Rethinking Moral Status

Common-sense morality implicitly assumes that reasonably clear distinctions can be drawn between the ‘full’ moral status usually attributed to ordinary adult humans, the partial moral status attributed to non-human animals, and the absence of moral status, usually ascribed to machines and other artefacts. These assumptions were always subject to challenge; but they now come under renewed pressure because there are beings we are now able to create, and beings we may soon be able to create, which blur traditional distinctions between humans, non-human animals, and non-biological beings. Examples are human non-human chimeras, cyborgs, human brain organoids, post-humans, human minds that have been uploaded into computers and onto the internet, and artificial intelligence. It is far from clear what moral status we should attribute to any of these beings. While commonsensical views of moral status have always been questioned, the latest technological developments recast many of the questions and raise additional objections. There are a number of ways we could respond, such as revising our ordinary suppositions about the prerequisites for full moral status. We might also reject the assumption that there is a sharp distinction between full and partial moral status. The present volume provides a forum for philosophical reflection about the usual presuppositions and intuitions about moral status, especially in light of the aforementioned recent and emerging technological advances.

Reasons, Competition, and Latitude

The overall moral status of an option—whether it is required, permissible, forbidden, or something we really should do—is explained by competition between the contributory reasons bearing on that option and the alternatives. A familiar challenge for accounts of this competition is to explain the existence of latitude: there are usually multiple permissible options, rather than a single required option. One strategy is to appeal to distinctions between reasons that compete in different ways. Philosophers have introduced various kinds of non-requiring reasons that do not generate requirements, even if they win the competition. This chapter rejects two familiar versions of this strategy, one appealing to merely justifying reasons and one appealing to merely commendatory reasons. It offers a new account of how reasons compete that instead appeals to a sharp distinction between the reasons against an option and the reasons for the alternatives to that option.

Culture and the arts

The later Middle Ages as a cultural period has been shaped by the Burckhardtian tradition: Burckhardt drew a sharp distinction between the ‘medieval’ outlook he believed had prevailed north of the Alps and the ‘rebirth’ of classical antiquity he saw taking place in the Italian peninsula. Over the past 60 years, however, the validity of such a contrast has been called into question. As a consequence, it is now generally accepted that the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were characterized more by diversity than by division. This chapter examines how, in every field of cultural endeavour, from painting and sculpture to poetry and music, there emerged a series of quite different, often heterogeneous trends. Originating in different parts of Europe, these were transmitted across the continent, where they interacted with parallel developments elsewhere. The effect was less that of a concerto than of a rich and discordant symphony of competing voices.

Transcendental Illusion

This chapter examines the nature of logical, empirical, and transcendental illusion. It goes into depth on the following topics: Kant’s account of the sources of transcendental illusion, his illustrative example of the construction of polysyllogisms and the lessons he draws from this example, his two accounts of how transcendental illusion leads to dogmatism and error, and his argument for the universality of transcendental illusion. The author partly agrees with, and partly takes issue with, Michelle Grier’s justly influential account of Kant’s views on transcendental illusion and metaphysical error. What is correct in this account is its insistence on maintaining a sharp distinction between transcendental illusion and dogmatic metaphysical error; what is mistaken is its account of the fallacy that constitutes the first paralogism.

What Does it Mean to "Throw Away the Ladder"?

In this paper, I will demonstrate via reductio ad absurdum that a resolute reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus should reconsider their equation of “throwing away the ladder” with the “end of philosophy.” To do this, I will show that an inconsistency arises in Wittgenstein’s view regarding the relationship of philosophy and science since he associates “the correct method of philosophy” with the propositions of science at the end of the aforementioned text. Due to this, I will maintain that it is reasonable to posit that the sharp distinction that Wittgenstein makes between philosophy and science in the Tractatus is merely illusory. An interesting consequence of this is that if this interpretation holds then this provides sufficient grounds to maintain that what some scholars refer to as “the end of philosophy” may actually be the beginning of “Wittgenstein’s naturalism.”

Ethnicity as a category of imperial racialization: What do race and empire studies offer to Romanian studies?

This article argues that the category of indigenous Romanian, which was articulated at the end of the 18th century can be better understood as a product of imperial racialization. Building on Katherine Verdery’s work, I analyze the production of the Romanian indigeneity within the context of imperial rivalries in the Habsburg empire. In doing so, I critically investigate the impact of Benedict Anderson’s theory of nationalism in Romanian studies, given that it introduced a sharp distinction between ethnicity and race. My argument opens up two new conceptual routes. On the one hand, it suggests a line of investigation comparing the formation of Romanian ethnicity with debates about white racial identity in North America. On the other hand, it makes visible the exclusion of Roma ethnicity from narratives about the origin of Romanianness. I conclude by drawing on larger consequences regarding, not only the question of race and stereotypes, but also by looking at the global process of forming the distinction between the indigenous and the foreign migrant.

Nutrient Stocks and Distribution in Ghanaian Cocoa Ecosystems

There is a paucity of information on nutrient stocks and distribution in the cocoa ecosystem for the management of production sites to improve its productivity. Apart, sites with long histories of cocoa production could differ in nutrient stocks and distribution relative to recent production regions. Therefore, some existing cocoa farms in Ghana were sampled on the basis of shade management (shaded and unshaded) and production site longevity (Eastern region > Western North region) to determine the nutrient stock and distributions in them. Over 93% of the total ecosystems’ elementary nutrients were stored in the soil. Higher nutrient stocks occurred under shaded cocoa ecosystem. Nutrient element concentrations in cocoa tree biomasses followed the order: N > Ca > K > Mg > P > S > Al = Fe > Zn = Mn, and mostly concentrated in leaf > root = husk > branch > stem. On average, region as a main factor affected nutrient distributions. There was a sharp distinction between macronutrient and micronutrient accumulations in favour of Eastern region and Western North region, respectively. Therefore, the regional distinction with respect to macro- and micronutrients could be used as a guide to fertilizer recommendation for cocoa systems in the two regions.

La intuición, el programa dialéctico de la República y su práctica en el Parménides y el Teeteto

This article examines the relation between the dialectical program established in Plato’s Republic and the practice of dialectic in other dialogues, such as the Parmenides and the Theaetetus. The author argues against those scholars who have sustained a sharp distinction between an intuitive (not discursive) conception of knowledge and the discursive practices characteristic of Plato’s concept of dialectic. In his view, Plato has been overinterpreted from the modern perspective of the distinction between intuitive and discursive forms of knowledge. As a consequence, this article also examines the relation between the dialectical practices displayed in the Parmenides and the Theaetetus and the anhypothetical condition that Plato attributes to “the principle of everything” in the Republic.

Theophrastus’De sensibus in A-fragments of Diels-Kranz. Revisiting the Testimonia and their Value

As a crucial source for Presocratic theories of sense perception, Theophrastus’ De sensibus deserves a closer scrutiny than the placement among A-fragments, as often suggested or instigated. This paper proposes to refine our terminology for labelling the varying quality of reporting within the A-fragments has. It supplements the existing criticism of Diels’ division by analysing neglected features. A reassessment of the assumptions underlying the terms ‘fragment’ and ‘paraphrase’ can contribute to dissolving the sharp distinction between A- and B-fragments in DK. It advocates, not equality for A-fragments, but a more inclusive and accurate evaluation of the passages.

Unclarity in Reformational Thought and the Naive-Theoretical Distinction

Students and philosophers alike often find Dooyeweerd’s writings unclear and inaccessible, and the ideas expressed in them obscure and difficult to grasp. In this paper I will first explore the issue of unclarity in Dooyeweerd’s work—for example, what makes Dooyeweerdian writings difficult to understand? Why is it that his meaning is often unclear? And does this imply that something is (philosophically) wrong with his writings? Second, and as a case in point regarding unclarity in Dooyeweerd’s work, I will examine an important distinction drawn in Reformational philosophy, namely, between naive experience and theoretical thinking. In his paper “The Amsterdam Philosophy: A Preliminary Critique,” philosopher and theologian John Frame criticizes Dooyeweerd for his unclear writings and for drawing an implausibly sharp distinction between naive experience and theoretical thinking. Assessing Frame’s critique will serve as a framework for the discussion of these two related issues.