scholarly journals The 1st international workshop on computational social choice

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
ULLE ENDRISS
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Computer Science ◽  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
International Workshop ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Computational Techniques ◽  
Computational Social Choice ◽  
Computer Scientists

AbsractComputational social choice is a new discipline currently emerging at the interface of social choice theory and computer science. It is concerned with the application of computational techniques to the study of social choice mechanisms, and with the integration of social choice paradigms into computing. The first international workshop specifically dedicated to this topic took place in December 2006 in Amsterdam, attracting a mix of computer scientists, people working in artificial intelligence and multiagent systems, economists, game and social choice theorists, logicians, mathematicians, philosophers, and psychologists as participants.

scholarly journals Logics of Preference when There Is No Best

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Grossi ◽  
Wiebe van der Hoek ◽  
Louwe B. Kuijer
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Knowledge Representation ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
General Class ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Argumentation Theory ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Logical Foundations ◽  
Preference Structures

Well-behaved preferences (e.g., total pre-orders) are a cornerstone of several areas in artificial intelligence, from knowledge representation, where preferences typically encode likelihood comparisons, to both game and decision theories, where preferences typically encode utility comparisons. Yet weaker (e.g., cyclical) structures of comparison have proven important in a number of areas, from argumentation theory to tournaments and social choice theory. In this paper we provide logical foundations for reasoning about this type of preference structures where no obvious best elements may exist. Concretely, we compare and axiomatize a number of ways in which the concepts of maximality and optimality can be generalized in this general class of preferences. We thereby expand the scope of the long-standing tradition of the logical analysis of preference.

scholarly journals Social Ranking Manipulability for the CP-Majority, Banzhaf and Lexicographic Excellence Solutions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tahar Allouche ◽  
Bruno Escoffier ◽  
Stefano Moretti ◽  
Meltem Öztürk
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Power Indices ◽  
Computational Social Choice ◽  
Social Ranking ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
The Social ◽  
Theoretical Results

We investigate the issue of manipulability for social ranking rules, where the goal is to rank individuals given the ranking of coalitions formed by them and each individual prefers to reach the highest positions in the social ranking. This problem lies at the intersection of computational social choice and the algorithmic theory of power indices. Different social ranking rules have been recently proposed and studied from an axiomatic point of view. In this paper, we focus on rules representing three classical approaches in social choice theory: the marginal contribution approach, the lexicographic approach and the (ceteris paribus) majority one. We first consider some particular members of these families analysing their resistance to a malicious behaviour of individuals. Then, we analyze the computational complexity of manipulation, and complete our theoretical results with simulations in order to analyse the manipulation frequencies and to assess the effects of manipulations.

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

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