scholarly journals EXTRADITION AS A CRIMINAL LAW INSTITUTION: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND APPLICATION

Author(s):  
Yuliya Khobbi ◽  

The article considers topical issues of definition and implementation of the institution of extradition in the criminal law of Ukraine. There is a view that extradition should be understood only as the institution of extradition of offenders, and the transfer of convicts to serve their sentences is an independent institution of criminal law. In our opinion, this statement cannot be accepted, as it concerns an identical procedure, the systemic material and legal feature of which is its security focus on the realization of individual criminal responsibility, and this view is supported by lexical analysis of terminological concepts "extradition" and «transfer». as identical in factual content. It is noted that the obligatory legal condition for extradition (as well as transfer) is a valid international agreement, the parties to which must be Ukraine and the state requesting the extradition of the person. It is proved that the institution of extradition has a complex interdisciplinary nature, because it arises at the crossroads of constitutional law, criminal law, criminal procedure and international law. It allows to define it as a comprehensive legal procedure for transferring a person to another state to implement the principle of inevitability of criminal liability, regardless of the place of temporary actual stay. It is shown that the main task of the institute of extradition is to ensure the inevitability of bringing a person guilty of a crime to criminal responsibility, which allows to determine the fundamental basis and essence of this institution as a criminal law. It is emphasized that the institution of extradition is complex, combining the extradition of persons suspected of committing a crime and persons convicted of a crime, and both cases of its application have a common purpose – to ensure that the person guilty of the crime is prosecuted.

Author(s):  
Asif Khan ◽  
Shaukat Hussain Bhatti ◽  
Abid Shah

Over the last few years, international criminal law has included an internationally recognized definition of the crime of aggression. One may sight the respective portion from part two (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Laws) Article 8 of the respective document. The purpose of this research represents the historical background of individual criminal responsibility under international law and the concept of individual criminal accountability for the crimes falling under the ambit of international criminal law committed by persons. Whereas the idea of how an individual could be brought to justice, for one of the core crimes of ICC's statutes, i.e., crime of aggression, was recently adopted and envisaged into Rome statutes, after the Kampala conference 2010. The concept of individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression faced many difficulties in at-least adopting its proper definition, which was leftover for future when Rome statue was formulated. To keep pace, this concept needs further evolution. Such an evolution demands such a condition wherein while granting the characteristics of adaptability with the contextual conditions and principles of criminal law. This article explores the anatomy of the crime of aggression and highlights issues that remain to be resolved


Postgenocide ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 33-62
Author(s):  
Kevin Aquilina

This chapter shows that although often states are parties in a genocide enterprise, the centrality—and responsibility—of states for genocide does not receive attention commensurate with the severity of the problem. Indeed, genocidal states are not held criminally responsibility for genocide. Underscoring difficulties at proving state criminal responsibility for genocide, the analysis compares and contrasts individual criminal responsibility and state criminal responsible for genocide. Whereas in the former case the matter has been dealt with by domestic and international criminal courts and tribunals, in the latter case there is no international judicial authority which can try states for criminal responsibility. However, non-state corporate criminal liability, and evolution of this institute in international law, may provide some transferable lessons for state responsibility for genocide. The chapter highlights the nexus between individual responsibility and state responsibility, and the failures of international genocide law in establishing state responsibility for genocide.


2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Fournet

AbstractDue to the heinous nature of international crimes, admissible defences in the context of international criminal justice understandably constitute an issue surrounded with controversy. Yet, while International Criminal Law precludes the use of a series of defences, it also admits that certain grounds may exclude individual criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment even in the case of the most serious international crimes. The present study thus proposes to analyse the permissibility of these defences and the availability of such grounds for excluding responsibility by drawing a comparison between Public International Law and International Criminal Law and by highlighting the differences and discrepancies between the two systems. Ultimately, this analysis aims at demonstrating that International Criminal Law, one of Public International Law's children, has now surpassed its parent to become a more sophisticated and a fairer legal and judicial system, for both the defendants and the victims.


Author(s):  
van Sliedregt Elies

National criminal law has been an important source for drafting provisions of individual criminal responsibility in international law. Notions that we know from national criminal law, such as aiding/abetting, conspiracy and instigation, are used to refer to modalities of criminal responsibility. To gain a better insight into the modalities of participating in international crime as codified in international statutes, they need to be analyzed in light of national criminal law. This chapter discusses five models of participation in crime and international models of participation.


Author(s):  
Laura Ausserladscheider Jonas ◽  
Dire Tladi

War crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression could not be perpetrated without those who finance them. This article examines the basis for criminal liability in international criminal law (ICL) for persons who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes. Despite the need for clear rules, neither international courts nor scholars agree upon (i) whether liability exists for individuals who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes; and (ii) if so, the circumstances under which such liability exists. This article argues that an individual who finances an entity that perpetrates a core crime should be held criminally liable under customary international criminal law as an aider and abettor. The objective of this article is to clarify the rules that would enable international courts and tribunals to identify the extent to which individual criminal liability attaches to the financing of core crimes, as well as the legal basis for such liability. By clarifying the criminal accountability of individuals who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes, this article also seeks to clarify the mental elements of the mode of liability of aiding and abetting.


Author(s):  
Werle Gerhard ◽  
Jeßberger Florian

This chapter focuses on the general principles of international criminal law. It first develops a general theory of crimes under international law by considering the concept of crimes under international law as well as the context of organised violence. The structure of crimes under international law is also explored. Next, the chapter studies the material and mental elements of crimes under international law. Individual criminal responsibility and superior responsibility are also discussed, as are the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility. Next, the chapter covers inchoate crimes, omissions within the context of the ICC Statute, immunity, the multiplicity of offences, and finally, the requirements for prosecution.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLIFF FARHANG

AbstractIn the Brđanin and Krajišnik judgments, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the accused may incur criminal liability for crimes carried out by low-level non-joint criminal enterprise (JCE) physical perpetrators who are used as tools or are otherwise instrumentalized by JCE members other than the accused to carry out the crimes of the common plan. Similarly, the Appeals Chamber held that the accused may also incur liability for crimes of excess committed by non-JCE perpetrators. However, as for the precise nature of liability in such cases, no clarification was provided. From this ambiguity the author detects an inclination on the part of the Appeals Chamber to construe JCE not only as an expression of commission but also of complicity. The author then identifies and elaborates the theoretical difficulties that this construction would instil in the traditional doctrine of JCE as formulated by the Tadić Appeals Chamber and the international law of individual criminal responsibility. He suggests that awareness of these very problems of theory is the reason behind the conspicuous ambiguity in Brđanin and Krajišnik as to the nature of JCE liability.


Author(s):  
van Sliedregt Elies

This chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of individual criminal responsibility covering developments in municipal criminal law and international criminal responsibility. It then discusses system criminality, Colonel Murray C. Bernays' collective criminality theory, and subsequent proceedings. The concept of individual criminal responsibility in international law is modelled on criminal responsibility in national law. While it is premised on the principle of individual fault it has gained collective traits enabling liability for the acts and omissions of others. In that, it follows trends and developments in national criminal law. Liability for international crimes does, however, have specific features.


Author(s):  
Kai Ambos ◽  
Alexander Heinze

International Criminal Justice is a controversial concept, and there is a burgeoning body of literature on its exact contours. Understood broadly, the term “international criminal justice” covers a broad category, integrating international criminal law (ICL) within an overarching interdisciplinary enterprise also “incorporating philosophical, historical, political and international relations, sociological, anthropological and criminological perspectives” (Roberts, 2007). International criminal law consists, at its core, of a combination of criminal law and public international law principles. The idea of individual criminal responsibility and the concept of prosecuting an individual for a specific (macrocriminal) act are derived from criminal law, while the classical (Nuremberg) offenses form part of (public) international law and thus the respective conduct is directly punishable under ICL (principle of direct individual criminal responsibility in public international law). The dualistic base of international criminal law is also reflected in the reading of the mandates of the international criminal tribunals; one can either take a “security, peace, and human rights”–oriented approach or a “criminal justice”–oriented approach, either of which may entail a paradoxical goal or purpose ambiguity of international criminal law. In any case, the strong grounding in criminal law, together with the actual enforcement of international criminal law by way of international criminal proceedings and trials, converts international criminal law into criminal law on a supranational level and thus entails the full application of the well-known principles of liberal, post-enlightenment criminal law, in particular the principles of legality, culpability, and fairness. These principles constitute the minimum standard of any criminal justice system based on the rule of law and thus must also apply in an international criminal justice system. The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 and the effective establishment of the Court in 2002 have led to an institutionalization of international criminal law, turning the page on ad hoc imposition in favor of a treaty-based universal system. In addition, the Rome Statute provides for the first codification of international criminal law, with a potentially universal reach. Therewith, international criminal law was not only united into a single penal system of the international community, but it was also extended beyond its fundamental core areas of substantive and procedural law into other branches of criminal law (law of sanctions, enforcement of sentences, and judicial assistance).


Author(s):  
Chantal Meloni

The recognition of individual criminal responsibility under international law is relatively recent. The commission of mass atrocities during the 20th century prompted the international community to recognize that individuals can be criminally responsible directly under international law and to work for the establishment of an international criminal court having jurisdiction on international crimes committed by individuals. Thus, after World War II, the principle was established that individuals—and not only states—can be the addressee of obligations, commit crimes, and therefore bear criminal responsibility directly under international law. As affirmed by the judges sitting in Nuremberg: “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” As a consequence, it is now undisputed that individuals shall be punished for the commission of crimes under international law (or “international crimes”) that seriously damage the interest of the international community as a whole, so that the goals of prevention and deterrence can be achieved. This principle is now well expressed in the Preamble of the Rome Statute of 1998, where it affirms that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished” and that the International Criminal Court aims “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” The attribution of criminal responsibility to individuals does not exclude that states can be held responsible for the violations of international law that also potentially amount to international crimes; however, individual criminal responsibility under international law possesses the same legal nature as the criminal responsibility under domestic law, whereas the responsibility of states is of an international/civil nature. Given the macro-criminal dimension of the crimes at stake, which normally involve the state apparatus and are committed by an organized group or in a systematic manner, the process of “individualization” of the responsibility encounters more than one challenge. First, the issue of immunities for heads of states and other subjects under international law; second, the regulation of the modes of liability, which need to take into account the collective dimension of commission of international crimes. To overcome some of the difficulties, the rules of attribution of criminal liability to individuals had been partly reinterpreted and new modes of liability developed. Moreover, the principle of personal culpability excludes collective and strict liability. As a consequence, several grounds to exclude criminal responsibility are recognized. Finally, the enforcement of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes is the real challenge in a context of collective commission and macro-dimension of the crimes, where, moreover, the mechanisms of enforcement are not homogeneous.


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