A Gödelian ontological argument improved

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Formal Argument ◽  
Positive Property

AbstractGödel's ontological argument is a formal argument for a being defined in terms of the concept of a positive property. I shall defend several versions of Gödel's argument, using weaker premises than Anderson's (1990) version, and avoiding Oppy's (1996 and 2000) parody refutations.

scholarly journals Goedel's Property Abstraction and Possibilism

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Randoph Rubens Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Formal Semantics ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
Third Order ◽  
Aesthetic Sense ◽  
Completeness Result ◽  
Positive Property ◽  
Modal Semantics

Gödel’s Ontological argument is distinctive because it is the most sophisticated and formal of ontological arguments and relies heavily on the notion of positive property. Gödel uses a third-order modal logic with a property abstraction operator and property quantification into modal contexts. Gödel describes positive property as "independent of the accidental structure of the world"; "pure attribution," as opposed to privation; "positive in the 'moral aesthetic sense.'" Pure attribution seems likely to be related to the Leibnizian concept of perfection.By a careful examination of the formal semantics of third-order modal logic with property abstraction together with a Completeness result for third-order modal logic with property abstraction for faithful models that I previously developed in 2000 in my work, Gödel’s Ontological Argument, I argue that it is not possible to develop a sufficient applied third-order modal semantics for Gödel’s ontological argument. As I explore possible approaches for an applied semantics including anti-Realist accounts of the semantics of modal logic compatible with Actualism, I argue that Gödel makes implicit philosophical assumptions which commit him to both possibilism (the belief in merely possible objects) and modal realism (the belief in possible worlds).

The Argument from Perfections

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss ◽  
Joshua L. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Positive Property ◽  
Being There

A new ontological argument schema for the existence of a necessary being is presented. Several ways to fill in this schema are shown, based upon different conceptions of “positive property.” The argument is made that at least one of these senses matches an intuitive, prephilosophical concept on which the premises are plausible. This argument has certain advantages over ontological arguments for God. In particular, it is explained how one could find the premises in the argument plausible without being committed to premises that entail the stronger thesis that there must be a perfect being. There follows a discussion of an objection Oppy raises against an ontological argument for the stronger thesis, and an explanation of how the argument put forward in the chapter avoids that objection.

scholarly journals Gödel`s Ontological Argument, Positive Properties, and Gaunilist Objection

Sententiae ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 56-67
Author(s):  
Oleg Bondar ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Core Concept ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Ontological Proof ◽  
Positive Property ◽  
History Of ◽  
Positive Properties ◽  
Counter Argument

The article is devoted to Gödel’s ontological argument, its place in the history of philosophy, and the current debate over the validity of ontological proof. First, we argue that Gödel's argument is a necessary step in the history of the development of ontological proof. Second, we show that Gödel’s argument (namely, its core concept of “positive property”) is based on implausible axiological principles (this fact raises many objections like Hajek’s counter-argument), but can be appropriately reformulated in terms of plausible axiological principles (Gustafsson’s argument). Also, we consider the debate over the validity of Gödel’s argument between contemporary neo-Gaunilist Graham Oppy and the advocate of Gödel’s ontological proof Michael Gettings. We conclude that Gödel’s ontological argument is immune to Oppy’s neo-Gaunilism. Finally, given the fact that Oppy’s parody is arguably the most fine-grained Gaunilo-style argument in the history of philosophy, we conclude that Gaunilist line of argumentation, even if successful in refuting Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence, does not work against Gödel’s ontological argument (what is evidenced by the results of the debate between Oppy and Gettings).

Waiting for Godo… and Godan: Completing Rowe’s Critique of the Ontological Argument

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-86
Author(s):  
Roslyn Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
William Rowe

In his critique of Anselm’s ontological argument for God’s existence, William Rowe introduces the concepts of “magico” and “magican”—defining “magicos” as magicians that do not exist, and “magicans” as magicians that do exist—to help diagnose what may have gone wrong in Anselm’s argument. As I made my way through Rowe’s intriguing article, I found myself waiting for “Godo”—and for “Godan.” I expected Rowe to invoke these counterparts to his “magico” and “magican”—a non-existing God to correspond to his non-existing magician, and an existing God to correspond to his existing magician—to complete his argument. Alas, like Vladimir and Estragon, I waited in vain: neither Godo—nor Godan—ever appeared. In what follows I shall argue that their inclusion in Rowe’s argument would have settled the matter against Anselm far more decisively than do Rowe’s forays into the murky waters of question-begging.

Anselm's Formula and the Logic of ‘God’

1973 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-288
Author(s):  
Paul M. van Buren
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Difference

Anselm built his meditation Proslogion on the formula ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’. The peculiarity of this phrase has been often remarked but not, I believe, fully appreciated. Properly understood, I shall argue, this formula, although unable to support the so-called ontological argument, throws important light on the logic of the religious use of the word ‘God’. My argument will turn on the difference between the two uses of the verb ‘conceive’ in Anselm's claim that we can conceive of that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

On the PROVER9 Ontological Argument

Philosophia ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 475-483
Author(s):  
T. Parent
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument
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