A reply

1984 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-187
Author(s):  
A. V. Lowe
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Recent Article ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Applicability ◽  
Closed Set ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Central Argument

Hidemi Suganami's thoughtful criticisms of my recent article in the Review1 throw valuable light on some of the key elements of the argument which I tried to outline there. None the less, those criticisms do not seem to undermine my central argument, which is that there is a difference between the conception of customary international law as a set of laws which in principle bind all states and the conception of customary international law as a set of obligations which in principle bind only those states which have consented to be bound by them. By ‘law’ here, I mean a rule which purports to apply to all entities which fall within the open-ended set (i.e., ‘states’) which constitutes its sphere of application rationae personae. An ‘obligation’, on the other hand, claims no such general applicability, but—in the case of consensual obligations, with which we are here concerned—is only binding upon the closed set of states which have consented to be bound by it. There is, in my view, no good reason why the orthodox conception of customary international law as a set of laws should be preferred to the conception of customary international law as a set of obligations.

scholarly journals Nature of Customary international law: All we need is practice

Pravni zapisi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 550-576
Author(s):  
Miloš Hrnjaz
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Additive Theory ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Normative Practice

The main objective of this paper is to critically assess the dominant additive theory of the formation of Customary International Law by using the concept of discursive normative practice and the work of Gerald Postema. My central conclusion is that the use of this concept provides an explanation of the process of formation of Customary International Law that is superior to the additive theory which consists of two elements - practice and opinio juris. On the other hand, Postema's theory also has its own weaknesses, and this paper explores ways to improve it.

Socrates on the Parts of Virtue

1976 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 101-116
Author(s):  
Paul Woodruff
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The Other ◽  
Numerical Identity ◽  
Other Hand

Plato represents Socrates as believing in the unity of the virtues, quarreling with those who, like Protagoras or Meno, wish to treat the virtues as distinct objects of inquiry (Protagoras 329c2ff., Meno 71e1ff.). On the other hand, there is good reason to deny that Plato's Socrates believed in the numerical identity of the virtues (cf. Meno 79a3-5). What Socrates did believe, I shall argue, is that the various virtues are one in essence. I shall show what this means and how it clears up prima facie inconsistencies among Plato's early dialogues.If I am right, Socrates’ theory has startling consequences. Since essence is exactly what Socrates wants a definition to state, it follows that all virtues will have one and the same definition. And if this is so, no wonder the quest for separate definitions of virtues fails in every case! For example in the Laches the generals are baffled by Courage because Courage has no private essence and cannot be marked off from the other virtues by stating its essence. Its essence is Virtue entire. That is a radical view, but there are good reasons for attributing it to Socrates.

Grotian Moments and Peremptory Norms of General International Law: Friendly Facilitators or Fatal Foes?

Grotiana ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-353
Author(s):  
Dire Tladi
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
High Threshold ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
State Practice ◽  
The One ◽  
Jus Cogens ◽  
The Right ◽  
Peremptory Norms ◽  
Law Making

Abstract The concept of a Grotian moment remains rather obscure in international law. On the one hand, it can refer simply to an empirical fact which galvanises the ordinary law-making processes, whether treaty-making or State practice, resulting in major shifts in international law. On the other hand, a Grotian moment might be seen as an event so significant that it results in an extraordinary shift in international law without full adherence to the processes for law-making. The former understanding has little legal significance, while the latter, which would be legally significant, would be controversial and without legal basis. Against this background the article discusses the intersections between peremptory norms and Grotian Moments. It does this by looking at the intersection between the two concepts as well as the intersection between Grotian Moments, on the one hand and, on the other hand, particular jus cogens norms. With respect to the former, for example, the article will consider whether the high threshold of peremptory status facilitates and hinders Grotian moments. With respect to the latter, the article will consider particular norms that have been said to have shifted on account of the Grotian moments, namely the right to use of force in self-defence as well humanitarian intervention.

scholarly journals Representation of an Unrecognized State under International Law – Example of the Republic of Artsakh

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-63
Author(s):  
Stefania Kolarz
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Community ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Representative ◽  
The Core ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Republic

Since the late 80s, the Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, a region situated within the internationally recognised borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan, have been struggling for creating their own state – the Republic of Artsakh. The fact that this self-proclaimed entity was not recognised by any of the international actors has not prevented it from constantly committing to intervene on the international plane, separately from Yerevan and Baku. For instance, it is the co-signatory of the Bishkek Protocol. On the other hand, it was refused participation in the core undertaking of the international community designed to settle the dispute – the OSCE Minsk process. The aforementioned situation raises the question as to who shall act as a legal representative of this quasi-state on the international plane? Azerbaijan, as the official centre of authority within the region, Armenia, or rather the separatist government of Nagorno-Karabakh?

scholarly journals Reviewing the National Courts in Creating Orderly International Law and Community

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 148
Author(s):  
Johanis Leatemia
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
National Court ◽  
National Interest ◽  
The Other ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
National Sovereignty ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The One

Orderly international community and international law are determined by a national court. Essentially, the national court must be competent to maintain the balance between the national interest which based on the national sovereignty as well as the provisions of international law within the framework of peaceful coexistence. This article reviews the role of national courts in creating and developing the customary international law. As it turns out in practice, however, it has certain weaknesses, particularly in view of the accountability and legitimacy aspects of its establishment. This purpose could be achieved if national courts were able to maintain a balance between the national interest based on the sovereignty of State on the one hand and the provisions of international law on the other. The function of the national court was to maintain a balance between international law and national law.

Inverted Hybridities: Reactions to Imperialism in Select Pseudepigraphic Ezra Materials

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-234
Author(s):  
Warren C. Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Second Temple ◽  
The Other ◽  
Colonial Discourse ◽  
Roman Imperialism ◽  
Jewish Heritage ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
Imperial Ideology ◽  
Jewish Revolt ◽  
The One

This article examines both 4 and 5 Ezra as two textual reactions to Roman imperialism utilizing Homi Bhabha's notion of ‘hybridity’. The central argument offered here is that 4 and 5 Ezra both exemplify resistance to and affiliation with the discourse of dominance integral to imperial ideology. Such reactions are, however, inverted. On the one hand, 4 Ezra primarily offers a theodicean resistance to the destruction of the Second Temple during the First Jewish Revolt (66–70 CE), but relies upon essentialized binaries integral to a colonial discourse of domination. On the other hand, 5 Ezra advances a notion of religious replacement in the aftermath of the Bar Kokhba revolt (132–135 CE); an expression of dominance that is simultaneously a strategy of communal preservation arising from a position of proximity to a Jewish heritage.

International Law Obligations Arising in relation to Nationally Determined Contributions

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benoit Mayer
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
International Law ◽  
Paris Agreement ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Legal Obligations ◽  
Nationally Determined Contributions ◽  
The One

AbstractThis article analyzes the international law obligations that arise in relation to nationally determined contributions (NDCs). It argues that distinct and concurrent obligations arise from two separate sources. On the one hand, treaty obligations arise under the Paris Agreement, which imposes an obligation of conduct on parties: they must take adequate measures towards the realization of the mitigation targets contained in their NDCs. On the other hand, communications such as NDCs may constitute unilateral declarations that also create legal obligations. These unilateral declarations impose obligations of various types, which may extend beyond mitigation. For example, they may specify measures of implementation or demand the achievement of a particular result. The potential ‘double-bindingness’ of NDCs should be a central consideration in the interpretation of international law obligations regarding climate change.

Part 1 Refugees, 2 Refugees Defined and Described

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Goodwin-Gill Guy S ◽  
McAdam Jane ◽  
Dunlop Emma
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Community ◽  
The Other ◽  
Refugee Status ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Local Protection ◽  
Ordinary Usage ◽  
The One ◽  
Prompt Response

This chapter defines and describes refugees. The term ‘refugee’ is a term of art, that is, a term with a content verifiable according to principles of general international law. In ordinary usage, it has a broader, looser meaning, signifying someone in flight, who seeks to escape conditions or personal circumstances found to be intolerable. For the purposes of international law, States have further limited the concept of the refugee. Defining refugees may appear an unworthy exercise in legalism and semantics, obstructing a prompt response to the needs of people in distress. On the one hand, States have nevertheless insisted on fairly restrictive criteria for identifying those who benefit from refugee status and asylum or local protection. On the other hand, the definition or description may facilitate and justify aid and protection, while satisfying the relevant criteria ought in practice to indicate entitlement to the pertinent rights or benefits. In determining the content in international law of the class of refugees, therefore, the traditional sources—treaties and the practice of States—must be examined, also taking into account the normative impact of the practice and procedures of the various bodies established by the international community to deal with the problems of refugees.

14 Treaty Entry into Force, Exceptions, Modifications, and Terminations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W
Keyword(s):  
Internal Pressure ◽  
International Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Labour Unions ◽  
Pressure Groups ◽  
Civic Organizations ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Investment Treaties

This chapter discusses the entry into force, exceptions, modifications, and terminations of investment treaties. While enunciating rules of international law governing foreign investors and investments, investment treaties at the same time incorporate various devices to regulate and limit the applicability of those rules and thereby allow contracting states to mediate tensions between demands of treaty partners and of internal pressure groups, such as labour unions, local manufacturers and merchants, and civic organizations. Such devices include treaty provisions on four matters: the entry into force of the treaty; treaty exceptions; treaty modifications; and treaty terminations. States employ the first two as part of the treaty negotiating process. On the other hand, states usually employ the latter two devices as a result of their unsatisfactory experience with a treaty that has entered into force.

The Part of International Law in the Further Limitation of Naval Armament

1926 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-256
Author(s):  
Charles Cheney Hyde
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
The Other ◽  
Judicial Process ◽  
International Differences ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Naval Fleets

Naval fleets are maintained by development and replacement because their possessors dare not fail to make provision for a maritime war in which they may be participants. No means yet devised and accepted for the amicable adjustment of international differences have removed from responsible statesmen a sense of the necessity of anticipating such a contingency. Despite increasing efforts in every quarter to cultivate wills for peace and abhorrence of armed conflict, as well as a desire to adjust grave differences by judicial process or through commissions of conciliation, war is still regarded as a contingency which must be reckoned with, and as one which is as dangerous as it is seemingly remote. In making provision as against a contingency which none would welcome or hasten, the governments of maritime states do not necessarily encourage war or indicate approval of recourse to it. A particular conference of maritime states may in fact uplift the hopes of prospective belligerents which resent and oppose agreements restricting recourse to measures and instrumentalities on which they expect to rely. On the other hand, general arrangements respecting belligerent activities may serve to lessen a zeal for war and to remove its very approach further from the horizon. Everything depends upon the ambitions of the states which consent to confer. The point to be observed is that agreements for the regulation of maritime war in so far as they purport to proscribe or check the use of particular instrumentalities or recourse to particular measures, are not to be deemed bellicose in design or effect. Such regulatory agreements are advocates of peace rather than of war. Moreover, as will be seen, they may be the means of encouraging states to reduce armaments which would otherwise be maintained.

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