Refugees and internally displaced persons — International humanitarian law and the role of the ICRC

1995 ◽  
Vol 35 (305) ◽  
pp. 162-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer

The main purpose of this brief study is to show the importance of international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, for internally displaced persons, i.e. persons displaced within their own country, and to refugees, i.e. persons who have fled their country. Not only does this body of international law protect them when they are victims of armed conflict, but its rules — if scrupulously applied — would make it possible to avoid the majority of displacements.

Author(s):  
Hill-Cawthorne Lawrence

This chapter identifies the main categories of persons deemed to be in need of protection in situations of armed conflict, according to which the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) are structured. The two principal categories of persons under the law of international armed conflict (IAC) are combatants/prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians. This categorization lies at the heart of one of the key principles of IHL, that of the distinction between combatants (being, generally, lawful targets) and civilians (being, generally, not lawful targets). These two principal categories are then further divided, with special (additional) rules applying to certain persons falling within each sub-category—including the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked; women; children; the elderly, disabled, and infirm; refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); mercenaries and spies; journalists; and the missing and the dead. For some of these categories of persons, such as women and displaced persons, the rules remain very basic and inadequate for the contemporary challenges faced in armed conflicts. What is more, many of these categories are even less clearly defined under the law of non-international armed conflict (NIAC).


1995 ◽  
Vol 35 (305) ◽  
pp. 181-191

According to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols additional thereto, the mandate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) applies in both international and noninternational armed conflict situations. The States party to the Geneva Conventions have also recognized the ICRC's right to propose activities in behalf of victims of internal strife, by adopting the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Article 5, para. 2d, of the Statutes).


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 435-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
DARAGH MURRAY

AbstractInternational humanitarian law establishes explicit safeguards applicable to detention occurring in non-international armed conflict. However, debate exists as to whether these treaty provisions establish an implicit legal basis for detention. This article approaches this debate in light of the application of international humanitarian law to non-state armed groups. It examines the principal arguments against implicit detention authority and then applies the law of treaty interpretation to international humanitarian law's detention-related provisions. On the basis of current understandings of international law – and the prohibition of arbitrary detention in particular – it is concluded that international humanitarian law must be interpreted as establishing implicit detention authority, in order to ensure the continued regulation of armed groups. Although, perhaps, problematic from certain states’ perspective, this conclusion is reflective of the current state of international law. However, this is not necessarily the end of the story. A number of potential ‘ways forward’ are identified: implicit detention authority may be (i) rejected; (ii) accepted; or (iii) re-examined in light of the non-state status of armed groups, and what this means for the content of the prohibition of arbitrary detention. These scenarios are examined in light of the desire to ensure: the coherency of international law including recognition of the role of armed groups, the continued effectiveness of international humanitarian law, and state sovereignty. An emphasis is placed on understanding the non-state status of armed groups and what this means for international regulation and the content of imposed obligations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 78-120
Author(s):  
Steve Tiwa Fomekong

While significant attention has thus far been paid to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), the rules of humanitarian law that it sets out have not yet been the subject of a specific in-depth analysis. This contribution aims to fill this gap in the literature. It specifically examines the humanitarian law rules contained in the Kampala Convention to determine their meaning and scope, as well as their contribution to strengthening international humanitarian law (IHL). It begins by analysing the articulation of these regional humanitarian rules with the universal rules of IHL that preceded them to determine whether there is any divergence between them. Next, the paper attempts to determine the extent to which the humanitarian law provisions of the Kampala Convention enrich the legal protections provided by IHL for the improvement of the plight of internally displaced persons from armed conflict. Finally, with an approach centred around making suggestions for law reform, the paper demonstrates why and how these rules should inspire the future development of conventional and customary norms that would assist with the challenges of conflict-induced displacement.


2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (895-896) ◽  
pp. 1195-1224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Heffes ◽  
Marcos D. Kotlik

AbstractCommon Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or asui generislegal regime.


Author(s):  
W Ochieng

Since the Geneva Conventions, the architecture of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has been founded upon a distinction between international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. Today, this claim stands to be revisited since international and non-international armed conflicts are no longer strict organising frameworks for the categorisation of rules of armed conflicts. This is seen in that over fifty years ago, when the four Geneva Conventions were negotiated, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were the cornerstones of international law and while their force today is still apparent, the interdependence of states, and global concerns such as terrorism and the commission of widespread human rights violations have eroded the traditional inviolability of borders. The dichotomy in humanitarian law is as implausible today as it is also fundamentally unworkable given the current conditions of conflicts. This dualist conception is no longer adequate to deal with current features of armed conflict, which do not fit neatly into the two categories and frequently contain mixed elements which thus make the task of classification highly complex. The codification of customary rules of international humanitarian law has narrowed the grounds on which the distinctions are predicated. In addition, the two regimes apply simultaneously on multiple situations. Moreover, the question of contemporary armed conflicts raises serious doubts as to whether the traditional understanding of international law still suffices to explain the complexities of modern day armed conflicts. This essay seeks to offer a different perspective on armed conflicts by suggesting a systematic rethinking of the categorisation of conflict. It argues that some of the dilemmas of contemporary conflicts may be attenuated by a new conceptualisation of this bipolar distinction namely a need for a unitary conception of armed conflict.


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