Point of No Return: Joint Criminal Enterprise in Brđanin

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLIFF FARHANG
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Precise Nature ◽  
Joint Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Point Of No Return ◽  
The Common ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Traditional Doctrine

AbstractIn the Brđanin and Krajišnik judgments, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the accused may incur criminal liability for crimes carried out by low-level non-joint criminal enterprise (JCE) physical perpetrators who are used as tools or are otherwise instrumentalized by JCE members other than the accused to carry out the crimes of the common plan. Similarly, the Appeals Chamber held that the accused may also incur liability for crimes of excess committed by non-JCE perpetrators. However, as for the precise nature of liability in such cases, no clarification was provided. From this ambiguity the author detects an inclination on the part of the Appeals Chamber to construe JCE not only as an expression of commission but also of complicity. The author then identifies and elaborates the theoretical difficulties that this construction would instil in the traditional doctrine of JCE as formulated by the Tadić Appeals Chamber and the international law of individual criminal responsibility. He suggests that awareness of these very problems of theory is the reason behind the conspicuous ambiguity in Brđanin and Krajišnik as to the nature of JCE liability.

Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Execution of a "Joint Criminal Enterprise" in the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Bogdan
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Joint Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

AbstractThis article explores the development of "joint criminal enterprise" form of responsibility in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter "Yugoslav Tribunal"). Although "joint criminal enterprise" does not appear in the Yugoslav Tribunal Statute, this form of responsibility was read into the Statute by the tribunal judges and is repeatedly relied on in finding individuals guilty in cases before the tribunal. In particular, ever since the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic held that "joint criminal enterprise", as a form of accomplice liability, is "firmly established in customary international law", other Trial and Appeals Chamber decisions continue to follow this holding. This article takes a critical look at some of the fundamental issues associated with the development of "joint criminal enterprise" at the Yugoslav Tribunal, in particular the methodology employed by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic. In addition, the article also examines the similarities between "joint criminal enterprise" and U.S. conspiracy law, and whether the use of "joint criminal enterprise" at the Yugoslav Tribunal violates the "principles of legality".

Challenges to Criminalizing State Responsibility for Genocide

Postgenocide ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 33-62
Author(s):  
Kevin Aquilina
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
State Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Courts ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
Corporate Criminal Liability ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

This chapter shows that although often states are parties in a genocide enterprise, the centrality—and responsibility—of states for genocide does not receive attention commensurate with the severity of the problem. Indeed, genocidal states are not held criminally responsibility for genocide. Underscoring difficulties at proving state criminal responsibility for genocide, the analysis compares and contrasts individual criminal responsibility and state criminal responsible for genocide. Whereas in the former case the matter has been dealt with by domestic and international criminal courts and tribunals, in the latter case there is no international judicial authority which can try states for criminal responsibility. However, non-state corporate criminal liability, and evolution of this institute in international law, may provide some transferable lessons for state responsibility for genocide. The chapter highlights the nexus between individual responsibility and state responsibility, and the failures of international genocide law in establishing state responsibility for genocide.

scholarly journals An overview on Individual Criminal Liability for Crime of Aggression

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 433-444
Author(s):  
Asif Khan ◽  
Shaukat Hussain Bhatti ◽  
Abid Shah
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Proper Definition ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

Over the last few years, international criminal law has included an internationally recognized definition of the crime of aggression. One may sight the respective portion from part two (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Laws) Article 8 of the respective document. The purpose of this research represents the historical background of individual criminal responsibility under international law and the concept of individual criminal accountability for the crimes falling under the ambit of international criminal law committed by persons. Whereas the idea of how an individual could be brought to justice, for one of the core crimes of ICC's statutes, i.e., crime of aggression, was recently adopted and envisaged into Rome statutes, after the Kampala conference 2010. The concept of individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression faced many difficulties in at-least adopting its proper definition, which was leftover for future when Rome statue was formulated. To keep pace, this concept needs further evolution. Such an evolution demands such a condition wherein while granting the characteristics of adaptability with the contextual conditions and principles of criminal law. This article explores the anatomy of the crime of aggression and highlights issues that remain to be resolved

scholarly journals EXTRADITION AS A CRIMINAL LAW INSTITUTION: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND APPLICATION

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-164
Author(s):  
Yuliya Khobbi ◽  
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Main Task ◽  
International Agreement ◽  
Common Purpose ◽  
Factual Content ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Legal Condition

The article considers topical issues of definition and implementation of the institution of extradition in the criminal law of Ukraine. There is a view that extradition should be understood only as the institution of extradition of offenders, and the transfer of convicts to serve their sentences is an independent institution of criminal law. In our opinion, this statement cannot be accepted, as it concerns an identical procedure, the systemic material and legal feature of which is its security focus on the realization of individual criminal responsibility, and this view is supported by lexical analysis of terminological concepts "extradition" and «transfer». as identical in factual content. It is noted that the obligatory legal condition for extradition (as well as transfer) is a valid international agreement, the parties to which must be Ukraine and the state requesting the extradition of the person. It is proved that the institution of extradition has a complex interdisciplinary nature, because it arises at the crossroads of constitutional law, criminal law, criminal procedure and international law. It allows to define it as a comprehensive legal procedure for transferring a person to another state to implement the principle of inevitability of criminal liability, regardless of the place of temporary actual stay. It is shown that the main task of the institute of extradition is to ensure the inevitability of bringing a person guilty of a crime to criminal responsibility, which allows to determine the fundamental basis and essence of this institution as a criminal law. It is emphasized that the institution of extradition is complex, combining the extradition of persons suspected of committing a crime and persons convicted of a crime, and both cases of its application have a common purpose – to ensure that the person guilty of the crime is prosecuted.

scholarly journals Joint Criminal Confusion

2009 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens David Ohlin
Keyword(s):  
Rome Statute ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Joint Liability ◽  
Joint Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Holistic Interpretation ◽  
Mental Element ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

Article 25 on individual criminal responsibility has generated more conflicting interpretations than any other provision in the Rome Statute. Part of the problem is that it is impossible to construct a coherent and nonredundant interpretation of Article 25(3)(d) on group complicity. Because of unfortunate drafting, both the required contribution and the required mental element are impossible to discern from the inscrutable language. As a result, it is nearly impossible to devise a holistic interpretation of Article 25(3)(d) that fits together with the rest of Article 25 and Article 30 on mental elements. One possible solution is to repair Article 25 with an amendment that replaces Article 25(3)(d) with a clear provision specifically incorporating some joint liability doctrine, albeit a version that excludes the worst excesses of the doctrine known as joint criminal enterprise.

Joint Criminal Enterprise: Cambodia's Reply to Tadić

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Marsh ◽  
Michael Ramsden
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Trial Chamber ◽  
Appeal Chamber ◽  
Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Joint Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Legal Foundation ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Expanded Form

AbstractThe doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), which imposes individual criminal responsibility on an accused for their participation in a group's common criminal plan, rose to prominence in the ICTY Appeal Chamber decision, Prosecutor v. Tadić. Since Tadić, there has been a general reluctance by international ad hoc tribunals to review the legal foundation of JCE. However, on 20 May 2010, the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) considered the applicability of JCE to the atrocities which occurred in Cambodia during 1975-1979 - the period within the tribunal's temporal jurisdiction. The PTC has, unlike any other ad hoc tribunal to date, subjected the reasoning in Tadić to close scrutiny. This article will analyse the PTC's decision. In squarely contradicting Tadić on the expanded form of JCE, its findings are to be welcomed. The PTC's decision should be upheld on appeal in order to uphold the principle of legality; to safeguard the continued respect, credibility and future legacy of the ECCC trial process.

Individual Criminal Responsibility

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chantal Meloni
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
International Community ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

The recognition of individual criminal responsibility under international law is relatively recent. The commission of mass atrocities during the 20th century prompted the international community to recognize that individuals can be criminally responsible directly under international law and to work for the establishment of an international criminal court having jurisdiction on international crimes committed by individuals. Thus, after World War II, the principle was established that individuals—and not only states—can be the addressee of obligations, commit crimes, and therefore bear criminal responsibility directly under international law. As affirmed by the judges sitting in Nuremberg: “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” As a consequence, it is now undisputed that individuals shall be punished for the commission of crimes under international law (or “international crimes”) that seriously damage the interest of the international community as a whole, so that the goals of prevention and deterrence can be achieved. This principle is now well expressed in the Preamble of the Rome Statute of 1998, where it affirms that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished” and that the International Criminal Court aims “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” The attribution of criminal responsibility to individuals does not exclude that states can be held responsible for the violations of international law that also potentially amount to international crimes; however, individual criminal responsibility under international law possesses the same legal nature as the criminal responsibility under domestic law, whereas the responsibility of states is of an international/civil nature. Given the macro-criminal dimension of the crimes at stake, which normally involve the state apparatus and are committed by an organized group or in a systematic manner, the process of “individualization” of the responsibility encounters more than one challenge. First, the issue of immunities for heads of states and other subjects under international law; second, the regulation of the modes of liability, which need to take into account the collective dimension of commission of international crimes. To overcome some of the difficulties, the rules of attribution of criminal liability to individuals had been partly reinterpreted and new modes of liability developed. Moreover, the principle of personal culpability excludes collective and strict liability. As a consequence, several grounds to exclude criminal responsibility are recognized. Finally, the enforcement of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes is the real challenge in a context of collective commission and macro-dimension of the crimes, where, moreover, the mechanisms of enforcement are not homogeneous.

Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.

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