scholarly journals Gödel`s Ontological Argument, Positive Properties, and Gaunilist Objection

Sententiae ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 56-67
Author(s):  
Oleg Bondar ◽  

The article is devoted to Gödel’s ontological argument, its place in the history of philosophy, and the current debate over the validity of ontological proof. First, we argue that Gödel's argument is a necessary step in the history of the development of ontological proof. Second, we show that Gödel’s argument (namely, its core concept of “positive property”) is based on implausible axiological principles (this fact raises many objections like Hajek’s counter-argument), but can be appropriately reformulated in terms of plausible axiological principles (Gustafsson’s argument). Also, we consider the debate over the validity of Gödel’s argument between contemporary neo-Gaunilist Graham Oppy and the advocate of Gödel’s ontological proof Michael Gettings. We conclude that Gödel’s ontological argument is immune to Oppy’s neo-Gaunilism. Finally, given the fact that Oppy’s parody is arguably the most fine-grained Gaunilo-style argument in the history of philosophy, we conclude that Gaunilist line of argumentation, even if successful in refuting Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence, does not work against Gödel’s ontological argument (what is evidenced by the results of the debate between Oppy and Gettings).

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Rudolph ◽  
Roman Seidel

AbstractThe Argument for God’s Existence is one of the major issues in the history of philosophy. It also constitutes an illuminating example of a shared philosophical problem in the entangled intellectual histories of Europe and the Islamic World. Drawing on Aristotle, various forms of the argument were appropriated by both rational Islamic Theology (kalām) and Islamic philosophers such as Avicenna. Whereas the argument, reshaped, refined and modified, has been intensively discussed throughout the entire post-classical era, particularly in the Islamic East, it has likewise been adopted in the West by thinkers such as the Hebrew Polymath Maimonides and the Medieval Latin Philosopher and Theologian Thomas Aquinas. However, these mutual reception-processes did not end in the middle ages. They can be witnessed in the twentieth century and even up until today: On the one hand, we see a Middle Eastern thinker like the Iranian philosopher Mahdī Ḥāʾirī Yazdī re-evaluating Kant’s fundamental critique of the classical philosophical arguments for God’s existence, in particular of the ontological proof, and refuting the critique. On the other hand, an argument from creation brought forward by the Islamic Theologian and critic of the peripatetic tradition al-Ghazāli has been adopted by a strand of Western philosophers who label their own version “The Kalām-cosmological Argument”. By discussing important cornerstones in the history of the philosophical proof for God’s existence we argue for a re-consideration of current Eurocentric narratives in the history of philosophy and suggest that such a transcultural perspective may also provide inspiration for current philosophical discourses between Europe, the Middle East and beyond.


1968 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-173
Author(s):  
Albert Anderson

Johann Georg Hamann, that great critic of the Enlightenment, once satirized the contemporary philosophical effort of his time by writing certain memoirs of Socrates “fuer die lange Weile des Publicums zusammengetragen von einem Liebhaber der langen Weile.” No doubt another article on Anselm also runs the risk of contributing to ennui. Still, in the history of philosophy his work is virtually unrivaled as a source for philosophical puzzlement. Nearly every anthology which introduces philosophy includes a section of his Proslogion, and recent analysis continues to demand attention to “the ontological argument” which is attributed to him. The present offering is, perhaps presumptuously, one more attempt to untangle some of the puzzlement and to do away with some of the misunderstanding that has accrued to the Anselmic tradition.


Author(s):  
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran

RESUMENDurante los últimos años, la filosofía analítica ha centrado su interés en la temática de las emociones y se han elaborado las más diversas teorías. En este artículo me propongo, por un lado, exponer las principales líneas de investigación actuales sobre las emociones y desarrollar los argumentos en favor y en contra cada una de ellas con el fin de perfilar mi propia posición; por otro lado, voy a presentar los desarrollos históricos precedentes a las teorías analíticas mostrando que la historia de la filosofía no ha relegado las emociones al olvido.PALABRAS CLAVEEMOCIÓN, FILOSOFÍA ANALÍTICA, TEORÍAS DEL SENTIR, TEORÍAS COGNITIVISTAS.ABSTRACTEmotions are one of the topics that have caught the attention of analytical philosophy during the past years, and philosophers have developed different theories in this field. In this article, I shall present the main lines of investigation in the current debate on emotions and explain the arguments in favour and against each of them in order to build up my own position on the one hand, and, present the historical developments previous to the analytical theories, showing that the history of philosophy has always had an interest in emotions as a topic on the other hand.KEY WORDSEMOTION, ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY, FEELING THEORIES, COGNITIVISTIC THEORIES


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document