scholarly journals Private Benefits, Public Vices: Railways and Logrolling in the Nineteenth-Century British Parliament

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Rui Esteves ◽  
Gabriel Geisler Mesevage
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Negative Externality ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Vote Trading

Vote trading among lawmakers (logrolling) can enable political rent-seeking but is difficult to identify. To achieve identification, we explore the rules governing voting for railway projects in the U.K. Parliament during the Railway Mania of the 1840s. Parliamentary rules barred MPs from voting directly for their interests. Even so, they could trade votes to ensure their interests prevailed. We find that logrolling was significant, accounting for nearly one-quarter of the railway bills approved. We also quantify a negative externality to society from logrolling ranging from 1/3 to 1 percent of contemporary GDP.

The Origins of State Pure Food Regulation

2003 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1103-1130 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARC T. LAW
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Food Industry ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Traditional Food ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Food Regulation ◽  
Information Problem ◽  
Late Nineteenth

Why did state governments begin to regulate the food industry in the late nineteenth century? One possible explanation is that pure food regulation was the result of rent seeking on the part of traditional food producers who wanted to limit the availability of new substitutes. Another potential hypothesis is that regulation was desired because it helped solve an asymmetric information problem in the market for food products. I find the evidence to be more consistent with the latter hypothesis.

Gold and the Public in the Nineteenth-Century Gold Rushes

2018 ◽  
pp. 65-87
Author(s):  
David Goodman
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Public Good ◽  
The State ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Private Land ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Electoral Defeat

In the great nineteenth-century British world cycle of gold rushes, individualist wealth seeking became associated with democratic politics, and views about the public rather than private benefits of gold became increasingly the preserve of conservatives. In Georgia, governor George Gilmer declared in 1830 that the gold diggers were “appropriating riches to themselves, which of right equally belong to every other citizen of the state,” but he soon suffered electoral defeat. In 1850s California and Australia, individual miners were rapidly associated with a democratic and egalitarian future, even with the public good. This helps explain the oddly uncontested decisions to allow mining on public—and, in many places, private—land and use of public resources such as timber and water. This chapter is by David Goodman.

scholarly journals Zeggenschap in de publieke onderneming: empty voting, hidden ownership, securities lending en short selling

2011 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 306-316
Author(s):  
Piet Duffhues ◽  
Sanne Van Oirschot
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Kunnen Zijn ◽  
Vote Trading ◽  
Hidden Ownership ◽  
Empty Voting

Het stemrecht op aandelen in publieke ondernemingen is na een lange periode van betrekkelijke desinteresse opnieuw terug in de aandacht van ondernemingen, beleggers, toezichthouders, juristen, academische onderzoekers en wetgevers. Traditioneel hielden alleen ondernemingen zich via de Algemene Vergadering van Aandeelhouders (AVA) bezig met het regelen van het stemrecht. Sinds enkele jaren doen dat ook de financiële markten zelf en wel op afstand van de onderneming. Dit vindt plaats in de vorm van financiële transacties die als innovatief kunnen worden beschouwd waardoor het cashflowrecht wordt gescheiden van het stemrecht op aandelen (‘ontkoppeling’ en ‘vote trading’). Traditioneel zijn deze twee rechten gebonden aanwezig in aandelen. De implicaties van deze transacties plaatsen de leiding van ondernemingen en de wetgever voor grote afwegingsproblemen. Dit artikel concludeert dat er geen reden is om de nieuwe financiële transacties a priori af te wijzen omdat deze vaak zullen berusten op een economisch rationele grondslag. Omdat concurrentiebeperking en het onttrekken van ‘private benefits’ hoofddoelen van de stemmende aandeelhouder kunnen zijn, is echter waakzaamheid geboden. Desondanks bieden deze overwegingen geen steekhoudend argument tegen ontkoppeling, omdat dit motief even goed leidend kan zijn wanneer cashflow- en zeggenschapsrechten niet gescheiden zijn.

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