in urban but not in rural areas had some influence on the members of Parliament. Counterfactual scenarios suggest that the reform bill would not have obtained a majority in the House of Commons in the absence of these factors.

Party Competition and Coalitional Stability: Evidence from American Local Government

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 1055-1070
Author(s):  
PETER BUCCHIANERI
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Party System ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Responsible Party

For decades, political scientists have argued that competition is a fundamental component of a responsible party system, such that when one party dominates politics, legislative coalitions destabilize and democratic accountability suffers. In this paper, I evaluate these predictions in an important but largely unexplored legislative environment: American local government. Using an original collection of roll-call records from 151 municipal councils, I show that legislative behavior is more one-dimensional when elections are partisan and the electorate is evenly balanced between the parties. When either of these features is absent, however, elite behavior remains unstructured, with coalitions shifting over time and across issues. These differences across institutional and competitive contexts suggest that partisan elections—and the party organizations that nearly always come with them—are critical for translating electoral insecurity into organized government, raising questions about the capacity for electoral accountability in a growing set of one-party dominant governments across the country.

scholarly journals What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?

2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW B. HALL
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
General Election ◽  
Primary Elections ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Primary Election ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
General Elections ◽  
The U.S

This article studies the interplay of U.S. primary and general elections. I examine how the nomination of an extremist changes general-election outcomes and legislative behavior in the U.S. House, 1980–2010, using a regression discontinuity design in primary elections. When an extremist—as measured by primary-election campaign receipt patterns—wins a “coin-flip” election over a more moderate candidate, the party’s general-election vote share decreases on average by approximately 9–13 percentage points, and the probability that the party wins the seat decreases by 35–54 percentage points. This electoral penalty is so large that nominating the more extreme primary candidate causes the district’s subsequent roll-call representation to reverse, on average, becoming more liberal when an extreme Republican is nominated and more conservative when an extreme Democrat is nominated. Overall, the findings show how general-election voters act as a moderating filter in response to primary nominations.

scholarly journals The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data

2004 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOSHUA CLINTON ◽  
SIMON JACKMAN ◽  
DOUGLAS RIVERS
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Models ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Bayesian Procedure ◽  
Party Discipline ◽  
Statistical Framework ◽  
Test Models ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Sincere Voting

We develop a Bayesian procedure for estimation and inference for spatial models of roll call voting. This approach is extremely flexible, applicable to any legislative setting, irrespective of size, the extremism of the legislators' voting histories, or the number of roll calls available for analysis. The model is easily extended to let other sources of information inform the analysis of roll call data, such as the number and nature of the underlying dimensions, the presence of party whipping, the determinants of legislator preferences, and the evolution of the legislative agenda; this is especially helpful since generally it is inappropriate to use estimates of extant methods (usually generated under assumptions of sincere voting) to test models embodying alternate assumptions (e.g., log-rolling, party discipline). A Bayesian approach also provides a coherent framework for estimation and inference with roll call data that eludes extant methods; moreover, via Bayesian simulation methods, it is straightforward to generate uncertainty assessments or hypothesis tests concerning any auxiliary quantity of interest or to formally compare models. In a series of examples we show how our method is easily extended to accommodate theoretically interesting models of legislative behavior. Our goal is to provide a statistical framework for combining the measurement of legislative preferences with tests of models of legislative behavior.

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