scholarly journals Social Ranking Manipulability for the CP-Majority, Banzhaf and Lexicographic Excellence Solutions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tahar Allouche ◽  
Bruno Escoffier ◽  
Stefano Moretti ◽  
Meltem Öztürk
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Power Indices ◽  
Computational Social Choice ◽  
Social Ranking ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
The Social ◽  
Theoretical Results

We investigate the issue of manipulability for social ranking rules, where the goal is to rank individuals given the ranking of coalitions formed by them and each individual prefers to reach the highest positions in the social ranking. This problem lies at the intersection of computational social choice and the algorithmic theory of power indices. Different social ranking rules have been recently proposed and studied from an axiomatic point of view. In this paper, we focus on rules representing three classical approaches in social choice theory: the marginal contribution approach, the lexicographic approach and the (ceteris paribus) majority one. We first consider some particular members of these families analysing their resistance to a malicious behaviour of individuals. Then, we analyze the computational complexity of manipulation, and complete our theoretical results with simulations in order to analyse the manipulation frequencies and to assess the effects of manipulations.

scholarly journals Ceteris paribus majority for social ranking

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Haret ◽  
Hossein Khani ◽  
Stefano Moretti ◽  
Meltem Öztürk
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Social Ranking ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Majority Principle ◽  
Single Peakedness

We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution inspired from the classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example.

scholarly journals Social Contract, Extended Goodness, and Moral Disagreement

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cyril Hédoin
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Interpersonal Comparisons ◽  
The Social ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Extended Preferences

This article discusses the role played by interpersonal comparisons (of utility or goodness) in matters of justice and equity. The role of such interpersonal comparisons has initially been made explicit in the context of social choice theory through the concept of extended preferences. Social choice theorists have generally claimed that extended preferences should be taken as being uniform across a population. Three related claims are made within this perspective. First, though it is sometimes opposed to social choice theory, the social contract approach may also consider the possibility of interpersonal comparisons. This is due to the fact that justice principles may be partially justified on a teleological basis. Second, searching for the uniformity of interpersonal comparisons is both hopeless and useless. In particular, moral disagreement does not originate in the absence of such uniformity. Third, interpersonal comparisons should be accounted for both in social choice and social contract theories in terms of sympathetic identification based on reciprocal respect and tolerance, where each person’s conception of the good partially takes care of others’ good. From the moral point of view, any person’s conception of the good should thus be ‘extended’ to others’ personal conceptions. This extension is, however, limited due to the inherent limitations in sympathetic identification and is a long way from guaranteeing the uniformity assumed by social choice theorists.

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

Bargaining in Legislatures

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 1181-1206 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron ◽  
John A. Ferejohn
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
The Social ◽  
Free Model ◽  
Sequential Nature ◽  
Choice Literature ◽  
Formal Rules

Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium.

scholarly journals Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 315-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
U. Endriss ◽  
N. Maudet ◽  
F. Sadri ◽  
F. Toni
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Multiagent System ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Artificial Society ◽  
The Social ◽  
Optimal Allocations

A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to exchange bundles of indivisible resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of resources will be reached eventually.

John Roemer’s Economic Philosophy and the Perils of Formalism

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 267-279
Author(s):  
Drew Christie
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economic Philosophy ◽  
Means Of Production

John Roemer’s recent work uses the mathematics of Social Choice Theory to examine the structure of socialist ideals. One striking conclusion is that the social ownership of the means of production entails the strict equalization of ‘utility.’1 The conclusion is surprising. While of course opposing many existing inequalities, socialists (as opposed to their critics) have not traditionally understood socialism to require strict equalization. Marx, for example, is scathing in his criticism of levelling, which he sees as a form of ‘crude’ communism.2This paper is both exposition and critique. By way of exposition, I show with less than full mathematical rigor what several of Roemer’s axioms of social ownership mean and why they entail the equality of utility.

scholarly journals The 1st international workshop on computational social choice

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
ULLE ENDRISS
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Computer Science ◽  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
International Workshop ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Computational Techniques ◽  
Computational Social Choice ◽  
Computer Scientists

AbsractComputational social choice is a new discipline currently emerging at the interface of social choice theory and computer science. It is concerned with the application of computational techniques to the study of social choice mechanisms, and with the integration of social choice paradigms into computing. The first international workshop specifically dedicated to this topic took place in December 2006 in Amsterdam, attracting a mix of computer scientists, people working in artificial intelligence and multiagent systems, economists, game and social choice theorists, logicians, mathematicians, philosophers, and psychologists as participants.

scholarly journals ”Hvorfor så meget stabilitet”? Stabiliserende elementer i det danske politiske system

Politik ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malthe Munkøe
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Political System ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Preference Aggregation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Empirical Question ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
Collective Preference

Social choice research has shown that collective preference aggregation mechanisms under some conditions will produce arbitrary results, and are prone to endless cycles or strategic manipulation. is prompted Tul- lock (1981) to ask the question “Why so much stability”? at is to say, what explains the discrepancy between these results which implicates that politics is chaotic and random, and general understanding of how politics works in practice. e literature has identi ed a number of mechanisms, including “structure-inducing” in- stitutions that have a stabilizing e ect on the political system. As such it is ultimately an empirical question to what extent a political system is stable or not, and what institutions, norms and arrangements engender stability. is article considers the Danish political system from the point of view of social choice theory and discusses which institutions and arrangements work to stabilize it. 

The Possibility of Self-Government

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Bird
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The People ◽  
The Social ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Intuitive Concept ◽  
The Common

Many have suggested that the findings of social choice theory demonstrate that there can be no “will of the people.” This has subversive implications for our intuitive concept of self-government. I explore the relation between the notion of a “social will,” that of self-government, and the impossibility theorems of social choice theory. I conclude that although the concept of the social will is essential to that of self-government, the findings of social choice theory do not cast doubt upon the possibility of either. Unlike many attempts to respond to the threat posed by social choice theory, my argument does not require any appeal to the problematic notion of the common good.

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