Has the Ontological Argument been Refuted?

1993 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-110
Author(s):  
William F. Vallicella
Keyword(s):  
Logical Form ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Deductive Argument ◽  
Reasonable Person ◽  
Informal Fallacy

Suppose we say that a deductive argument is probative just in case it is (i) valid in point of logical form, (ii) possesses true premises, and (iii) is free of informal fallacy. We can then say that an argument is normatively persuasive for a person if and only if it is both probative and has premises that can be accepted, without any breach of epistemic propriety, by the person in question. If the premises of a probative argument would be accepted by any reasonable person, I will call such an argument demonstrative.

Waiting for Godo… and Godan: Completing Rowe’s Critique of the Ontological Argument

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-86
Author(s):  
Roslyn Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
William Rowe

In his critique of Anselm’s ontological argument for God’s existence, William Rowe introduces the concepts of “magico” and “magican”—defining “magicos” as magicians that do not exist, and “magicans” as magicians that do exist—to help diagnose what may have gone wrong in Anselm’s argument. As I made my way through Rowe’s intriguing article, I found myself waiting for “Godo”—and for “Godan.” I expected Rowe to invoke these counterparts to his “magico” and “magican”—a non-existing God to correspond to his non-existing magician, and an existing God to correspond to his existing magician—to complete his argument. Alas, like Vladimir and Estragon, I waited in vain: neither Godo—nor Godan—ever appeared. In what follows I shall argue that their inclusion in Rowe’s argument would have settled the matter against Anselm far more decisively than do Rowe’s forays into the murky waters of question-begging.

Iconicity and Logical Form

1994 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-64
Author(s):  
Chrsitopher Hookway
Keyword(s):  
Logical Form

The Structure of Truth

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Historical Document ◽  
Truth Theory ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
First Time

Donald Davidson’s 1970 Locke Lectures appear in print for the first time in this volume, accompanied by an introduction highlighting their significance as a snapshot of his evolving views in the philosophy of language and describing their relationship to the work he published during his lifetime. The lectures comprise an invaluable historical document that illuminates how Davidson was thinking about the theory of meaning, the role of a truth theory therein, the ontological commitments of a truth theory, the notion of logical form, and so on, at a pivotal moment in the development of his thought. Unlike Davidson’s previously published work, they are written so as to be presented to an audience as a fully organized and coherent exposition of his program in the philosophy of language. Had these lectures been widely available in the years following 1970, the reception of Davidson’s work, especially in the philosophy of language, might have been very different. Given the systematic nature of the presentation of Davidson’s semantic program in these lectures, it is hoped that they will be of use to those encountering his thought for the first time.

Torts and Other Wrongs

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Gardner
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Reasonable Person ◽  
Reasonable Person Standard ◽  
The Law

Torts and Other Wrongs is a collection of eleven of the author’s essays on the theory of the law of torts and its place in the law more generally. Two new essays accompany nine previously published pieces, a number of which are already established classics of theoretical writing on private law. Together they range across the distinction between torts and other wrongs, the moral significance of outcomes, the nature and role of corrective and distributive justice, the justification of strict liability, the nature of the reasonable person standard, and the role of public policy in private law adjudication. Though focused on the law of torts, the wide-ranging analysis in each chapter will speak to theorists of private law more generally.

Moralizing Risk

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Oberdiek
Keyword(s):  
Tort Law ◽  
Complex Task ◽  
Reasonable Person ◽  
Moral Context

Chapter 2 takes up the complex task of formulating a conception of risk that can meet the twin desiderata of practicality and normativity. Though neither an unreconstructed subjective nor objective account of risk can, on its own, play the role we need it to play in a moral context, the accounts can be combined to take advantage of their respective strengths. Much of the chapter is therefore devoted to explaining how to overcome this recalibrated perspective-indifference. The chapter defends the perspective of a particular interpretation of the reasonable person, well-known from tort law, as a way of bringing determinacy to the characterization of risk. Defending this evidence-relative perspective while criticizing competing belief- and fact-relative perspectives, the chapter argues that it has the resources to meet the twin desiderata of practicality and normativity.

Anselm's Formula and the Logic of ‘God’

1973 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-288
Author(s):  
Paul M. van Buren
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Difference

Anselm built his meditation Proslogion on the formula ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’. The peculiarity of this phrase has been often remarked but not, I believe, fully appreciated. Properly understood, I shall argue, this formula, although unable to support the so-called ontological argument, throws important light on the logic of the religious use of the word ‘God’. My argument will turn on the difference between the two uses of the verb ‘conceive’ in Anselm's claim that we can conceive of that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

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