Rational Justification and Mutual Recognition in Substantive Domains

Dialogue ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Historical Knowledge ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Fundamental Part ◽  
Pragmatic Account

This paper argues that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for rational justification in empirical knowledge or morals, is in fundamental part socially and historically based, although this is consistent with realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and with strict objectivity about basic moral principles. To judge fully rationally that one judges, and thus to justify one’s judgment rationally, requires recognizing one’s inherent fallibility and hence our mutual interdependence for assessing our own and each others’ judgments and their justification. This provides a pragmatic account of rational justification which dispatches the distinction between “rational” and “historical” knowledge.

Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’sPhenomenology of Spirit

Dialogue ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 753-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Modern Natural ◽  
Pragmatic Account

ABSTRACT: Individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification in cognition or morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. I argue for this by defending key themes from Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts of rational judgment and justification, including the “autonomy” of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel’s account of “mutual recognition.” These themes are rooted in Kant’s and Hegel’s transformation of the modern natural law tradition, which originates the properly pragmatic account of rationality, which affords genuine rational justification, and which provides for realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about moral norms.

scholarly journals How might we identify and measure learning progression in history?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Zarmati
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Mathematical Concept ◽  
Early Learning ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Learning Progression ◽  
Historical Knowledge ◽  
Essential Characteristic

Learning progression is a continuum that measures advances in learning by tracking development from early learning to more sophisticated levels of mastery. Mathematics relies on an understanding of empirical knowledge and concepts in a hierarchical sequence; students need to understand (or master) one mathematical concept before they can proceed to the next. In comparison, progress of understanding in history is not necessarily hierarchical because it is based on mastery of concepts and skills rather than historical knowledge, which is geographically and temporally variable. With history, it is not necessary to progress sequentially from one concept in order to comprehend another; learning is measured by mastery of levels of complexity within each skill or understanding and mastery can be concurrent and interrelated. The essential characteristic of progression in history is that students can demonstrate an increase in their cognitive ability to think analytically and critically.

Rag-bags, Disputes and Moral Pluralism

Utilitas ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berys Gaut
Keyword(s):  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Moral Principles

Moral pluralism of the kind associated with W. D. Ross is the doctrine that there is a plurality of moral principles, which in their application to particular cases can conflict, and that there is no further principle to determine which of these principles takes priority in cases of conflict. Two objections are commonly advanced against this kind of pluralism: that it proposes a rag-bag of moral principles lacking a unifying basis; and that it offers no way to adjudicate moral disputes when our intuitions about what to do conflict. The present paper replies to both of these objections, in particular by responding to versions of them advanced by Brad Hooker. The tying together and justification of different moral principles may be achieved by a general rational justification procedure, rather than by a further moral principle; and such a rational justification procedure can help to adjudicate moral disputes.

scholarly journals Hegel’s justification of the human right to non-domination

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Critical Methodology ◽  
Philip Pettit ◽  
The Social ◽  
Republican Liberty

?Hegel? and ?human rights? are rarely conjoined, and the designation ?human rights? appears rarely in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that readers have looked for a modern Decalogue, and have neglected how Hegel justifies his views, and hence just what views he does justify. Philip Pettit (1997) has refocused attention on republican liberty. Hegel and I agree with Pettit that republican liberty is a supremely important value, but appealing to its value, or justifying it by appeal to reflective equilibrium, are insufficient both in theory and in practice. By reconstructing Kant?s Critical methodology and explicating the social character of rational justification in non-formal domains, Hegel shows that the republican right to non-domination is constitutive of the equally republican right to justification (Forst 2007) - both of which are necessary requirements for sufficient rational justification in all non-formal domains, including both claims to rights or imputations of duties or responsibilities. That is the direct moral, political and juridical implication of Hegel?s analysis of mutual recognition, and its fundamental, constitutive role in rational justification. Specific corollaries to the fundamental republican right to non-domination must be determined by considering what forms of illicit domination are possible or probable within any specific society, in view of its social, political and economic structures and functioning.

Moral principles and cognitive load

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanne M. Watkins ◽  
Simon M. Laham
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Load ◽  
Moral Principles
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