On Necessary Gratuitous Evils

The standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil makes the prevention of gratuitous evil a necessary condition on moral perfection. I argue that, on any analysis of gratuitous evil we choose, the standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil is false. It is metaphysically impossible to prevent every gratuitously evil state of affairs in every possible world. No matter what God does—no matter how many gratuitously evil states of affairs God prevents—it is necessarily true that God coexists with gratuitous evil in some world or other. Since gratuitous evil cannot be eliminated from metaphysical space, the existence of gratuitous evil presents no objection to essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially morally perfect, and necessarily existing beings.

Organic Unities

The principle of organic unities is a metaphysical claim regarding the nature of moral value. It states that the value of the whole is not equal to the summation of its parts. Even though this principle has a major impact on moral theory, it has been neglected in the consideration of the problem of God and evil. I claim that the theist can utilize the principle of organic unities to undermine the problem of evil. First, I explain the principle of organic unities and how it affects one’s understanding of moral value. Next, I explicate the two major historical versions of the problem of evil: the logical argument from evil and the evidential argument from evil. Lastly, I argue that the principle of organic unities demonstrates that God may logically co-exist with evil and that the atheologian lacks rational warrant appealing to gratuitous evil against God’s existence. As a result, both problems fail.

God and Gratuitous Evil

In Chapter 3 of this volume, Klaas Kraay presented a critique of William Hasker’s necessity-of-gratuitous-evil defense against the evidential problem of evil (the NGE defense). Hasker’s response here in Chapter 4 contends that the defense survives all of Kraay’s objections. Most important of these objections is the contention that there is far too much gratuitous evil to be accounted for by Hasker’s defense.

Theism, Pro-Theism, Hasker, and Gratuitous Evil

In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, it is widely held that if God exists, no gratuitous evil occurs. In an important series of papers, however, William Hasker has resisted this view. If Hasker’s argument were to succeed, this would have significant consequences for certain arguments from evil, and for the debate about the axiological effects of God’s existence. Chapter 3 sets out and evaluates Hasker’s argument—three objections to it are considered and rejected, but a fourth objection is developed in a way that places considerable pressure on his view.

How to Solve the Problem of Evil

One paradigmatic argument from evil against theism claims that (1) if God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil. But (2) there is gratuitous evil, so (3) God does not exist. I consider three deontological strategies for resisting this argument. Each strategy restructures existing theodicies which deny (2) so that they instead deny (1). The first two strategies are problematic on their own, but their primary weaknesses vanish when they are combined to form the third strategy, resulting in a promising new approach to the problem of evil.

Anti-Theism, Pro-Theism, and Gratuitous Evil

Ebrahim Azadegan recently argues that personal anti-theism, the view that it’s rational for a particular individual to prefer that God not exist, is a form of gratuitous evil. He justifies this evil by arguing that the anti-theist is uniquely positioned to bargain, implore, and plea to God. I argue that Azadegan faces a paradox. Once the anti-theist recognizes that God plus anti-theism makes the world better, she should convert to pro-theism. But then there can be no reflective anti-theists who could add value to the world. Ignorance is a requirement of the anti-theist who can offer these unique goods.

C. S. Lewis & John Hick on Theodicy: Superficially Similar but Significantly Different

In the April 2014 edition of The Journal of Inklings Studies, Mark S. M. Scott compared the theodicies of C. S. Lewis and John Hick, concluding that there are ‘significant structural and substantive affinities’ between the two. In my essay, I too analyze these theodicies but arrive at a different conclusion. I argue two points: First, I argue that Lewis’ and Hick’s theodicies bear merely superficial similarities. Second, and more importantly, I argue that they stand in significant opposition to one another at fundamental points. The purpose of this essay is to set Lewis’ views on suffering apart from Hick’s and to suggest that, in the end, perhaps Lewis’ theodicy should not be included in the broad category of ‘greater-good’ theodicies, and would therefore be immune to attacks leveled against Hick’s theodicy as well as the various attacks leveled against the greater-good approach in general. For those who reject the greater-good approach and who hold that gratuitous evil does not count against God’s moral perfection, Lewis’ theodicy could serve as a helpful starting point from which one could develop more thoroughly a non-greater-good theodicy.