scholarly journals Discussion: Alternatives to the Local Property Tax for Educational Finance

1973 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-97
Author(s):  
James M. Stepp

Dr. Hady's paper begins by noting why some practical alternatives to the local property tax may soon become very urgent in all parts of the United States. The California Supreme Court decision in the case of Serrano v. Priest, which Hady cites, constituted the first ruling by a major appellate court that disparities in the property tax bases of school districts render that tax invalid as a basis for financing public schools. The applicable constitutional provision is the “equal protection” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and similar provisions of State constitutions. The fact that the United States Supreme Court is reviewing a decision of a three-judge Federal court of appeals in a Texas case, Rodriquez v. San Antonio Independent School District, rather than the California case may be of considerable importance to possible future changes in educational finance.

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-213
Author(s):  
Nicholas S. Paliewicz

This essay analyzes how a rhetorical culture emerged in which the Supreme Court of the United States assumed corporations were constitutional persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. Approaching rhetorical culture from a networked standpoint, I argue that corporate personhood emerged from Southern Pacific Railroad Co.’s networks and alliances with environmental preservationists, politicians, publics, lawyers, judges, and immigrants in the late 19th century. Contributing to literatures on rhetorical culture and agency, this study shows how Southern Pacific Railroad Co., through networks of influence and force, was a rhetorical subject that shaped a networked rhetorical culture that expanded the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment even though the Supreme Court of the United States had not worked out the philosophical underpinnings of corporate personhood. Corporate personhood remains theoretically restrained by legal discourses that reduce subjectivity to a singular, speaking, human subject.


1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 367-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Sawyer

Four of the five issues normally involved in an argument of policy can be persuasively argued on the basis of facts. However, the fourth issue, that of fairness, might better be argued by following the organizational plan of an appellate court decision. The Supreme Court decision in Teminello vs. the United States is offered as an example. The practicality of this plan is illustrated with a student paper.


1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 657-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Carroll

The Supreme Court of the United States, whose decisions not only define constitutional law but vitally affect national policy, has long held both an honored and a controversial place in American life. In no area do its decisions bring it more honor or more controversy than in the field of religion; for, as a member of the First Congress under the Constitution said, “the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand. … Thus, the same decision of the Court may be hailed by some as a great landmark in the struggle for religious liberty, and denounced by others as a serious invasion of liberty of conscience. For although it may be pleasant to dream of religion insulated from governmental touch, the dual membership of citizens in the state and in religious bodies insures that conscience and government will touch at some points with inevitable friction, and, to the conscience so touched, it makes little difference whether the governmental hand is that of a local school board, the Congress, or the Supreme Court of the United States.The Court has recently been attacked as antireligious, or at least as callous to our religious heritage, because of its decisions invalidating a state-prescribed prayer and state-prescribed Bible reading in public schools. The first of these decisions prompted the more excited outcry, but the two, at first singly and then together, have precipitated a renewed debate about the proper constitutional relationship between the state and religion.


Author(s):  
Willis P. Whichard

This essay examines the public career of James Iredell, who was probably Revolutionary-era North Carolina’s most influential propagandist. His first published essay, which appeared in September 1773, defended the jurisdiction of colonial courts in the foreign attachment controversy, and he was one of the first Whig writers to reject the sovereignty of Parliament in America. During the Revolution, Iredell continued to write on behalf of the American cause, but financial woes limited his political activities. During the debate over the ratification of the Constitution, however, Iredell emerged as one of North Carolina’s most energetic Federalists, and George Washington rewarded him with an appointment to the United States Supreme Court. Like many southern Federalists, Iredell supported the new government, but was wary of pushing federal power too far, and in his best known opinion, a dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), he argued that a state could not be sued in federal court without its consent.


1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Hodder-Williams

Six different notions of ‘political’ are commonly used in discussions of the US Supreme Court. All six are familiar, but the distinctions among them are seldom carefully drawn. The six are: (1) purely definitional, in the sense that the Supreme Court, as an appellate court of last resort inevitably authoritatively allocates values; (2) empirical, in the sense that litigants use the Court to try to achieve their political purposes; (3) influence seeking, in the sense that the justices have a natural desire to prevail in arguments within the court; (4) prudential, in the sense that the justices frequently consider the probable consequences of their decisions; (5) policy-oriented, in the – usually pejorative – sense that justices are said to use the Court and the law as a cover for pursuing their own policy and other goals; and (6) systemic, in the sense that the Court's decisions frequently, as a matter of fact, have consequences for other parts of the American political system. These six notions are considered in the context of recent abortion decisions.


1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 816-820
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Vázquez

In this first decision by the United States Supreme Court on the scope and application of the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, better known as the Hague Service Convention, petitioner, a West German company, challenged the respondent’s attempt to serve process on petitioner by serving its wholly owned U.S. subsidiary in accordance with the state’s rules rather than pursuant to the procedures of the Convention. The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, found that the relationship between the German parent and the U.S. subsidiary was such that, under state-law rules of agency, the U.S. subsidiary was the parent’s involuntary agent for service of process. Because service could thus be perfected entirely within the United States, the court held that it was not necessary to follow the procedures of the Hague Service Convention. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court (per O’Connor, J.) affirmed and held: (1) the Hague Service Convention is “mandatory” and preempts inconsistent state-law methods of service in all cases to which it applies; (2) the Convention applies where there is occasion to transmit a document abroad to charge persons with formal notice of a pending action; and (3) whether it is necessary to transmit a document abroad for such purposes is determined by the forum state’s internal law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-553
Author(s):  
Rebecca J. Scott

The mountain of modern interpretation to which the language of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution has been subjected tends to overshadow the multiple concepts of antidiscrimination that were actually circulating at the time of its drafting. Moreover, as authors on race and law have pointed out, Congress itself lacked any African American representatives during the 1866–68 moment of transitional justice. The subsequent development of a “state action doctrine” limiting the reach of federal civil rights enforcement, in turn, eclipsed important contemporary understandings of the harms that Reconstruction-era initiatives sought to combat. In contrast to the oblique language of the Fourteenth Amendment, a dignity-based legal theory of affirmative equal rights had by 1867 taken center stage in the cosmopolitan city of New Orleans. Activists formulated the concept of “public rights” as a claim to participation without discrimination in the entire sphere of “common life.” Elections for delegates to Louisiana's Constitutional Convention of 1867–68, held under the broad suffrage mandated by the Military Reconstruction Acts, yielded a convention in which half of the members were men of African descent. Seeking the “impartial treatment of all men” in “[c]hurches, hotels, cars, steamboats, theaters, stores, even schools,” the convention crafted a Bill of Rights that affirmatively guaranteed to all of the state's citizens “the same civil, political, and public rights,” independent of race or color. These innovations in the defense of human rights under law drew from a deep well of anti-caste thinking developed in domestic and transnational discussions conducted in both French and English, with participants from both sides of the Atlantic and the Caribbean. Cosmopolitan progressives such as Edouard Tinchant and Jean-Charles Houzeau worked with Louisiana-born activists including Louis Charles Roudanez, Simeon Belden, and Paul Trévigne to develop and advance the idea of public rights. Legislators crafted and passed state statutes that provided for civil penalties for violation of these rights, along with a private cause of action that could yield both actual and exemplary damages. Throughout the 1870s, however, advocates met a fierce white-supremacist counterattack, one that fused obstructionist litigation, vote suppression, and vigilante violence. A claim to equal treatment under the 1868 constitution was won in the state courts by Josephine Decuir, but was overturned in 1877 at the United States Supreme Court. With the ascent of the Democratic Party, white supremacists–including the lawyer/vigilante Robert Hardin Marr-took their seats on the state Supreme Court. By 1879, the public rights guarantees had been expunged from the state's constitution. Nonetheless, for a crucial decade, the cross-racial politics of Louisiana had overcome many of the deficits of legitimacy that often undercut moments of transitional lawmaking. Delegates to the 1867–68 Constitutional Convention took the opportunity to spell out specific positive rights that they saw as essential to full civil freedom. And at the center, they placed their insistence that the state had an obligation to assure that men and women of color would not be subjected to forced indignity in the public sphere.


2005 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Tartaro

This paper reviews recent federal court rulings on section 1983 cases relating to custodial suicide. The criteria for succeeding in such cases was not clearly articulated until the Farmer v. Brennan case was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1994. Unfortunately for the families of deceased inmates, the Farmer ruling made the already challenging task of prevailing in federal court even more difficult. This paper includes an analysis of the defenses available to corrections personnel faced with a section 1983 lawsuit for a correctional suicide that occurred on their watch.


1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 695-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Manuel Vázquez

A distinction has become entrenched in United States law between treaties that are “self-executing” and those that are not. The precise nature of this distinction—indeed, its very existence—is a matter of some controversy’ and much confusion. More than one lower federal court has pronounced the distinction to be the “most confounding” in the United States law of treaties. A tremendous amount of scholarship has sought to clarify this distinction, but the honest observer cannot but agree with John Jackson’s observation that “[t]he substantial volume of scholarly writing on this issue has not yet resolved the confusion” surrounding it. The continuing, and remarkably candid, judicial confusion over this issue will, I hope, excuse yet another attempt to bring some coherence to the doctrine. In this article, I argue that much of the doctrinal disarray and judicial confusion is attributable to the failure of courts and commentators to recognize that for some time four distinct “doctrines” of self-executing treaties have been masquerading as one. With a view to furthering the development of doctrine in conformity with constitutional allocations of power, I identify these four “doctrines,” as reflected in the self-execution decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, and I examine the very different types of analysis that they call for.


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