scholarly journals Evil and the complexity of history: a response to Durston

2003 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICK TRAKAKIS
Keyword(s):  
Religious Studies ◽  
Single Event ◽  
Epistemic Condition ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Causal Chains

Kirk Durston recently presented an argument aimed against evidential arguments from evil predicated on instances of suffering that appear to be gratuitous; ‘The consequential complexity of history and gratuitous evil’, Religious Studies, 36 (2000), 65–80. He begins with the notion that history consists of an intricate web of causal chains, so that a single event in one such chain may have countless unforeseen consequences. According to Durston, this consequential complexity exhibited by history negatively impacts on our grasp of the data necessary to determine whether or not an evil is gratuitous. He therefore concludes that our epistemic condition poses an insurmountable barrier towards the inference from inscrutability to pointlessness. By way of reply, I contend that Durston's argument is flawed in two significant respects, and thus the evidential argument emerges unscathed from his critique.

Gratuitous evil and divine providence

2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALAN R. RHODA
Keyword(s):  
Divine Providence ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Definition Of

AbstractDiscussions of the evidential argument from evil generally pay little attention to how different models of divine providence constrain the theist's options for response. After describing four models of providence and general theistic strategies for engaging the evidential argument, I articulate and defend a definition of ‘gratuitous evil’ that renders the theological premise of the argument uncontroversial for theists. This forces theists to focus their fire on the evidential premise, enabling us to compare models of providence with respect to how plausibly they can resist it. I then assess the four models, concluding that theists are better off vis-à-vis the evidential argument if they reject meticulous providence.

The consequential complexity of history and gratuitous evil

2000 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIRK DURSTON
Keyword(s):  
Benjamin Franklin ◽  
Discrete Events ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Significant Challenge ◽  
Causal Chains ◽  
Lack Of Knowledge

History is composed of a web of innumerable interacting causal chains, many of which are composed of millions of discrete events. The complexity of history puts us in a position of having knowledge of only a minuscule portion of the consequences of any event, actual or proposed. Our almost complete lack of knowledge of the data necessary to know if an event is gratuitous makes it very likely that we would be mistaken about a very large number of events. The complexity of history, therefore, poses a significant challenge to certain types of evidential arguments from evil that begin with our observations of evils that appear to be gratuitous.For want of a nail the shoe is lost,For want of a shoe the horse is lost,For want of a horse the rider is lost,And all for the want of a nail.Benjamin Franklin, 1757

Peter van Inwagen on gratuitous evil

2013 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
KLAAS J. KRAAY
Keyword(s):  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Do So

AbstractDefenders and critics of the evidential argument from evil typically agree that if theism is true, no gratuitous evil occurs. But Peter van Inwagen has challenged this orthodoxy by urging that for all we know, given God's goals, it is impossible for God to prevent all gratuitous evil, in which case God is not required do so. If van Inwagen is right, the evidential argument from evil fails. After setting out this striking and innovative move, I examine three responses found in the literature, and show that none of them defeats van Inwagen's argument. I then offer a novel criticism: I show that van Inwagen implicitly relies on the claim that God can sensibly be thought tosatisfice, and I argue that this is seriously under-motivated. Accordingly, van Inwagen's objection to the evidential argument from evil is, at best, incomplete.

Sceptical theism and a lying God: Wielenberg's argument defended and developed

2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN LAW
Keyword(s):  
Divine Revelation ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
God's Word ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Sceptical Theism

AbstractSceptical theists attempt to block the evidential argument from evil by arguing that a key premise of that argument – that gratuitous evil exists – cannot reasonably be maintained. They argue that, for all we know, our knowledge of reasons God may have to permit such evil is radically incomplete. Thus the fact that we cannot identify reasons for God to permit the evil we observe does not allow us reasonably to conclude that no such reasons exist. In response, Erik Wielenberg has pointed out what appears to be, for many sceptical theists, an unfortunate further consequence of their position. According to Wielenberg, if sceptical theism is correct, then, similarly, the fact that we cannot identify reasons why God would lie to us does not allow us reasonably to conclude no such reasons exist. But then, for all we know, God's word constitutes not a divine revelation but a divine lie. This article examines sceptical theist responses to Wielenberg's argument to date (from Segal, and McBrayer and Swenson) and develops two new Wielenberg-style arguments for the same conclusion.

The complexity of history and evil: a reply to Trakakis

2006 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIRK DURSTON
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Religious Studies ◽  
The State ◽  
Detailed Knowledge ◽  
Consideration Of Future Consequences ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Original Argument ◽  
Future Consequences

I have presented an argument from the consequential complexity of history against certain types of evidential arguments from evil; ‘The consequential complexity of history and gratuitous evil’ Religious Studies, 36 (2000), 65–80. Nick Trakakis has responded with two objections; ‘Evil and the complexity of history: a response to Durston’ Religious Studies, 39 (2003), 451–458. He argues that the consideration of future consequences to the end of actual history may be irrelevant and, also, that one does not need detailed knowledge about possible worlds to conclude that there are better worlds. In this paper I show that, given the complexity of history, both of his objections fail to move us out of the state of agnosticism regarding what God should or should not permit. Thus, my original argument remains intact.

Defining ‘gratuitous evil’: a response to Alan R. Rhoda

2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM HASKER
Keyword(s):  
Divine Providence ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil

AbstractIn his article, ‘Gratuitous evil and divine providence’, Alan Rhoda claims to have produced an uncontroversial theological premise for the evidential argument from evil. I argue that his premise is by no means uncontroversial among theists, and I doubt that any premise can be found that is both uncontroversial and useful for the argument from evil.

scholarly journals Organic Unities

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-151
Author(s):  
Graham Floyd
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Organic Unities ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Metaphysical Claim

The principle of organic unities is a metaphysical claim regarding the nature of moral value.  It states that the value of the whole is not equal to the summation of its parts.  Even though this principle has a major impact on moral theory, it has been neglected in the consideration of the problem of God and evil.  I claim that the theist can utilize the principle of organic unities to undermine the problem of evil.  First, I explain the principle of organic unities and how it affects one’s understanding of moral value.  Next, I explicate the two major historical versions of the problem of evil: the logical argument from evil and the evidential argument from evil.  Lastly, I argue that the principle of organic unities demonstrates that God may logically co-exist with evil and that the atheologian lacks rational warrant appealing to gratuitous evil against God’s existence.  As a result, both problems fail.

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