Should Have Known

This chapter argues that there are cases in which a subject, S, should have known that p, even though, given her state of evidence at the time, she was in no position to know it. In particular, S should have known that p when (i) another person has, or would have, legitimate expectations regarding S’s epistemic condition, (ii) the satisfaction of these expectations would require that S knows that p, and (iii) S fails to know that p. I argue that these three conditions are sometimes jointly satisfied. There are (at least) two main sources of legitimate expectations regarding another’s epistemic condition: participation in a legitimate social practice; and moral and epistemic expectations more generally. In developing my position on this score, I will have an opportunity (i) to contrast practice-generated entitlements to expect with epistemic reasons to believe; (ii) to compare the “should have known” phenomenon with the phenomenon of culpable ignorance; and finally (iii) to suggest the bearing of the “should have known” phenomenon to epistemology itself.

Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility

I consider three challenges to the traditional view according to which moral responsibility involves an epistemic condition in addition to a freedom condition. The first challenge holds that if a person performs an action A freely, then she thereby knows that she is doing A. The epistemic condition is thus built into the freedom condition. The second challenge contends that no epistemic condition is required for moral responsibility, since a person may be blameworthy for an action that she did not know was wrong. The third challenge invokes the quality of will view. On this view, a person is blameworthy for a wrong action just in case the action manifests a bad quality of will. The blameworthy person need not satisfy an additional epistemic condition. I will argue that contrary to appearances, none of these challenges succeeds. Hence, moral responsibility does require a non-superfluous epistemic condition.

Is it time for robot rights? Moral status in artificial entities

Some authors have recently suggested that it is time to consider rights for robots. These suggestions are based on the claim that the question of robot rights should not depend on a standard set of conditions for ‘moral status’; but instead, the question is to be framed in a new way, by rejecting the is/ought distinction, making a relational turn, or assuming a methodological behaviourism. We try to clarify these suggestions and to show their highly problematic consequences. While we find the suggestions ultimately unmotivated, the discussion shows that our epistemic condition with respect to the moral status of others does raise problems, and that the human tendency to empathise with things that do not have moral status should be taken seriously—we suggest that it produces a “derived moral status”. Finally, it turns out that there is typically no individual in real AI that could even be said to be the bearer of moral status. Overall, there is no reason to think that robot rights are an issue now.

The Effects of Dyadic Conversations on Coronavirus-Related Belief Change

In a high-risk environment, such as during an epidemic, people are exposed to a large amount of information, both accurate and inaccurate. Following exposure, they typically discuss the information with each other in conversations. Here, we assessed the effects of such conversations on their beliefs. A sample of 126 M-Turk participants first rated the accuracy of a set of COVID-19 statements (pre-test). They were then paired and asked to discuss either any of these statements (low epistemic condition) or only the statements they thought were accurate (high epistemic condition). Finally, they rated the accuracy of the initial statements again (post-test). We did not find a difference of epistemic condition on belief change. However, we found that individuals were sensitive to their conversational partners, and changed their beliefs according to their partners’ conveyed beliefs. This influence was strongest for initially moderately held beliefs. In exploratory analyses, we found that pre-test COVID-19 knowledge was predicted by trusting Fauci, not trusting Trump, and feeling threatened by COVID-19. Conversely, pre-test COVID-19 conspiracy endorsement was predicted by trusting Trump, not trusting Fauci, news media consumption, social media usage, and political orientation. In further exploration of the political orientation predictor, we found that Democrats were more knowledgeable than Republicans, and Republicans believed more conspiracies than Democrats.

Artificial Intelligence, Responsibility Attribution, and a Relational Justification of Explainability

This paper discusses the problem of responsibility attribution raised by the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. It is assumed that only humans can be responsible agents; yet this alone already raises many issues, which are discussed starting from two Aristotelian conditions for responsibility. Next to the well-known problem of many hands, the issue of “many things” is identified and the temporal dimension is emphasized when it comes to the control condition. Special attention is given to the epistemic condition, which draws attention to the issues of transparency and explainability. In contrast to standard discussions, however, it is then argued that this knowledge problem regarding agents of responsibility is linked to the other side of the responsibility relation: the addressees or “patients” of responsibility, who may demand reasons for actions and decisions made by using AI. Inspired by a relational approach, responsibility as answerability thus offers an important additional, if not primary, justification for explainability based, not on agency, but on patiency.

What it is to Possess a Reason

It is a truism that in order to possess a reason, one must stand in a privileged epistemic relation with that reason. Most of the literature on possession is about this condition. This chapter defends a view about the epistemic condition. It does this by considering three different divisions between views about the epistemic condition and arguing via process of elimination that the epistemic condition is being in a position to know. Along the way arguments are given against the E = K thesis and the view that reasons explanations are non-factive. Initial connections between possession and correctly responding to reasons are forged.

What it is to Possess a Reason

This chapter defends the book’s official view of possession. It starts by arguing that meeting the epistemic condition is not sufficient for possession. There are cases where one meets the epistemic condition but fails to possess because one does not appreciate the normative relevance of the fact in question. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to spelling out what it takes to adequately appreciate normative relevance. Arguments are given against subjective reason accounts and Humean accounts. It is argued that what it is to possess a reason is to be in a position to manifest knowledge about how to use the reason as the reason that it is. Finally, it is argued that meeting the epistemic condition is a background condition for being in a position to manifest the relevant know-how.

Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability

Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the epistemic condition on moral responsibility makes blameworthiness much less common than we ordinarily suppose, and much harder to identify. This paper argues that such epistemically based responsibility skepticism is mistaken. Section 2 sketches a general account of moral responsibility, building on the Strawsonian idea that blame and credit relates to the agent’s quality of will. Section 3 explains how this account deals with central cases that motivate epistemic skepticism and how it avoids some objections to quality of will accounts recently raised by Gideon Rosen. But an intuitive worry brought out by these objections remains. Section 4 spells out this remaining worry and argues that, like traditional metaphysical responsibility skepticism, it has its source in a non-standard explanatory perspective on action, suggesting that strategies for explaining away the intuitive pull of traditional skepticism are applicable in this case too.