The Part of International Law in the Further Limitation of Naval Armament

1926 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-256
Author(s):  
Charles Cheney Hyde

Naval fleets are maintained by development and replacement because their possessors dare not fail to make provision for a maritime war in which they may be participants. No means yet devised and accepted for the amicable adjustment of international differences have removed from responsible statesmen a sense of the necessity of anticipating such a contingency. Despite increasing efforts in every quarter to cultivate wills for peace and abhorrence of armed conflict, as well as a desire to adjust grave differences by judicial process or through commissions of conciliation, war is still regarded as a contingency which must be reckoned with, and as one which is as dangerous as it is seemingly remote. In making provision as against a contingency which none would welcome or hasten, the governments of maritime states do not necessarily encourage war or indicate approval of recourse to it. A particular conference of maritime states may in fact uplift the hopes of prospective belligerents which resent and oppose agreements restricting recourse to measures and instrumentalities on which they expect to rely. On the other hand, general arrangements respecting belligerent activities may serve to lessen a zeal for war and to remove its very approach further from the horizon. Everything depends upon the ambitions of the states which consent to confer. The point to be observed is that agreements for the regulation of maritime war in so far as they purport to proscribe or check the use of particular instrumentalities or recourse to particular measures, are not to be deemed bellicose in design or effect. Such regulatory agreements are advocates of peace rather than of war. Moreover, as will be seen, they may be the means of encouraging states to reduce armaments which would otherwise be maintained.

Grotiana ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-353
Author(s):  
Dire Tladi

Abstract The concept of a Grotian moment remains rather obscure in international law. On the one hand, it can refer simply to an empirical fact which galvanises the ordinary law-making processes, whether treaty-making or State practice, resulting in major shifts in international law. On the other hand, a Grotian moment might be seen as an event so significant that it results in an extraordinary shift in international law without full adherence to the processes for law-making. The former understanding has little legal significance, while the latter, which would be legally significant, would be controversial and without legal basis. Against this background the article discusses the intersections between peremptory norms and Grotian Moments. It does this by looking at the intersection between the two concepts as well as the intersection between Grotian Moments, on the one hand and, on the other hand, particular jus cogens norms. With respect to the former, for example, the article will consider whether the high threshold of peremptory status facilitates and hinders Grotian moments. With respect to the latter, the article will consider particular norms that have been said to have shifted on account of the Grotian moments, namely the right to use of force in self-defence as well humanitarian intervention.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-63
Author(s):  
Stefania Kolarz

Since the late 80s, the Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, a region situated within the internationally recognised borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan, have been struggling for creating their own state – the Republic of Artsakh. The fact that this self-proclaimed entity was not recognised by any of the international actors has not prevented it from constantly committing to intervene on the international plane, separately from Yerevan and Baku. For instance, it is the co-signatory of the Bishkek Protocol. On the other hand, it was refused participation in the core undertaking of the international community designed to settle the dispute – the OSCE Minsk process. The aforementioned situation raises the question as to who shall act as a legal representative of this quasi-state on the international plane? Azerbaijan, as the official centre of authority within the region, Armenia, or rather the separatist government of Nagorno-Karabakh?


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benoit Mayer

AbstractThis article analyzes the international law obligations that arise in relation to nationally determined contributions (NDCs). It argues that distinct and concurrent obligations arise from two separate sources. On the one hand, treaty obligations arise under the Paris Agreement, which imposes an obligation of conduct on parties: they must take adequate measures towards the realization of the mitigation targets contained in their NDCs. On the other hand, communications such as NDCs may constitute unilateral declarations that also create legal obligations. These unilateral declarations impose obligations of various types, which may extend beyond mitigation. For example, they may specify measures of implementation or demand the achievement of a particular result. The potential ‘double-bindingness’ of NDCs should be a central consideration in the interpretation of international law obligations regarding climate change.


2016 ◽  
pp. 307-328
Author(s):  
Sinthya Rubio Escolar

Violence against children and youth in war causes severe damage to individuals, communities and societies. This chapter aims to demonstrate the importance of reparations for children and youth as a peacebuilding mechanism in the context of transitional justice. On one hand, the chapter seeks to address reparations for children and youth understood as a political project, with a transformative and participatory potential for rebuilding societies and healing the wounds of those who have been affected by armed conflict. On the other hand, the paper attempts to overcome the conception of children and youth as passive victims, providing them with agency to become engaged political members in building peaceful societies. Thus, reparations should position them as subjects of rights, giving them voice as contributors in peacebuilding processes.


Author(s):  
Goodwin-Gill Guy S ◽  
McAdam Jane ◽  
Dunlop Emma

This chapter defines and describes refugees. The term ‘refugee’ is a term of art, that is, a term with a content verifiable according to principles of general international law. In ordinary usage, it has a broader, looser meaning, signifying someone in flight, who seeks to escape conditions or personal circumstances found to be intolerable. For the purposes of international law, States have further limited the concept of the refugee. Defining refugees may appear an unworthy exercise in legalism and semantics, obstructing a prompt response to the needs of people in distress. On the one hand, States have nevertheless insisted on fairly restrictive criteria for identifying those who benefit from refugee status and asylum or local protection. On the other hand, the definition or description may facilitate and justify aid and protection, while satisfying the relevant criteria ought in practice to indicate entitlement to the pertinent rights or benefits. In determining the content in international law of the class of refugees, therefore, the traditional sources—treaties and the practice of States—must be examined, also taking into account the normative impact of the practice and procedures of the various bodies established by the international community to deal with the problems of refugees.


Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter discusses the entry into force, exceptions, modifications, and terminations of investment treaties. While enunciating rules of international law governing foreign investors and investments, investment treaties at the same time incorporate various devices to regulate and limit the applicability of those rules and thereby allow contracting states to mediate tensions between demands of treaty partners and of internal pressure groups, such as labour unions, local manufacturers and merchants, and civic organizations. Such devices include treaty provisions on four matters: the entry into force of the treaty; treaty exceptions; treaty modifications; and treaty terminations. States employ the first two as part of the treaty negotiating process. On the other hand, states usually employ the latter two devices as a result of their unsatisfactory experience with a treaty that has entered into force.


Author(s):  
Sabahi Borzu

This chapter discusses ten important findings included in this book. One finding is the dual origin of the modern rules on State responsibility and reparation in both private law notions and public international law, resulting in the objective of reparation of putting the aggrieved party in the ‘hypothetical position’, that would have existed if the unlawful act had not occurred. This objective is mirrored in the modern Chorz ów Factory formula. Restitution, which seeks to re-establish the status quo ante, may need to be accompanied by additional compensation to fully reach the hypothetical position. The amount of compensation, on the other hand, based on the recent jurisprudence, may vary depending on whether the acts complained of were lawful or unlawful. Other important points arising from this study concerning the principles of reparation and compensation are also highlighted in the chapter.


Author(s):  
Ward Thomas

International law and armed conflict have a rather contentious history together. One the one hand, armed conflict implies and absence of law, and yet, on the other, international law plays an important role in codifying the use of force. The UN Charter’s restrictions on the use of force, drafted in the waning days of a second cataclysmic world war, were intended to radically transform the centuries-old ideology of raison d’état, which viewed war as a sovereign prerogative. More precisely, Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids not just war but force of any kind, or even the threat of it. On its face, the Charter system is a model of simplicity, consisting of a clear prohibition and two exceptions to that prohibition. The apparent simplicity is misleading, however. Article 2(4) is violated so often that experts disagree about whether it should even be considered good law. The Chapter VII enforcement exception is rarely used, and the meaning of self-defense under Article 51 is the subject of contentious disagreement. Moreover, even some UN bodies have supported creating another exception (humanitarian intervention) that coexists uneasily with the organization’s foundational principles. In addition, there is yet another exception (the use of force by national liberation movements) that may be as significant as the others, yet is little discussed by contemporary commentators.


1992 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Roach

In recent critical theory, the word performance has undergone a significant expansion, some would say an inflation. As the Editor's Note to the May issue of PMLA (“Special Topic: Performance”) observes, “What once was an event has become a critical category, now applied to everything from a play to a war to a meal. The performative … is a cultural act, a critical perspective, a political intervention.” Theatre historians will perhaps greet such pronouncements with mixed emotions. On one hand, they may welcome the acknowledgment by the principal organ of the Modern Language Association that performance (as opposed to drama merely) can count for so much. On the other hand, they may wonder what exactly is intended by the conceptual leap that takes performance beyond the established theatrical genres to encompass armed conflict and comestibles.


1924 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-280
Author(s):  
James Brown Scott

There are certain preliminary observations which should be made before we can take up the question of codifying international law or the method of codification, for without a correct understanding of certain matters, which may be considered fundamental, we may not know whether we are to deal with a system of law or a system of philosophy. As a matter of fact we are dealing with both, for law develops unconsciously or consciously in accordance with the principles of philosophy. If the law of nations is to be considered law in the strict sense of the word, we must deal with it as a system of law. If, on the other hand, it is a system of philosophy rather than of law, we must deal with it as philosophy, and the point of approach and the method of treatment will be different. But, above and beyond law, we are dealing with justice, and with those principles of justice, which, expressed in rules of law, we call the law of nations. Justice is the source; the principles of justice applicable to the conduct of nations constitute the law of nations, and the rules of law based upon these principles change with conditions, or to meet new conditions, and form the body and substance of international law at any given period.


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