scholarly journals Does Financial Market Structure Affect the Cost of Raising Capital?

Author(s):  
James Brugler ◽  
Carole Comerton-Forde ◽  
Terrence Hendershott

Abstract We provide evidence on market structure and the cost of raising capital by examining changes in market structure in U.S. equity markets. Only the Order Handling Rules (OHR) of the Nasdaq, the one reform that reduced institutional trading costs, lowered the cost of raising capital. Using a difference-in-differences framework relative to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that exploits the OHR’s staggered implementation, we find that the OHR reduced the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings by 1–2 percentage points compared with a pre-OHR average of 3.6%. The effect is the largest in stocks with the largest reduction in institutional trading costs after the OHR.

Author(s):  
R. Stephen Elliott ◽  
Mark Schaub

Because of the growth of international trade and the increase in sales and profits in the food and beverage industry in recent years investors may believe there is a great opportunity to reap high returns from foreign equities. Cumulative excess returns from all newly issued foreign food and beverage equities over a 36-month period following the date listed on the New York Stock Exchange are tested for significant differences in performance to determine whether they outperform the S & P 500 returns. Although the 36-month cumulative excess returns are not significant, findings indicate that the food and beverage ADRs performed 13.55 percent lower than the S & P 500 Index which serves as a proxy for the market in general. Food and beverage seasoned equity offerings outperformed initial public offerings.


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Hagiu ◽  
David B Yoffie

The patent market consists mainly of privately negotiated, bilateral transactions, either sales or cross-licenses, between large companies. There is no eBay, Amazon, New York Stock Exchange, or Kelley's Blue Book equivalent for patents, and when buyers and sellers do manage to find each other, they usually negotiate under enormous uncertainty: prices of similar patents vary widely from transaction to transaction and the terms of the transactions (including prices) are often secret and confidential. Inefficient and illiquid markets, such as the one for patents, generally create profit opportunities for intermediaries. We begin with an overview of the problems that arise in patent markets, and how traditional institutions like patent brokers, patent pools, and standard-setting organizations have sought to address them. During the last decade, a variety of novel patent intermediaries has emerged. We discuss how several online platforms have started services for buying and selling patents but have failed to gain meaningful traction. And new intermediaries that we call defensive patent aggregators and superaggregators have become quite influential and controversial in the technology industries they touch. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the role and efficiency tradeoffs of these new patent intermediaries. Finally, we offer a provisional assessment of how the new patent intermediary institutions affect economic welfare.


1972 ◽  
Vol 7 (s1) ◽  
pp. 1687-1690
Author(s):  
William C. Freund

The facts of increased institutional trading on the nation's securities markets are by now well known. On the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the six major institutional groups—insurance companies, investment companies, noninsured pension funds, nonprofit institutions, common trusts, and mutual savings banks, now own more than one-fourth of the market value of listed shares compared with less than 16 percent at the end of 1956. But, ownership is merely the tip of the perennial iceberg, since institutional trading of stock has become much more significant than institutional ownership. This fact is pointed up in the recent SEC Study of Institutional Investors. It shows that there has been a relatively slow increase in the share of outstanding stock owned by institutions in all markets, but the institutional share of trading has mushroomed.


2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Zeff

This paper discusses the circumstances in which the Accounting Principles Board (APB) issued Opinions 3 and 19, in 1963 and 1971, respectively, when the Board encouraged and then required companies to publish a statement of source and application of funds, known as the funds statement. In doing so, the Board both times lagged behind company practice and the views of influential organizations, including the New York Stock Exchange and the Securities and Exchange Commission.


2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 449-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing L. Burke ◽  
Tim V. Eaton

ABSTRACT In September 2014, the Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba Group Holding Limited issued shares on the New York Stock Exchange, making it the world's largest initial public offering. This case examines different aspects of the Alibaba Group's initial public offering, including Alibaba Group's business model, financial reporting and corporate governance, as well as the macroeconomic, political, and legal environment in which the company operates. In addition, this case will familiarize students with the risks and opportunities for Chinese companies and investors when a Chinese company lists in the U.S. This case is suitable for financial accounting and international accounting courses at the intermediate and advanced levels for undergraduates as well as graduate students. The case is scalable, and instructors can choose from multiple sections of the case and different case questions to tailor the case difficulty to their students' learning needs.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document