Self-control observed

1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-159
Author(s):  
Howard Rachlin
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Conscious Thought ◽  
Overt Behavior ◽  
Teleological Behaviorism ◽  
Scientific Legitimacy ◽  
Mediating Mechanisms ◽  
Complex Cases

AbstractComplex cases of self-control involve processes such as guilt-avoidance, inhibition, self-punishment, conscious thought, free will, and imagination. Such processes, conceived as internal mediating mechanisms, serve the function in psychological theory of avoiding teleological causation. Acceptance of the scientific legitimacy of teleological behaviorism would obviate the need for internal mediation, redefine the above processes in terms of temporally extended patterns of overt behavior, and clarify their relation to selfcontrol.

Free will, temptation, and self-control: We must believe in free will. We have no choice

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Wertenbroch ◽  
Joachim Vosgerau ◽  
Sabrina Bruyneel
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Self Control

Pattern proliferation in teleological behaviorism

1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-146
Author(s):  
Bruce N. Waller
Keyword(s):  
Self Control ◽  
Behavioral Patterns ◽  
Teleological Behaviorism ◽  
Controlling Behavior

AbstractRachlin's teleological behaviorist account shows promise for extending our behavioral understanding of many aspects of self-control, particularly when self-control involves controlling behavior through larger behavioral patterns. However, it may face special challenges in dealing with instances of self-control that involve pattern breaking.

Frankfurt and the Problem of Self-Control

2020 ◽  
pp. 421-433
Author(s):  
Ryan Cummings ◽  
Adina L. Roskies
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Structural Account ◽  
The Will

Frankfurt’s compatibilist account of free will considers an individual to be free when her first- and second-order volitions align. This structural account of the will, this chapter argues, fails to engage with the dynamics of will, resulting in two shortcomings: (1) the problem of directionality, or that Frankfurtian freedom obtains whenever first- and second-order volitions align, regardless of which desire was made to change, and (2) the potential for infinite regress of higher-order desires. The authors propose that a satisfying account of the genesis of second-order volitions can resolve these issues. To provide this they draw from George Ainslie’s mechanistic account of self-control, which relies on intertemporal bargaining wherein an individual’s self-predictions about future decisions affect the value of her current choices. They suggest that second-order volitions emerge from precisely this sort of process, and that a Frankfurt-Ainslie account of free will avoids the objections previously raised.

The Developmental and Cultural Origins of Our Beliefs about Self-Control

2020 ◽  
pp. 47-64
Author(s):  
Adrienne Wente ◽  
Xin Zhao ◽  
Alison Gopnik ◽  
Carissa Kang ◽  
Tamar Kushnir
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The United States ◽  
Control Culture ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Control Beliefs ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Experience Effects ◽  
Children's Beliefs ◽  
Cultural Origins ◽  
Us Children

Self-control is quite difficult—sometimes people are successful, but frequently they are not. So why do people believe that they can choose, by their own free will, to exercise self-control? This chapter summarizes recent research exploring the cultural and developmental origins of beliefs about self-control and free will. It discusses how two factors contribute to the development of children’s beliefs about self-control: culture and first-person experiences. The authors’ studies of four- to eight-year-old children (N = 441; mean age = 5.96 years; range = 3.92–8.90 years) from China, Singapore, Peru, and the United States indicate that self-control beliefs differ across cultures, and that, comparatively, US children hold intuitions that they can freely choose to exercise self-control. Additionally, evidence indicates that the experience of self-control failure impacts beliefs about free will in US children, but that these experience effects are not culturally universal.

Can teleological behaviorism account for the effects of instructions on self-control without invoking cognition?

1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-135
Author(s):  
Kristi Lemm ◽  
Yuichi Shoda ◽  
Walter Mischel
Keyword(s):  
Self Control ◽  
Temporal Patterning ◽  
Control Behavior ◽  
Verbal Instructions ◽  
Teleological Behaviorism ◽  
Experimental Findings

AbstractIn its commitment to eschewing internal causes, the teleological behavioristic analysis endeavors to explain self-control through the temporal patterning of behavior, but it leaves unanswered the most challenging questions. It fails to account convincingly for experimental findings in which self-control behavior was predictably changed by verbal instructions to think about and imagine the rewards in different ways.

The teleological science of self-control

1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Rachlin
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Pattern ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Teleological Behaviorism ◽  
Complex Patterns ◽  
The Mind

In response to Ainslie & Gault: The value of a temporally extended behavioral pattern depends on relationships inherent in the pattern itself. It is not possible to express that value as the simple sum of the discounted present values of the pattern's component acts.In response to Leiber: Teleological behaviorism may be deemed unscientific because it has not yet succeeded to the required degree in predicting and controlling the highly complex patterns of human behavior that comprise our mental lives. However teleological behaviorism is not unscientific because it is teleological or “noncausal;” nor is teleological behaviorism unscientific because it is not reducible to neurophysiology. Nothing in principle bars the development of a teleological science of the mind.

The role of negative reinforcement; or: Is there an altruist in the house?

2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edmund J. Fantino ◽  
Stephanie J. Stolarz-Fantino
Keyword(s):  
Conditioned Reinforcement ◽  
Negative Reinforcement ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Behavioral Analysis ◽  
Behavioral Patterns ◽  
Teleological Behaviorism ◽  
Rule Governed Behavior

We agree with Rachlin's argument that altruism is best understood as a case of self-control, and that a behavioral analysis is appropriate. However, the appeal to teleological behaviorism and the value of behavioral patterns may be unnecessary. Instead, we argue that altruism can generally be explained with traditional behavioral principles such as negative reinforcement, conditioned reinforcement, and rule-governed behavior.

Self-control: Acts of free will

1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-141
Author(s):  
James A. Schirillo
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Behavioral Patterns

AbstractRachlin overlooks that free will determines when and in what direction acts that appear impulsive will occur. Because behavioral patterns continuously evolve, animals are not guaranteed when they will, or how to, maximize larger-later reinforcements. An animal therefore uses self-control to emit free acts to vary behavioral patterns to optimize larger-later rewards.

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