George Crowder: The Problem of Value Pluralism: Isaiah Berlin and Beyond. (New York: Routledge, 2020. Pp. ix, 233.) - Johnny Lyons: The Philosophy of Isaiah Berlin. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. Pp. xxi, 276.)

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-3
Author(s):  
Jason Ferrell
2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 818-840
Author(s):  
George Crowder

AbstractHow far can monotheism be reconciled with the pluralism characteristic of modern societies? In this article, I focus on the “value pluralism” of Isaiah Berlin, which I suggest captures a deeper level of plurality than Rawls's more familiar version of pluralism. However, some critics have objected that Berlinian pluralism is too controversial an idea in which to ground liberalism because it is profoundly at odds with the monotheism professed by so many citizens of a modern society. I argue that monotheists can be value pluralists as long as they do not insist that their faith is superior to all others. This pluralist position is exemplified by elements of the interfaith movement, according to which many religions are recognized as having roughly equal value. I also argue that a value-pluralist approach to religious accommodation, if it can be achieved, may be more stable than the uneasy combination of disapproval and restraint involved in the more orthodox solution to conflict among religions, toleration.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-320
Author(s):  
Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

Abstract This article seeks to interpret the striking divergence between the two judgments passed by the European Court of Human Rights in the Lautsi v Italy case in terms of value pluralism. The latter is a hotly debated position in ethics, brought to life in the second half of the twentieth century by Isaiah Berlin. Pluralism elucidates these in interesting ways. First, value pluralism sheds light on three major aspects of the trial before the European Court of Human Rights: the nature of the collision of values, the discrepancy between the two decisions, and the rationale of the final judgment. Secondly, this is my thesis that while the first judgment fits ethical monism, which underlies Dworkin’s ‘one right answer’ theory, the second ruling chimes with pluralism. The pluralist spirit of the Grand Chamber’s final decision turned Europe away from the path of Americanization.


2018 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-127
Author(s):  
George Crowder

AbstractJeremy Waldron claims that Isaiah Berlin wrongly neglects, and is hostile to, constitutional and democratic institutions. I argue that although Berlin offers no extended discussion of constitutionalism or democracy, he is not hostile to them. Moreover, the logic of Berlin's value pluralism is strongly supportive of these ideas—for example, it fits well with constitutionalist notions such as the separation of powers and checks and balances. On the other hand, Waldron's rejection of judicial review on the ground of democracy is questionable in these same pluralist terms. Here I argue that Berlinian pluralism supports democracy as long as this is inclusive in its outcomes. But contemporary democracy cannot be relied upon to be sufficiently inclusive, in part because of the effects of the war on terror and the rise of populism. Under these conditions it is unwise for pluralists to dispense with judicial review.


2013 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Zakaras

AbstractThe essay explores the relationship between value pluralism, as Isaiah Berlin understood it, and liberalism. It consists of two main parts. In the first part, I argue that value pluralism does not entail liberalism, and I criticize two philosophers—William Galston and George Crowder—who believe that it does. In the second, I reconstruct and defend Isaiah Berlin's own understanding of this relationship, drawing on an essay that is often neglected by Berlin's interpreters: “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life.” Berlin thought that the relationship between value pluralism and liberalism was largely psychological. He believed that those who embraced value pluralism would be more likely to affirm liberal institutions, because they would be more likely to exhibit certain virtues—notably empathy, imagination, and openness to other ways of life—that typically motivate tolerance.


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