Should Any Court Accept the “Social Authority” Paradigm?

2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Nowlin

Monahan and Walker have proposed that American judges should fundamentally alter the way they receive and assess social science evidence in court, by treating social science research as “law-like” or authoritative when certain professional research criteria are met. Strict application of the stipulated criteria to various kinds of social science research introduced into American and Canadian courts reveals, however, that such research can seldom be considered authoritative in the way Monahan and Walker imagine. Accordingly, as a general rule judges should be reluctant to apply Monahan and Walker’s “social authority” model to the courtroom resolution of difficult questions of social, economic, and cultural or historical facts.

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine L. Horn ◽  
Patricia Marin ◽  
Liliana M. Garces ◽  
Karen Miksch ◽  
John T. Yun

Different from more traditional policy-making avenues, the courts provide an antipolitical arena that does not require broad agreement from various constituents for policy enactment. Seeking to guide court decisions on these policy issues, individuals and organizations have filed amicus briefs that increasingly include social science to support their arguments. The Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin Supreme Court case presents an ideal example to study the use of social science evidence in amicus briefs to shape educational policy. Findings from this study identify differences in the use of social science research that suggest many ways in which our current understanding of the efforts of actors to shape educational policy via the highest court in the nation is incomplete. This study also highlights why developing this understanding could be extremely useful to both the creation of educational policy and the use of antipolitical approaches to change such policy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 233-243
Author(s):  
David Schultz

The dispute over the extent of voter fraud and voter identification is certain to affect to the 2012 elections. But this debate is muddled in a methodological and evidentiary mess, conducted with little or no reliable data. This article examines the methodological issues in studying voter fraud. The basic argument is that arguments about fraud are often made without reference to a methodology dictated by good social science research. In effect, assertions of voter fraud often invoke untestable claims. Second, inference that the few reported instances of fraud are proof of more extensive occurrences is baseless to the extent that parallels are drawn to speeding or littering. The latter do not pro- vide an analogy to voter fraud. Thus, assertions about voter fraud have generally failed to provide serious social science evidence or testable propositions to test claims.


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