John Maynard Keynes Between Old and New Institutionalism

The article considers the possible compatibility (in epistemological and ontological terms) of the conceptions of convention and institutions in the thought of John Maynard Keynes, Thorstein Veblen and Douglass North. We argue, first, that while Veblen suggests an approach to institutions based on instincts, North sustains an approach to institutions based on rational choice, which implies distinct conceptions about institutions and the social world. We then present Keynes's ontological commitments and the epistemological implications of his ontology. We conclude that there is a background ontological compatibility between Keynes and the late North in that both accept that the socioeconomic world is fundamentally uncertain and non-ergodic; also that Keynes is epistemologically closer to North than Veblen in studying the economy as a market system embedded in social institutions; and finally that Keynes's treatment of individual action is closer to Veblen’s than North’s, in that both Keynes and Veblen see human action as based on instincts and not only on rationality.

One or None? Truth and Self-Transformation for Śaṅkara and Kamalaśīla

This article explores how two influential 8th-century Indian philosophers, Śaṅkara and Kamalaśīla, treat the threefold scheme of learning, reasoning, and meditation in their spiritual path philosophies. They have differing institutional and ontological commitments: the former, who helped establish Advaita Vedānta as the religious philosophy of an elite Hindu monastic tradition, affirms an unchanging “self” (ātman) identical to the “world-essence” (brahman); the latter, who played a significant role in the development of Buddhist monasticism in Tibet, denies both self and essence. Yet, they share a concern with questions of truth and the means by which someone could gain access to it, such as what, if anything, meditation contributes to knowledge and its acquisition. By exploring their answers to this and related questions, including how discursive and conceptual practices like learning, reasoning, and meditation could generate nonconceptual knowledge or knowledge of the nonconceptual, this essay shows the difficulty of separating “philosophical” problems of truth from those related to self-transformation or “spirituality,” as Michel Foucault defines the terms. It also reassesses, as a framework for comparison, the well-known contrast between “gradual” and “sudden” approaches to the achievement of liberating knowledge and highlights them as tensions we still struggle to resolve today.

Linguistic Relativity and the Question of Language-Specific Ontology: An Exploration of the Ontological Commitments of the Basque Language

<p>This essay explores the relationship holding between language, cognition and space by examining the notion of “ontological commitments” and focusing on Basque as the exemplar. In recent years discussions of linguistic relativity have brought to the fore the question of language-specific ontology. This topic has been addressed by Lucy (1996; 2000), and Levinson (1996), and even earlier by Whorf in the 1940s (Whorf 1995) as well as more indirectly by language typologists such as Senft (2000) and other researchers (Barton and Frank 2001; Nisbett 2003; Nisbett et al. 2001; Watson 1990). The chapter begins by introducing the key role played by “ontological commitments” in language, using Basque as the data source and, more concretely, by means of a fine-grained analysis of two Basque morphemes -en and -ki along with the schemas associated with them. Once the morphological complexity of each of the Basque examples is established, I attempt to describe the conceptual structure inherent to each classifier, following the lead of Tuggy (2003), Inglis (2003) and Palmer (2003). Methodologically, I draw on Langacker’s (2004) remarks on type, instance and nominal grounding, as well as those of Hudson (2004) and Dryer (2004) in reference to the cross-linguistic applicability of the terms “nominal grounding” and “noun phrases”. Overall, I argue for the following position: there is an aspect of spatial representation that relates directly to the differences in these ontological commitments and is conditioned by them. Finally, I propose that cognitive linguistics can profit by broadening its focus and becoming more aware of the cross-linguistic and cross-cultural research being conducted on ontological commitments.</p>

Ontological Indifference of Theories and Semantic Primacy of Sentences

In his late philosophy, Quine generalized the structuralist view in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical theories are indifferent to the ontology we choose for them. According to his ‘global structuralism’, the choice of objects does not matter to any scientific theory. In the literature, this doctrine is mainly understood as an epistemological thesis claiming that the empirical evidence for a theory does not depend on the choice of its objects. The present paper proposes a new interpretation suggested by Quine’s recently published Kant Lectures from 1980 according to which his global structuralism is a semantic thesis that belongs to his theory of ontological reduction. It claims that a theory can always be reformulated in such a way that its truth does not presuppose the existence of the original objects, but only of some objects that can be considered as their proxies. Quine derives this claim from the principle of the semantic primacy of sentences, which is supposed to license the ontological reductions he uses to establish his global structuralism. It is argued that these reductions do not actually work because they do not account for some hidden ontological commitments that are not detected by his criterion of ontological commitment.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMPLEXITY: NEUROBIOLOGICAL NATURALISM AND INTEGRATED INFORMATION THEORY

In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and aim to compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg &amp; Mallatt’s Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi’s and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg &amp; Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.

A free dialogical logic for surrogate reasoning: generation of hypothesis without ontological commitments

This article aims to present a Free Dialogic Logic [FDL] as a general framework for hypothesis generation in the practice of modelling in science. Our proposal is based on the idea that the inferential function that models fulfil during the modelling process (surrogate reasoning) should be carried out without ontological commitments. The starting point to achieve our objective is that the scientific consideration of models without a target is a symptom that, on the one hand, the Applicability of Logic should be considered among the conditions of adequacy that should take into account all modeling process and, on the other, that the inferential apparatus at the base of the surrogate reasoning process must be rid of realistic assumptions that lead to erroneous conclusions. In this sense, we propose as an alternative an ontologically neutral inferential system in the perspective of dialogical pragmatism.

Competing Ontologies: A Redux Primer for Public Administration

Over the last decade, a growing number of public administration theorists have taken up the question of how ontology—assumptions about the nature of existence—shapes our understanding of governance. This substantially updated primer, originally published in Public Administration Review, introduces the essay, provides a basic explanation of ontology, describes the fundamental debates in philosophies of ontology, and discusses why ontology is important to social and political theory and therefore public administration theory and practice. Using an ideal-type approach grounded in differing ontological assumptions, a Governance Typology is provided to support analysis of differing public administration theories. An integrative approach to governance is offered that is grounded in relational process ontology—a foundation that may support a viable synthesis of the other four primary ideal-types. The essay concludes with a call for personal reflection on the part of scholars and practitioners regarding their own ontological commitments and an invitation to collaborative inquiry.

Risk, Reward, and Scientific Ontology: Reply to Bryant, Psillos, and Slater

ABSTRACTScientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology contends that ontological commitments associated with scientific inquiry are infused with philosophical commitments. Interpretations of scientific ontology involve (what I call) metaphysical inferences, and furthermore, there are different ways of making these inferences, on the basis of different but nonetheless rational epistemic stances. If correct, this problematizes any neat distinction between naturalized and other metaphysics, and dissolves any presumption of there being a uniquely correct answer to ontological questions connected to the sciences. In this paper, I consider some weighty challenges to these contentions by Amanda Bryant, Stathis Psillos, and Matthew Slater.

Proving God without Dualism: Improving the Swinburne-Moreland Argument from Consciousness

With substance dualism and the existence of God, Swinburne (2004, The Existence of God, Oxford University Press, Oxford) and Moreland (2010, Consciousness and the Existence of God, Routledge, New York) have argued for a very powerful explanatory mechanism that can readily explain several philosophical problems related to consciousness. However, their positions come with presuppositions and ontological commitments which many are not prepared to share. The aim of this paper is to improve on the Swinburne-Moreland argument from consciousness by developing an argument for the existence of God from consciousness without being committed to substance dualism. The argument proceeds by suggesting a solution to the exceptional-point-of-view problem, i.e., the question how it can be explained that there is a conscious being lucky enough to experience the point of view of a relatively tiny brain amidst a giant universe that is indifferent about which physical entities it brings about according to the laws of physics.