Formal Argument that Contract Meaning Depends on Linguistic Cooperation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Bradley Kar
Keyword(s):  
Formal Argument

Formal Argument and Olympiodorus’ Development as a Plato-Commentator

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 210-241
Author(s):  
Harold Tarrant
Keyword(s):  
Sixth Century ◽  
Formal Argument ◽  
Formal Validity

Abstract Olympiodorus led the Platonist school of philosophy at Alexandria for several decades in the sixth century, and both Platonic and Aristotelian commentaries ascribed to him survive. During this time the school’s attitude to the teaching of Aristotelian syllogistic, originally owing something to Ammonius, changed markedly, with an early tendency to reinforce the teaching of syllogistic even in Platonist lectures giving way to a greater awareness of its limitations. The vocabulary for arguments and their construction becomes far commoner than the language of syllogistic and syllogistic figures, and also of demonstration. I discuss the value of these changes for the dating of certain works, especially where the text lectured on does not demand different emphases. The commitment to argument rather than to authority continues, but a greater emphasis eventually falls on the establishment of the premises than on formal validity.

HISTORIOSOPHICAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE FORMATION OF THE CULT OF PERSONALITY IN THE BIOGRAPHIES OF V.I. LENIN 1924–1956

2021 ◽  
pp. 136-146
Author(s):  
Elena V. Barysheva ◽  
◽  
Dmitriy V. Morozov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Historical Development ◽  
Historical Narrative ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Process ◽  
Formal Argument ◽  
Cult Of Personality ◽  
The One ◽  
The Masses ◽  
Plot Structure

The authors make an attempt to analyse on the basis of Hayden White’s theory of historical narrative historiosophical prerequisites for the formation of the cult of personality in the soviet biographies of V.I. Lenin published in 1924–1956. The basis of texts is a plot structure, implying, on the one hand, the existence of immutable laws of historical development, which humanity is forced to obey, and, on the other, a person who is able to learn them through the bitterness of defeats and put them at his service. The explanation of the facts of the historical narrative takes place by using two types of formal argument: Mechanism, which emphasizes the laws of historical development and the role of the masses in the historical process, and organicism, which gives high priority to V.I. Lenin himself and the party he created. The authors conclude that the articulation of the plot structure and types of formal argument embodied in the biographies becomes a prerequisite for the formation of the cult of personality. The latter implies the construction of an image of a person capable of transforming the reality, according to the concept of historical development that dominates in the party political historiography

Smoothing of Stokes discontinuities

1992 ◽  
Vol 437 (1900) ◽  
pp. 343-354 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Function ◽  
Formal Argument ◽  
First Approximation ◽  
Rigorous Treatment ◽  
Asymptotic Forms

When the asymptotics of an analytic function f ( z ) are given in terms of two asymptotic forms S 1 ( z ), S 2 ( z ), alternately dominant in alternating sectors of the z -plane, Stokes observed that the coefficients of S 1 , S 2 , while constant in any one sector, can change from sector to sector, and that to a first approximation the change appears to be discontinuous. Recently, Berry has given an interesting formal argument which shows in more detail how the change takes place, and the present paper gives a rigorous treatment of Berry’s result.

Is there a modal fallacy in van Inwagen's 'First Formal Argument'?

Analysis ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Formal Argument

A Gödelian ontological argument improved

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Formal Argument ◽  
Positive Property

AbstractGödel's ontological argument is a formal argument for a being defined in terms of the concept of a positive property. I shall defend several versions of Gödel's argument, using weaker premises than Anderson's (1990) version, and avoiding Oppy's (1996 and 2000) parody refutations.

Is there a formal argument against positive rights?

1989 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Melnyk
Keyword(s):  
Formal Argument ◽  
Positive Rights

scholarly journals Canonical instabilities of autonomous vehicle systems

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrick Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Traffic Control ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Autonomous Vehicle ◽  
Power Network ◽  
Ground Vehicles ◽  
The Road ◽  
Control Information ◽  
Formal Argument ◽  
Vehicle Systems ◽  
And Control

Formal argument suggests that command, communication and control systems can remain stable in the sense of the Data Rate Theorem that mandates the minimum rate of control information required to stabilize inherently unstable 'plants', but may nonetheless, under fog-of-war demands, collapse into dysfunctional modes at variance with their fundamental mission. We apply the theory to autonomous ground vehicles under intelligent traffic control in which swarms of interacting, self-driving devices are inherently unstable as a consequence of the basic irregularity of the road network. It appears that such 'V2V/V2I' systems will experience large-scale failures analogous to the vast propagating fronts of power network blackouts, and possibly less benign, but more subtle patterns of `psychopathology' at various scales.

scholarly journals Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-94
Author(s):  
Jonathan C. Rutledge
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Common Type ◽  
The Self ◽  
Original Sin ◽  
Philosophical Methodology ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
Formal Argument ◽  
Argument Proceeds

In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument.

scholarly journals Testing for Partial RhD with a D-Screen Diagast Kit in Moroccan Blood Donors with Weak D Expression

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Z. Kabiri ◽  
M. Benajiba ◽  
K. Hajjout ◽  
N. Dakka ◽  
H. Bellaoui
Keyword(s):  
Red Blood Cells ◽  
Blood Cells ◽  
Blood Donors ◽  
Formal Argument ◽  
Appropriate Care ◽  
Specific Reactions ◽  
D Antigen

The aim of this study was to search for the partial D phenotype in Moroccan blood donors with weak D expression. The study included 32 samples with weak D phenotype, and partial D category red blood cells were detected with the D-Screen Diagast kit, which consists in 9 monoclonal anti-D antibodies specific for the most common categories of partial D. Among the 32 samples studied, we identified 13 specific reactions to a partial D antigen (3 DVI, 2 DVa, 2 DIII(a,b,c), and 6 DVII), with 8 reactions suggesting a weak D and 11 reactions providing no formal argument in favor of a partial D antigen. This work can be used to validate the performance of the anti-D reagent and to improve the safety of transfusion of red blood cells from donors expressing the partial D antigen by integrating the finding into the recipient file with a recommendation concerning the appropriate care.

Reply to “Modeling the evolution of preferences: an answer to Schubert and Cordes”

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-351
Author(s):  
CHRISTIAN SCHUBERT ◽  
CHRISTIAN CORDES ◽  
PETER J. RICHERSON
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Role Models ◽  
Dynamic Equations ◽  
Formal Argument ◽  
Evolution Of Preferences

In their comment “Modeling the evolution of preferences: an answer to Schubert and Cordes” (2013, this journal), Kapeller and Steinerberger claim to have identified some flaws in the formal argument developed in our paper “Role models that make you unhappy: light paternalism, social learning, and welfare” (2013, this journal). Specifically, they maintain that there is no runaway dynamic in consumption and preference values and that our model therefore always leads to a stable society. In their proof, Kapeller and Steinerberger show that their system is bounded by the highest and lowest preference and consumption levels in the population and can never escape them. Their argument does, however, not apply to the system of coupled dynamic equations we employed to model runaway consumption.

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