VII. The Liberal Party Divided 1916–1918

1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward David

A great deal of published historical work has been devoted to establishing the causes and chronology of the demise of the Liberal party in British politics. The downfall of the Liberals has been ascribed to the inevitable outflanking development of the Labour party; to the mutilation of Liberal principles involved in waging the first ‘total’ war; to the personal rifts and feuds between the rival followers of Asquith and Lloyd George—and to various combinations of these factors. Yet there has been no detailed analysis of the division within the Parliamentary Liberal party during the First World War. Although at the end of 1916 obviously certain Liberals supported Asquith and others Lloyd George, no attempt has been made to examine the way in which the rifts in the party were reflected in political action in the House of Commons during the time of the second coalition government, nor to determine accurately the lines of division in the party. An answer to the question of ‘How did the Liberal party divide during the First World War?’ has proved elusive, although some historians of the period have been more successful than others.

1989 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
George L. Bernstein

For some time now, the narrative of the Liberal party's demise during the First World War has been fairly firmly defined. The war imposed strains on liberal ideology by forcing Liberals to compromise long-cherished policies such as free trade, a free market and a volunteer army. Concurrently, a growing division among Liberals emerged over how to conduct the war. H. H. Asquith and his supporters were increasingly reluctant to accept further compromises of voluntarism and the market mechanism for allocating resources; David Lloyd George and his supporters demanded massive government intervention in every aspect of the economy to mobilize the nation for total war. The replacement of Asquith by Lloyd George as prime minister in December 1916 marked the triumph of the latter approach. Traditional liberalism as a practical ideology of government was now discredited. The Liberal party was left with no unity or purpose. The leaders disliked and distrusted each other; there was no agreement on policy or the future direction of the party. Thus, it was in no position by the end of the war to compete with the resurgent Conservative and Labour parties for the allegiance of the British voter.


Author(s):  
Benjamin Ziemann

It is a commonplace to see the First World War as a major caesura in German and European history. This article records the war years from 1914–1918 in Germany. Not least, such an interpretation can rely on the perceptions of influential contemporary observers. In Germany, as in other belligerent countries, many artists, intellectuals, and academics experienced the outbreak of the war as a cathartic moment. While it is straightforward to see the mobilization for war and violence as a major caesura for any of the belligerent countries, it is much more complicated to account for causalities and for German peculiarities. Difficult methodological questions arise, which have not always been properly addressed. While Germany was facing a ‘world of enemies’, as a popular slogan suggested, the semantics of the political shifted to an articulation of emotions, excitements, and promises, contributing to a dramatized narrative centered around the notions of sacrifice and fate. The effect of World War I concludes the article.


1998 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-462
Author(s):  
Carol A. Lockwood

The English rural myth suggested that being close to the rhythms of nature, as opposed to being immersed in the irritations and pollution of city life, would create a settled, healthy, content, and loyal population. By the inter-war period the rural myth depicted an appealing image of self-sufficient, independent peasants living an uncomplicated lifestyle based on agricultural pursuits. In the aftermath of the First World War this picture of a golden countryside was popular and admired by social reformers, members of the government, and the general public. The coalition government incorporated this myth into its post-war social legislation and created in 1919 a land settlement scheme for newly demobilized soldiers aimed at establishing a new base of smallholding agricultural workers to populate the countryside. The myth may have been appealing, but it turned out to be economically not self-sustaining and politically it got little more than lip service. A myth cannot be attained through mere legislation. This article examines the land settlement scheme in East Sussex during the inter-war period and argues that even in an area seemingly well-suited to such a program, the scheme was neither practical nor successful in its attempt to put the myth into practice.


Author(s):  
Matthias Blum ◽  
Jari Eloranta

This chapter features a discussion of the economy and mobilization for the First World War. The authors analyse the implications and cost of total war, concluding with an examination of its contradictory legacies. In studying the war’s impact on Germany in particular, the chapter provides an in-depth look at the consequences of war on Europe’s strongest pre-war economy, without the complications of separating out the issues of a developing country, which can mimic those faced in wartime. The economic challenges that warring parties faced during the war included mobilization, warfare, labour shortage, impaired domestic economic activity, restricted international trade, a systematic redistribution of resources towards the war economy, food rationing, the predictable emergence of black markets, and a drop in living standards. The authors also discuss strategies to meet the significant financial demands associated with the war, and its tumultuous economic and political aftermath.


1972 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Douglas

The National Democratic Party (NDP) provides the most spectacular example of a ‘ mushroom ’ party in twentieth century British politics. It first fielded candidates in the 1918 general election, and ten of them were returned to parliament. Those of its M.P.s who defended their seats in 1922 all stood under different auspices; they were all defeated, and none of them was ever again elected. Yet in its short career the NDP and its predecessors underwent some very considerable changes in structure and purpose. Their origin must be sought in the widely different, and often confused, attitudes to the First World War which existed in the Labour party and the various Socialist groups.


2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 413-431
Author(s):  
ANDREW BARROS

ABSTRACTRecent studies of ‘total war’ depict a process of inexorable expansion leading to an often nebulous linkage of everything to war. This article takes the study of ‘total war’ in the opposite direction by studying a specific example of strategic restraint. It examines how the French bombing strategy that was developed over the course of the First World War went to considerable lengths to maintain a distinction between the civilian and the military. The article studies France's restraint by highlighting the strategic, geographical, institutional, and economic factors upon which it was built. It then goes on to examine the political pressures for an expansion of bombing which proved incapable of overturning this policy. Finally, it contrasts French restraint with that of its key ally, Great Britain. There, bombing developed into a strategic weapon designed to destroy the ‘home front’. This study of restraint underscores the importance of limits, and the attendant choices government has to make, in understanding the course and intensity of a country's mobilization for modern war.


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