Moore’s Account of Vindictive Punishment: A Test Case for Theories of Organic Unities

This paper discusses two conceptions of organic unities. Moore, who first brought the notion of an organic unity to prominence, argues for an intrinsicalist conception of the organic: items do not have different non-instrumental value in different contexts, but the value they contribute to a whole of which they are a part may vary according to other parts of that whole. In this sense, they can contribute value that they have not got. This paper contrasts that conception with a different, variabilist conception which is more friendly to a general holism in the theory of value. It argues that intrinsicalism gives an incoherent account of what Moore calls vindictive punishment.

Taking values seriously

Recently, there has been a revival in taking empirical magnitudes seriously. Weights, heights, velocities and the like have been accepted as abstract entities in their own right rather than just equivalence classes of objects. The aim of my paper is to show that this revival should include value magnitudes. If we posit such magnitudes, important value comparisons (cross-world, cross-time, mind to world, cross-theory, cross-polarity, ratio) can be easily explained; it becomes easier to satisfy the axioms for measurement of value; goodness, badness, and neutrality can be given univocal definitions; value aggregation can be given a non-mathematical understanding which allows for Moorean organic unities. Of course, this does not come for free. One has to accept a rich ontology of abstract value magnitudes, but, to quote David Lewis, ‘The price is right; the benefits in theoretical unity and economy are well worth the entities.’

From Commoning the Alternatives to Commonism as an Integral Alternative to Capitalism

<p>Any inclusive comprehension of the inner nature, deep structures, and conflictual dynamism of capitalism is potentially a transformative cognitive Commons. Likewise, to achieve an inclusive understanding of the existing post-capitalist praxes and the imaginary visions of utopian futures require cumulative, collective, and cooperative learning. Thus, theories of capital and the post-/counter-capital alternatives can be generated and treated as the Commons. In this paper, I argue that although there is no single/exclusive line of historical progress beyond Capital, it is possible to create integral theoretical frameworks for orchestrating common actions across different alternative praxes. This becomes a strong possibility if our knowledge of the existing or imminent post-capitalist experiences is liberated from the disintegrating forces of the corporatized Eurocentric intellectual institutions. A <i>transformative scholarship</i> in collaboration with communities of struggle is therefore vitally needed today to generate educational Commons as a means for establishing organic unities among alternative praxes. This in itself is a prefigurative movement. <br><br></p> <p>The political goal should then be to go beyond the localized fragmented radical struggles without reducing their multiformity to challenge the totalizing effects of the capitalist markets and states. The process of building organic unities or what we may call ‘Commoning the alternatives’ requires ‘organic intellectuals’ to help post-capitalist initiatives to self-reflectively explore and address their limitations. Therefore, Commoning the knowledge and experiences of alternatives is a self-rectifying endeavor that translates paralyzing assortments into collective learning processes through which each movement becomes capable of traversing (rather than transcending) their self-inflicted ideological boundaries and thereby of developing integral macro-political projects to transcend capitalism; i.e. a <i>Commonist </i>project. </p><div><div> </div> </div>

From Commoning the Alternatives to Commonism as an Integral Alternative to Capitalism

<p>Any inclusive comprehension of the inner nature, deep structures, and conflictual dynamism of capitalism is potentially a transformative cognitive Commons. Likewise, to achieve an inclusive understanding of the existing post-capitalist praxes and the imaginary visions of utopian futures require cumulative, collective, and cooperative learning. Thus, theories of capital and the post-/counter-capital alternatives can be generated and treated as the Commons. In this paper, I argue that although there is no single/exclusive line of historical progress beyond Capital, it is possible to create integral theoretical frameworks for orchestrating common actions across different alternative praxes. This becomes a strong possibility if our knowledge of the existing or imminent post-capitalist experiences is liberated from the disintegrating forces of the corporatized Eurocentric intellectual institutions. A <i>transformative scholarship</i> in collaboration with communities of struggle is therefore vitally needed today to generate educational Commons as a means for establishing organic unities among alternative praxes. This in itself is a prefigurative movement. <br><br></p> <p>The political goal should then be to go beyond the localized fragmented radical struggles without reducing their multiformity to challenge the totalizing effects of the capitalist markets and states. The process of building organic unities or what we may call ‘Commoning the alternatives’ requires ‘organic intellectuals’ to help post-capitalist initiatives to self-reflectively explore and address their limitations. Therefore, Commoning the knowledge and experiences of alternatives is a self-rectifying endeavor that translates paralyzing assortments into collective learning processes through which each movement becomes capable of traversing (rather than transcending) their self-inflicted ideological boundaries and thereby of developing integral macro-political projects to transcend capitalism; i.e. a <i>Commonist </i>project. </p><div><div> </div> </div>

The Significance of Value Additivity

Whether value is “additive,” that is, whether the value of a whole must equal the sum of the values of its parts, is widely thought to have significant implications in ethics. For example, additivity rules out “organic unities,” and is presupposed by “contrast arguments.” This paper reconsiders the significance of value additivity. The main thesis defended is that it is significant only for a certain class of “mereologies”, roughly, those in which both wholes and parts are “complete”, in the sense that they can exist independently. For example, value additivity is significant in the case of a mereology of material objects, but not in the case of a mereology of propositions.

Organic Unities

The principle of organic unities is a metaphysical claim regarding the nature of moral value. It states that the value of the whole is not equal to the summation of its parts. Even though this principle has a major impact on moral theory, it has been neglected in the consideration of the problem of God and evil. I claim that the theist can utilize the principle of organic unities to undermine the problem of evil. First, I explain the principle of organic unities and how it affects one’s understanding of moral value. Next, I explicate the two major historical versions of the problem of evil: the logical argument from evil and the evidential argument from evil. Lastly, I argue that the principle of organic unities demonstrates that God may logically co-exist with evil and that the atheologian lacks rational warrant appealing to gratuitous evil against God’s existence. As a result, both problems fail.

Architecture and organic unity = Arquitectura y unidad orgánica

Buildings and monuments are among the most important works of art. But the conception of the arts that emerged in the 18th century, and remained the orthodoxy in philosophy for about two centuries, either excludes architecture from the fine arts or relegates it to the intermediate or decorative arts. This essay addresses this puzzle, assesses the truth in certain formalist doctrines about architecture, and advances the view that works of art are organic unities, i.e. integrated sets of solutions to various problems, some aesthetic and others technical, mathematical, theological, political, etc.Key words: art, architecture, aesthetics, formalism.Resumen: Los edificios y monumentos se encuentran entre las obras de arte más importantes. Pero la concepción de las artes que surgió en el siglo XVIII y permaneció como la ortodoxia en la filosofía durante aproximadamente dos siglos excluye la arquitectura de las bellas artes, o la relega a las artes intermedias o decorativas. El presente ensayo aborda este enigma, evalúa la verdad en ciertas doctrinas formalistas sobre la arquitectura, y avanza la opinión de que las obras de arte son unidades orgánicas, es decir, conjuntos integrados de soluciones a diversos problemas, algunos estéticos y otros técnicos, matemáticos, teológicos, políticos, etc.Palabras clave: arte, arquitectura, estética, formalismo.

Organic Unities and the Problem of Evil

Chapter 9 constitutes a critical examination of Noah Lemos’s contribution to this volume (see Chapter 8). It addresses Lemos’s defense of G. E. Moore’s principle of organic unities against three objections. The first objection concerns what is involved in contributing to the intrinsic value of a state of affairs; the second concerns a kind of evaluative schizophrenia; and the third concerns the concept of evaluative inadequacy. Lemos’s response to the third objection is examined at length, and it is argued that this response may not succeed in defeating the objection, in which case the problem of evil may not be as easy to solve as some theodicists have suggested,

Organic Unities, Summation, and the Problem of Evil

Many attempts to respond to the problem of evil appeal to the concept of an organic unity. The first part of Chapter 8 explains Roderick Chisholm’s views on organic unities, the concept of defeat, and how he thinks they bear on the problem of evil. The second part examines three prominent and recent objections to the principle of organic unities. Roughly, the objections are that (1) the principle of organic unities is incoherent, (2) it leads to “evaluative schizophrenia,” and (3) the examples that allegedly support it, do not, in fact, do so. It is argued that these objections give us no good reason to reject the principle of organic unities.

On ‘Hybrid’ Theories of Personal Good

‘Hybrid’ theories of personal good, defended by e.g. Parfit, Wolf, and Kagan, equate it, not with a subjective state such as pleasure on its own, nor with an objective state such as knowledge on its own, but with a whole that supposedly combines the two. These theories apply Moore's principle of organic unities, which says the value of a whole needn't equal the sum of the values its parts would have by themselves. This allows them, defenders say, to combine the attractions of purely subjective and purely objective views. This common understanding of the theories is, however, mistaken. At the most fundamental level they don't combine a subjective and an objective element but two objective ones. Once this is understood, their attraction as hybrid theories diminishes: the value in their wholes may be just the sum of the values in their parts.