Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil

1966 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence Penelhum
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Nelson Pike ◽  
Divine Goodness

The purpose of this paper is not to offer any solution to the problem of evil, or to declare it insoluble. It is rather the more modest one of deciding on its nature. Many writers assume that the problem of evil is one that poses a logical challenge to the theist, rather than a challenge of a moral or scientific sort. If this assumption is correct, and the challenge cannot be met, Christian theism can be shown to be untenable on grounds of inconsistency. This in turn means that it is refutable by philosophers, even if their task is interpreted in the most narrowly analytical fashion. It has recently been argued that the challenge of the problem of evil can be met on logical grounds, and that if the existence of evil is damaging to theism it is not because the recognition of its existence is inconsistent with some essential part of it. I take two examples of this position. The first is in the paper ‘Hume on Evil’ by Nelson Pike; the second I owe to Professor R. M. Chisholm.

scholarly journals On the Significance of Assumptions about Divine Goodness and Divine Ontology for ‘Logical’ Arguments from Evil

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 186
Author(s):  
John Bishop
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agent ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Radical Nature ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Goodness

Sterba’s Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) draws attention to the importance of ethical assumptions in ‘logical’ arguments from evil (LAfEs) to the effect that the existence of (certain types) of evil is incompatible with the existence of a God who is all-powerful and morally perfect. I argue, first, that such arguments are likely to succeed only when ‘normatively relativized’—that is, when based on assumptions about divine goodness that may be subject to deep disagreement. I then argue that these arguments for atheism are also, and more fundamentally, conditioned by assumptions about the ontology of the divine. I criticise Sterba’s consideration of the implications for his own novel LAfE of the possibility that God is not a moral agent, arguing that Sterba fails to recognize the radical nature of this claim. I argue that, if we accept the ‘classical theist’ account that Brian Davies provides (interpreting Aquinas), then God does not count as ‘an’ agent at all, and the usual contemporary formulation of ‘the problem of evil’ falls away. I conclude by noting that the question of the logical compatibility of evil’s existence with divine goodness is settled in the affirmative by classical theism by appeal to its doctrine that evil is always the privation in something that exists of the good that ought to be.

On Some Alleged Humean Insights and Oversights

1970 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-377
Author(s):  
Donald F. Henze
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Recent Article ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Philosophical Argument ◽  
Natural Religion ◽  
Introductory Note ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Nelson Pike

The knockdown argument, the logically impregnable position are rarities in philosophy. Indeed, there are some who might argue (guardedly of course) that no philosophical argument or position is immune from damaging criticism: what seems utterly convincing to one generation of philosophers is 1iable to be held up as a classic blunder by the next. Nevertheless, Hume's presentation of the problem of evil and his allied criticisms of a Christian-type theism (in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, esp. Parts X and XI) have seemed conclusive to an impressive array of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers, and both his efforts, consequently, might be regarded as likely exceptions to the principle of philosophical fallibility. But now, in a fairly recent article, Professor Nelson Pike has seen fit to challenge even these supposedly reliable cornerstones of our philosophical heritage. More recently still, Pike has included this article, unchanged, in an anthology which he has edited, and he has backed it up with an introductory note which reaffirms his challenge to Hume on evil.

Non-human animals and process theodicy

2006 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARY CHARTIER
Keyword(s):  
General Problem ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Process Thought ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Divine Goodness

I argue that that the suffering of non-human animals poses some potentially knotty difficulties for process theodicy. To respond satisfactorily to the problem of evil as it involves animals, process theists will, I argue, need either to defend some form of consequentialism or make a number of potentially plausible but certainly contestable empirical claims. I begin this internal critique by explaining the nature of the process response to the problem of evil. I explain how process thought can respond with reasonable effectiveness to the general problem of the suffering of non-human animals while highlighting the special difficulty predation might be thought to pose for the process thinker. Then, I elaborate alternative consequentialist and non-consequentialist process accounts of divine goodness in the face of the harm to non-human animals caused by predation. After summarizing my analyses in the conclusion, I underscore the costs associated with these alternatives.

The Argument from Evil: Reply to Professor Richman

1980 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Langston
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Natural Religion ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Nelson Pike

The problem of evil has traditionally been formulated as a claim about the incompatibility of the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’. Hume, for example, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part x, claims that the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’ are incompatible. In his esssy ‘Hume on Evil’, Nelson Pike argues that it has not been shown that the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’ are incompatible because it has not been shown that God could not have a morally sufficient reason for permitting suffering he could prevent.1 Moreover, according to Pike, the theist who is convinced that God must have a morally sufficient reason for permitting suffering he can prevent will claim that the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’ are not incompatible. He will claim this even though he cannot specify the morally sufficient reason why God permits suffering he can prevent. The theist will thus maintain that God exists even given the occurrence of suffering in the world.2 Robert Richman, in his essay ‘The Argument from Evil’, argues that Pike is too generous to the theist. According to Richman, only if the theist can specify the morally sufficient reason why God permits suffering he can prevent will the theist be rationally justified in maintaining that God exists in the face of suffering in the world. Richman supports his position by reformulating the argument from evil in terms of what he calls ‘the logic of our moral judgmentsr’.3 Richman thinks that his formulation of the argument from evil is successful against the theist who cannot specify the morally sufficient reason why God permits evil he can prevent. In this paper, I shall argue that Richman's argument is not successful against the typical theist, i.e. the person who accepts the existence of God on the basis of faith or a priori arguments.4

The Concept of Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil

1975 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Stanley kane
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Traditional Theism ◽  
Human Goodness ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Divine Goodness

Traditional theism maintains the view that the world is created by a God who is at once omnipotent and perfectly good. One of the most persistent challenges to this view is that known as the problem of evil. The challenge consists in the allegation that the manifest imperfections of the world are incompatible with its having been created by a God who is both perfectly good and has the power to carry out his will. In the face of this challenge some theists have sought to defend theism by drawing a sharp distinction between human goodness and divine goodness and claiming that the goodness of God is different from human goodness not merely in degree but in kind, and that God's goodness cannot be understood by men. As a consequence of this, they contend, the created world can be judged to be imperfect only if it is measured against the inferior standards of human goodness, which because they are inferior are inappropriate for judging the works of the almighty and infinitely perfect God. The sharp distinction between God's goodness and man's thus allows the theist to maintain that God is perfectly good even while recognising that there is (according to human standards of goodness and evil) a great deal of evil in the world. Hence, if the distinction can be successfully defended, it provides a neat way of getting out of the problem of evil.

Psychology and the problem of evil

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Nagpal ◽  
Ankur Prahlad Betageri
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.

The Argument from Evil and God’s Contingent Ethics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

This Introduction raises the problem of divine ethics and how it bears on the problem of evil (or ‘argument from evil’). It notes the importance of distinguishing among three conceptions of God: God as maximally great being (as ‘an Anselmian being’), God as that being who is supremely worthy of worship, and God as that being who is fully worthy of allegiance. This book treats the first conception to be the most explanatorily basic, and thus it is the sole focus of inquiry for most of the book (Chapters 1 through 6); the second and third conceptions are considered in the second part of the book (Chapters 7 through 9).

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