Hegel's Correspondence Theory of Truth
“The world”, said Wittgenstein, “is the totality of facts, not of things”. According to the “correspondence theory”, therefore, “the truth” will be the totality of assertions that state “the facts”. In Hegel's mature theory of “truth”, this is not “philosophical truth” at all, but the ideal limit of “correct statement”. “Philosophical truth” however – like Wittgenstein's Tractatus – is a rather special subset of “the truly assertible facts”. It is the set that contains all of the true assertions about the logical structure of human cognitive experience. Thus, it is a set of “logical facts”; and if we are to know scientifically, what “human knowledge” is, we must be able to state these “facts” correctly. Hence Hegel's theory of “truth” is not independent of his theory of “correctness”. He has a “correspondence theory” of “truth”; but “Truth” is a property of assertions about “knowledge”, not of assertions about “the world”. For this reason, the theory of “truth” becomes a complex and interesting topic in Hegel's view, and not the boringly simple matter already disposed of in the formal definition of “correctness”. What is called “the correspondence theory” does not deserve the honorific name of “theory” at all. It is a formal logical truth that can be stated in a single sentence. Only in Hegel's theory of “experience” does “correspondence” become, for the first time, interesting.