Perceptions of free will and self-control in a medically relevant treatment recommendation scenario

Author(s):  
Courtney Alderson ◽  
Nao Hagiwara ◽  
Jeffrey Green
2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Wertenbroch ◽  
Joachim Vosgerau ◽  
Sabrina Bruyneel
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
pp. 421-433
Author(s):  
Ryan Cummings ◽  
Adina L. Roskies

Frankfurt’s compatibilist account of free will considers an individual to be free when her first- and second-order volitions align. This structural account of the will, this chapter argues, fails to engage with the dynamics of will, resulting in two shortcomings: (1) the problem of directionality, or that Frankfurtian freedom obtains whenever first- and second-order volitions align, regardless of which desire was made to change, and (2) the potential for infinite regress of higher-order desires. The authors propose that a satisfying account of the genesis of second-order volitions can resolve these issues. To provide this they draw from George Ainslie’s mechanistic account of self-control, which relies on intertemporal bargaining wherein an individual’s self-predictions about future decisions affect the value of her current choices. They suggest that second-order volitions emerge from precisely this sort of process, and that a Frankfurt-Ainslie account of free will avoids the objections previously raised.


2020 ◽  
pp. 47-64
Author(s):  
Adrienne Wente ◽  
Xin Zhao ◽  
Alison Gopnik ◽  
Carissa Kang ◽  
Tamar Kushnir

Self-control is quite difficult—sometimes people are successful, but frequently they are not. So why do people believe that they can choose, by their own free will, to exercise self-control? This chapter summarizes recent research exploring the cultural and developmental origins of beliefs about self-control and free will. It discusses how two factors contribute to the development of children’s beliefs about self-control: culture and first-person experiences. The authors’ studies of four- to eight-year-old children (N = 441; mean age = 5.96 years; range = 3.92–8.90 years) from China, Singapore, Peru, and the United States indicate that self-control beliefs differ across cultures, and that, comparatively, US children hold intuitions that they can freely choose to exercise self-control. Additionally, evidence indicates that the experience of self-control failure impacts beliefs about free will in US children, but that these experience effects are not culturally universal.


1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-141
Author(s):  
James A. Schirillo

AbstractRachlin overlooks that free will determines when and in what direction acts that appear impulsive will occur. Because behavioral patterns continuously evolve, animals are not guaranteed when they will, or how to, maximize larger-later reinforcements. An animal therefore uses self-control to emit free acts to vary behavioral patterns to optimize larger-later rewards.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toma Strle ◽  
Olga Markič ◽  

In the following article we first present the growing trend of incorporating neuroscience into the law, and the growing acceptance of and trust in neuroscience’s mechanistic and reductionistic explanations of the human mind. We then present and discuss some studies that show how nudging peoples’ beliefs about matters related to human agency (such as free will, decision-making, or self-control) towards a more deterministic, mechanistic and/or reductionistic conception, exerts an influence on their very actions, mentality, and brain processes. We suggest that the neuroscientific view of the human mind exerts an influence on the very cognitive phenomena neuroscience falsely believes to be studying objectively. This holds especially when we consider the systematic integration of neuroscience into the public domain, such as the law. For, such an integration acts as a reinforcement of the public’s and legal decision-makers’ endorsement of and trust in neuroscience’s view of human nature that further changes how people think and act. Such looping effects of neurolaw are probably inevitable. Accordingly, we should be aware of the scope of neuroscientific explanations and be careful not to overstate neuroscientific evidence and findings in legal contexts.


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 1482-1490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Rigoni ◽  
Simone Kühn ◽  
Gennaro Gaudino ◽  
Giuseppe Sartori ◽  
Marcel Brass
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Paul Russell

This chapter discusses an important class of new compatibilist theories of agency and responsibility, frequently referred to as reactive attitude theories. Such theories have their roots in another seminal essay of modern free will debates, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). This chapter disentangles three strands of Strawson’s argument—rationalist, naturalist, and pragmatic. It also considers other recent reactive attitude views that have attempted to remedy flaws in Strawson’s view, focusing particularly on the view of R. Jay Wallace. Wallace supplies an account of moral capacity, which is missing in Strawson’s view, in terms of an account of what Wallace calls “reflective self-control.” The chapter concludes with suggestions of how a reactive attitude approach to moral responsibility that builds on the work of Strawson, Wallace, and others might be successfully developed.


1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-159
Author(s):  
Howard Rachlin

AbstractComplex cases of self-control involve processes such as guilt-avoidance, inhibition, self-punishment, conscious thought, free will, and imagination. Such processes, conceived as internal mediating mechanisms, serve the function in psychological theory of avoiding teleological causation. Acceptance of the scientific legitimacy of teleological behaviorism would obviate the need for internal mediation, redefine the above processes in terms of temporally extended patterns of overt behavior, and clarify their relation to selfcontrol.


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