ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). Pp. 717. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, Iran's Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). Pp. 432.

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith S. Yaphe

Tony Cordesman has become a veritable institution among Washington policy analysts. Few are more prolific, especially in the area of comparative analysis of weapons systems. He can be depended on to produce data-rich, comprehensive, lavishly documented studies of military doctrine and usage, intentions to acquire or produce weapons systems, and willingness to abide by international arms-control regimes. These two books are no exception. They include indepth analyses of conventional and non-conventional weapons systems. It is the latter that makes these books so important to analysts of regional weapons development and arms control. Cordesman examines Iraqi and Iranian acquisitions, from purchase, absorption, production, and use of conventional weapons to efforts to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—the so-called weapons of mass destruction—and the requisite ballistic-missile–delivery systems.

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (913) ◽  
pp. 235-259
Author(s):  
Frank Sauer

AbstractThis article explains why regulating autonomy in weapons systems, entailing the codification of a legally binding obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of force, is such a challenging task within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is difficult because it requires new diplomatic language, and because the military value of weapon autonomy is hard to forego in the current arms control winter. The article argues that regulation is nevertheless imperative, because the strategic as well as ethical risks outweigh the military benefits of unshackled weapon autonomy. To this end, it offers some thoughts on how the implementation of regulation can be expedited.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Pettineo ◽  
Robert Aitchison ◽  
Scott M Leikin ◽  
Stephen N Vogel ◽  
Jerrold B Leikin

Asian Survey ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gi-Wook Shin ◽  
Rennie J. Moon

Kim Jong Un continued to consolidate his power through personnel changes, and North Korean society saw increasing consumerism, along with signs of growing inequality. The economy did well through early 2017 but the subsequent effects of sanctions remained uncertain. North Korea conducted its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and its sixth nuclear test, triggering heated debate in the US and elsewhere about how to respond. Kim clearly is not going to give up working on weapons of mass destruction.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S1) ◽  
pp. s58-s58 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rossodivita ◽  
M. Guidotti ◽  
M. Ranghieri

In the history of humankind, any new scientific discovery has shown the risk of a “dual use” for peaceful purposes or for warfare. In regard to non-conventional weapons, the recent exponential development of nanosciences and nanotechnology can provide efficient tools for counteracting these threats, by improving the detection, protection, and decontamination capabilities in the field of CBRN defence. Nevertheless, these disciplines also may offer novel, uncontrolled means of mass destruction, leading to the synthesis of new, intentionally toxic systems. Furthermore, several points of concern are linked to the new concepts of “nanotoxicology” and “nanopathology: If a multidisciplinary approach is needed to study nanosciences and nanotechnologies, a multidisciplinary approach also is needed to have a strict control on potential illegal uses of nanosystems. Experts active in various fields, such as academic, industrial, military, and health protection institutions, must work cooperatively to constantly follow the state of the art, note which kind of critical emerging technologies may lead to illicit uses, and control the diffusion of hazardous nanosystems that may be potential precursors of weapons of mass destruction, and cooperate with CBRN emergency prevention organizations in order to plan suitable countermeasures. This presentation will cover some examples of nanosystems applied to defense from non-conventional warfare agents and answer questions regarding potential misuses of basic nanoscience and nanotechnology findings.


Author(s):  
Joseph K. Asahina ◽  
Takao Shirakura

Destruction of chemical weapons is a technical area that involves extensive international cooperation, with open discussion among a wide variety of participants aimed at elimination of these weapons of mass destruction. The most common methods for destruction of chemical weapons are: (1) chemical neutralization and (2) incineration after separation of the chemical agent from the weapon’s explosive charge. When the munitions are stockpiled, the agent and the explosive charge are easily separated by means of reverse assembly or water jet cutting. However, for munitions that are not stockpiled, complete separation of agent and explosive charge is nearly impossible.


2017 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Ballard ◽  
Jonathan E. Forman

AbstractThe Chemical Weapons Convention remains a landmark international treaty. It was the first multilateral agreement to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and include a strict verification regime to monitor compliance. Scientists were not only deeply engaged in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but have been central to the life of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ever since it came into existence almost 20 years ago. Over that time, during which the OPCW focused primarily on its mission to oversee the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, the organization has relied on a very committed core of scientific expertise – from within and outside – to help guide it. As that core task comes to a close, the Organization faces a new challenge: ensuring that chemical weapons do not return. Meeting that challenge will require new approaches to the OPCW’s mission.


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