Is it True What Haack Says About Tarski?

Philosophy ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 62 (240) ◽  
pp. 237-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard C. Jennings
Keyword(s):  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
Correspondence Theory Of Truth ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Susan Haack

In her paper ‘Is it True What They Say About Tarski?’, Susan Haack argues that Popper is wrong to regard Tarski's theory of truth as a correspondence theory of truth. For, she says:… Tarksi does not present his theory as a correspondence theory. In fact Tarski explicitly comments that the correspondence theory cannot be considered a satisfactory definition of truth. And later he observes that he was ‘by no means surprised’ to learn that, in a survey carried out by Naess, only 15 per cent agreed that truth is correspondence with reality, while 90 per cent agreed that ‘It is snowing’ is true if and only if it is snowing (p. 324).

scholarly journals Aristotle and Tarski

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-270
Author(s):  
Jan Woleński
Keyword(s):  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
Alfred Tarski ◽  
Correspondence Theory Of Truth ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Semantic Definition

Alfred Tarski frequently declared that his semantic definition of truth was inspired by Aristotle’s views. The present paper discusses this issue in the context of Marian Wesoły’s criticism of the thesis that there is an affinity between Tarski’s views and those of Aristotle. The article concludes with an inquiry into whether Aristotle’s definition of truthfulness can be identified with the correspondence theory of truth.

scholarly journals Aristotle and Tarski

2017 ◽  
pp. 261-270
Author(s):  
Jan Woleński
Keyword(s):  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
Alfred Tarski ◽  
Correspondence Theory Of Truth ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Semantic Definition

Alfred Tarski frequently declared that his semantic definition of truth was inspired by Aristotle’s views. The present paper discusses this issue in the context of Marian Wesoły’s criticism of the thesis that there is an affinity between Tarski’s views and those of Aristotle. The article concludes with an inquiry into whether Aristotle’s definition of truthfulness can be identified with the correspondence theory of truth. 

Hegel's Correspondence Theory of Truth

1994 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
H S Harris
Keyword(s):  
Logical Truth ◽  
Logical Structure ◽  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
Correspondence Theory Of Truth ◽  
The World ◽  
Cognitive Experience ◽  
Special Subset ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Ideal

“The world”, said Wittgenstein, “is the totality of facts, not of things”. According to the “correspondence theory”, therefore, “the truth” will be the totality of assertions that state “the facts”. In Hegel's mature theory of “truth”, this is not “philosophical truth” at all, but the ideal limit of “correct statement”. “Philosophical truth” however – like Wittgenstein's Tractatus – is a rather special subset of “the truly assertible facts”. It is the set that contains all of the true assertions about the logical structure of human cognitive experience. Thus, it is a set of “logical facts”; and if we are to know scientifically, what “human knowledge” is, we must be able to state these “facts” correctly. Hence Hegel's theory of “truth” is not independent of his theory of “correctness”. He has a “correspondence theory” of “truth”; but “Truth” is a property of assertions about “knowledge”, not of assertions about “the world”. For this reason, the theory of “truth” becomes a complex and interesting topic in Hegel's view, and not the boringly simple matter already disposed of in the formal definition of “correctness”. What is called “the correspondence theory” does not deserve the honorific name of “theory” at all. It is a formal logical truth that can be stated in a single sentence. Only in Hegel's theory of “experience” does “correspondence” become, for the first time, interesting.

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